Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Illinois law provides that workers at public works projects must be paid not less than general prevailing rate of hourly wages for work of a similar character on non-federal public works in the locality, 820 ILCS 130/3. The public body awarding the contract is required to determine prevailing wage, but the Department of Labor conducts annual investigations of prevailing wage for each type of construction and demolition work in each locality and, in practice, public bodies simply adopt that determination. Landscape contractors who do non-federal public works projects sued the Department, arguing that it violated the due process clause by delegating ascertainment of prevailing wage to private entities, namely a labor union and contractors with which it has a collective bargaining agreement. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the contractors did not object to the prevailing wage determination.

Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1, based on denial of overtime pay. For the IMWL claim, the district court certified two classes: "hourly" and "assistant branch manager." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the certification order did not comply with the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(c)(1)(B). The court referred to the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and concluded that the defendant's unofficial policy concerning overtime provided the "common answer" that will potentially resolve the case.

The County Sheriff terminated plaintiff's probationary employment as a deputy based on violations of standard operating procedures, failure to follow orders, and insufficient commitment to the job. He sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981, claiming he was fired because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of discrimination fell short of supporting an inference that he was terminated because of his race. No evidence suggests that the sheriff or other decision-makers participated in any of the alleged racially charged behavior: watching Blazing Saddles in the workplace and giving plaintiff racially tinged nicknames. Although plaintiff identified several white deputies who were retained despite performance problems during their probationary employment, their misconduct was not comparable to his, so they cannot be considered similarly situated.

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue.

The EEOC filed suit on behalf of two servers, alleging that the servers were sexually harassed (Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) while employed at the franchise restaurant. A jury found hostile work environment and awarded compensatory damages to both and punitive damages to one plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. A rational jury could have found: that plaintiff was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment; that defendants did not exercise reasonable care in instituting an effective sexual harassment policy with a reasonable complaint mechanism and in taking corrective action; that the policy was ineffective in advancing education and protection of employees rights; and that certain policy language was inserted to discourage complaints. Because the district court injected a new theory of the case after the time that defendants could present rebuttal evidence, and because the district court reserved ruling on an issue ultimately found to be a question for the jury, the district court’s ruling with respect to corporate liability was reversed and remanded.

The Postal Service terminated plaintiff's 32 years of employment as a clerk, claiming that it fired her because she told her psychiatrist she was having thoughts of killing her supervisor, and it believed she posed a danger to fellow employees. Plaintiff is an African-American woman and claimed discrimination and retaliatory discharge. In support of her disparate treatment claims she presented evidence that two white male employees at the same facility had recently threatened another employee at knife-point, yet received only one-week suspensions from the same manager who fired her. The district court granted the Postal Service summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the similarly-situated inquiry is flexible, common-sense, and factual. A reasonable jury could infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the firing. Plaintiff's evidence could also demonstrate pretext.

Former Illinois Department of Transportation employees alleged they were wrongfully terminated because of their political beliefs and party affiliation. They were among about 190 employees laid off in 2004 as part of budget cuts. They filed their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims exactly two years after the effective date of the terminations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period began to run when plaintiffs received unequivocal notices of termination.

A tax employee of defendant, terminated after reporting an alleged tax fraud scheme to the company and federal enforcement agencies, filed suit asserting claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and 1962(d). The district court dismissed, finding that the predicate acts alleged were either unrelated or did not proximately cause plaintiff's injuries. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The retaliatory actions were related to the alleged tax fraud scheme, under the Supreme Court's "continuity plus relationship" test. Since enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) retaliation against an employee constitutes racketeering. Retaliatory acts are inherently connected to the underlying wrongdoing exposed by the whistleblower, even though they occur after the coverup is exposed. In this case, the retaliatory acts were not isolated events, separate from the tax fraud. Plaintiff properly alleged that his termination was proximately caused by a RICO predicate act of retaliation.

Plaintiff injured his back while working for defendant. Following worker's compensation leave, he returned to work as a long-haul driver and worked without incident for two years. With the birth of his child, he asked to switch to a city route. After the switch, plaintiff began having problems with his back and asked to switch back, but the collective bargaining agreement did not allow another change within a year, so the request was denied. He took medical leave, but sought to return to work as a long-haul driver, presenting a medical release which limited him to "road driver work" and "limited dock work." Defendant would not allow plaintiff to return, saying that it needed clarification on medical restrictions and that he could not return to work as a driver unless he received a medical release without restrictions. The district court granted employer summary judgment in a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because he is capable of long-haul driving; at most, he is unable to work as a city driver because it involves short hauls and dock work that requires him to frequently load and unload cargo.

The law firm successfully represented plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation suit against her employer. The jury awarded $65,000 in damage. The attorneys then sought attorneys' fees of 131,665.88. The district court awarded $70,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated, acknowledging concerns about excessive fees. The district court looked to impermissible considerations in calculating the award; most significantly, it reduced the statutory award based on the existence of an agreement, which specifies that the agreed contingent fee will not apply to the statutory award of fees(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)). The court should have provided plaintiff with an opportunity to respond before applying the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (a chart of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area, prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be used in fee-shifting cases), and should have provided a clear explanation as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $400. The district court also erred in reversing its award of fees to outside counsel.