Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The employer operates a municipal landfill and had five permanent employees, including Jarvis, the "Landfill Supervisor." Jarvis and others discussed unionizing, but the company asserted that Jarvis was ineligible for inclusion. The Regional Director of the NLRB found that Jarvis was not a supervisor. Eight days before the election, Jarvis was terminated for what was later called "an egregious violation" in failing to cover the garbage. At the time, Jarvis was told that there was a reduction in force. Regardless, Jarvis cast a vote, and the result was 3-2 in favor of unionizing. The company refused to bargain; an ALJ found that Jarvis was improperly discharged. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied the company's appeal and granted enforcement of the NLRB orders. Jarvis lacked authority "responsibly to direct" other employees (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 152(11)) and was discharged based on protected union activity.

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, invalidated a prior holding that the ADA does not mandate reassignment.

Plaintiff began work as a police officer in 1976. In 1992 he was charged with misconduct related to an improper arrest and, following a hearing, was fired. The state trial and appellate courts affirmed the Police Board; the highest court rejected an appeal. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with Illinois Human Rights Commission, for the first time alleging racial and age discrimination and retaliation. While the matter was pending, he filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 and state laws. The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The IHRC awarded $274,283.05 for lost wages, holiday and overtime pay, lost pension annuity interest, and other prejudgment interest, plus attorney's fees of $400,555.50. Neither party appealed the IHRC’s final determination. Plaintiff filed a federal suit, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The district court rejected the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the suit barred by claim preclusion.

The employer sought an early withdrawal from its obligation to make pension contributions to a multiemployer pension fund; it entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, six weeks before expiration of the existing agreement, that abrogated its obligation to make payments to the fund. The fund sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1145. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the agreement was ambiguous in providing that the employer could not “prospectively” change its obligation.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit, charging racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought class certification (FRCP 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4)) for deciding whether defendant engaged in practices that have a disparate impact on members of the class. The district court denied certification. After determining that appeal was timely, based on a renewed motion for certification made in reliance on the Supreme Court's 2011 decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Whether defendant's company-wide policies put blacks at a disadvantage is a question common to the class. While individual suits may be necessary to determine damages, that question could be resolved in a single proceeding, making limited class action treatment appropriate.

Plaintiff filed a class-action in state court seeking overtime wages under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/4a, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). After the state court denied class certification, plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for his overtime claim in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). After the state suit was resolved for less than $5,000 and the federal case resulted in an award of about $11,000, plaintiff's attorney moved for attorneys' fees of $112,566. The district court awarded $1,864, reasoning that if the attorney had not misrepresented damages until the start of trial, the case would have settled quickly. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Although a district court has discretion in determining the lodestar, it cannot base its decision on an irrelevant consideration or reach an unreasonable conclusion. It was unreasonable for the court to cut almost all of the attorney's hours based on its conclusion that the case should not have gone to trial.

In 2006, plaintiff was a citizen of California and agreed to relocate to Illinois to work for defendant. When he quit about five months after moving, his family was still in California. He filed suit in state court, seeking relocation benefits the company allegedly promised. The company, which has its principal place of business in California removed to federal court, asserting that plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts. Plaintiff had a home in Massachusetts when the case was removed, was registered to vote there, and had a Massachusetts driver's license. The district court ordered arbitration under one of the contracts between the parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal and denied sanctions. Relocation benefits are "employment related" and subject to arbitration under the agreement. The court noted that the company also failed to follow the rules. The company "should be able to tell the difference between residence and domicile, and should not have any difficulty complying with Rule 38."

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as Senior Humane Officer for the city after refusing to support defendant's successful mayoral campaign and brought suit, claiming that the position of SHO was not subject to political termination and that his dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court, relying on an official job description, found that the SHO was a policy-making position, and that plaintiff could be dismissed for political reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that city ordinances authorized the SHO to exercise policy-making discretion.

Abbott created Hospira for its Hospital Products Division. Before the spin-off, HPD employees had access to Abbott's pension plan. Hospira did not offer a pension plan. The spin-off included reciprocal two-year no-hire policies. When HPD employees became Hospira employees, non-vested pension rights in the Abbott plan were eliminated. Retirement-eligible HPD employees were effectively prevented from retiring from Abbott then joining Hospira. A certified class of Hospira employees alleged that violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1140, by using the spin and no-hire policy to get rid of pension liability and deter HPD employees from exercising pension benefits before the spin. They alleged that Abbott breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose that Hospira would not offer pension benefits. The district court entered judgment for Abbott and Hospira on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. ERISA claims failed because Abbott and Hospira did not act with the requisite intent to interfere with plaintiffs' pension benefits. The breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim failed because Abbott had nothing to do with the Hospira benefits plan and because Abbott reported truthfully to HPD employees that benefits might change after the spin.

An associate, dismissed from the law firm after five years, sought bonuses and fees with respect to cases on which he worked that settled after his departure. He filed attorney's liens in Illinois state courts. When that strategy failed, he filed in federal court. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to contract claims and claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2), but otherwise affirmed. No court has ever decided whether plaintiff's employment agreement entitled him to compensation for work he did on the cases at issue and he made a plausible case that the agreement entitles him to some portion of the revenues. His contract required the firm to give him 30 days' notice before terminating his employment, but it failed to do so.