Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a part-time mail handler for the USPS since 1987, injured his back on the job in 1998. He returned to "light-duty" work until 2003, when he reinjured himself at work. Except for one week, he did not return to work nor did he provide documentation concerning his injury. In 2005, a supervisor notified him that he would be terminated. Plaintiff's union filed a grievance and the settlement required plaintiff to see a doctor and either return to "full duty" or apply for disability retirement by a certain date. Physicians cleared him to work with several permanent restrictions. A USPS physician determined that plaintiff was unfit for "full duty." He was terminated for violation of the agreement. The EEOC found no discrimination. He filed a claim that, although he was not legally disabled, he was "regarded as" disabled. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After determining that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), prior to 2009 amendments, applied, the court found that plaintiff did not establish that USPS regarded him as disabled. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the "100% healed" requirement of the settlement agreement under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff, hired by IDOT in 1989, was suspended in 2003, pursuant to a "last chance" agreement, for fighting in the workplace. There had been prior disciplinary measures. In 2005, plaintiff was involved in a worksite altercation with a co-worker and a supervisor. IDOT initiated discharge proceedings. Plaintiff disputed that he had physical contract with his supervisor, but did not alleged that the attempt to discharge him was retaliation for his filing a race discrimination charge in 2001. An ALJ conducted a hearing at which plaintiff was represented by counsel and concluded that plaintiff had engaged in an altercation but that discharge was not warranted. A state trial court overturned the decision and sustained the discharge. Three years later, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the retaliation claim does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the claim made in the state court. The claim could have been raised in that forum.

Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle."

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.

Following a vote by employees of the truck transportation company, the NLRB certified a local union as representative for the employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board's decision that a ballot with irregular markings should be counted as indicating the clear intent of the voter. The ballot, which had an apparent erasure of a vote for a competing union, was the deciding vote.

Plaintiff was hired as a teller in 1980 and promoted to branch manager in 1995. She received an overall rating of "improvement needed" on 2004 and 2005 performance evaluations, based on complaints from customers and employees about negative attitude and unprofessional behavior. Complaints continued until she was terminated in 2006 at age 44. The district court entered summary judgment for the bank on her retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not show retaliation for her objection to age discrimination. Complaints about pension plan contributions and about staff cutbacks did not qualify. She filed a claim with the EEOC after she was fired.

Plaintiff worked as a manager for defendant, a food broker, from 2001 until she quit in 2007. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), claiming that the company maintained a hostile work environment, in which conditions for women were inferior to those for men, and paid women less than men for the same work. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit remanded with respect to claims about salary, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination rather than random assignment of salaries. The court affirmed with respect to hostile environment, noting that the offender responsible for most of the obnoxious conduct had been disciplined and had quit two years before plaintiff left.

Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a lead technologist in a medical radiology department. She admits that there were issues with her job performance, but claimed discrimination on account of her race (white) because the employer terminated her employment rather than demoting her as it had some employees of other races. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer in her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff did not provide direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory reason for the decision to terminate her position.

The company operates stores. The union was concerned about use of nonunion contractors who did not pay prevailing wages for construction and remodeling of stores. Unsatisfied with the company's response, the union urged a consumer boycott. Union representatives distributed handbills that were "extremely unflattering" outside the stores. Some pictured a rat to represent the company. The company ejected the representatives from the property. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), for discriminatory practice in prohibiting the union from handbilling while permitting nonunion solicitations and distributions. An ALJ found that as a nonexclusive easement holder at 23 of the stores, the company did not have a state property right to exclude handbillers, and had violated the Act. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the Board's petition for enforcement.

Defendant employed plaintiff as a security supervisor. After she complained that her supervisor, Spann, made sexually offensive remarks and favored males, Spann gave her negative evaluations and accused her of misconduct, including theft. Defendant transferred her to a non-supervisory position at a distant location. Spann told her to turn in keys and empty her locker. Believing that she had been fired, she did not return. In her 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) suit, the judge instructed the jury that to find for plaintiff it had to find that a decision-maker fired plaintiff because she was female or because she complained about sexually harassing comments. In response to a request for clarification, the judge indicated that the decision-maker reference meant that "he was the sole decision-maker." The jury responded "no" to the question corresponding to the decision-maker instruction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, calling the "cat's paw" theory of liability "a dreadful muddle" and "judicial attractive nuisance," referring to an employee being subjected to adverse employment action by a supervisor who has no discriminatory motive, but who has been manipulated by a subordinate with such motive. Injecting “sole decision-maker” into deliberations created confusion, Spann was not a cat’s paw; "he was the monkey."