Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Three named plaintiffs in a class action suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and parallel state laws appealed the district court’s decertification of the classes. Proceeding as individual lawsuits by the three plaintiffs, the case settled, reserving plaintiffs’ right to appeal the decertification. The Seventh Circuit denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If appeals such as this were held to be precluded on standing grounds, there would be no judicial economies, since if the named plaintiffs settle after denial of class certification and then exit the scene another member of the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place. View "Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Scruggs worked for Carrier since 1986. In 2004, Scruggs’s mother was moved to a nursing home. He sought intermittent leave to assist in her care and submitted Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, certification paperwork five times. Four certifications permitted leave for nursing home visits and transportation to doctor’s appointments. The fifth certification, in effect at his termination, permitted Scruggs to take his mother to doctor’s appointments once every six months and did not mention nursing home visits. In 2006, Carrier implemented a new plan to combat suspected FMLA abuse. Carrier hired McGough to watch about 35 employees who were suspected of misusing leave or had unexcused absences. McGough followed Scruggs, but found no evidence of misusing FMLA leave on the first two occasions. After Scruggs reported that he was taking FMLA leave for an entire day, an investigator recorded that Scruggs did not leave home. Following his suspension, Scruggs provided documentation from his mother’s doctor and the nursing home that he was assisting his mother on the date at issue. After further investigation, Carrier concluded that Scruggs had misused FMLA leave and terminated his employment. The district court rejected his FMLA suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Carrier had an “honest suspicion.” View "Scruggs v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004 Caterpillar hired Hanson as a supplemental assembler. Under the plant’s collective bargaining agreement, supplemental employees work 40 hours per week on a temporary but indefinite basis. They are not entitled to seniority rights and benefits in the same way as full-time employees. Two weeks into her stint as an assembler, Hanson injured her neck while installing a hydraulic hose. Hanson did not seek medical attention nor did she report her injury to plant management until five weeks later. Hanson claims that a union representative cautioned her against doing so. She was temporarily placed on light-duty work, filing papers. Her temporary position ended, but a doctor Hanson’s progress had plateaued and that her medical restrictions would continue indefinitely. Although another doctor indicated that she was fit to return to work, Hanson’s employment was terminated. In her suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the district court granted summary judgment for Caterpillar, reasoning that Hanson was not a “qualified individual with a disability.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Caterpillar placed her in three different positions, all within her medical restrictions and did not regard Hanson as impaired as to a broad range of jobs. View "Hanson v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

The Union established two funds for its members—a Pension Fund and a Health & Welfare Fund. DLF entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Union, under which DLF agreed to be bound to all Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Union and various employer associations in the geographical jurisdiction of the Union. Under the CBA, DLF is required to make fringe benefit contributions to the Funds on behalf of members of the Union. An audit of DLF’s payroll records showed that DLF had failed to make contributions on behalf of Mata, a cement mason who also performed other work (such as painting), for 1,119.5 hours in 2007 and for 234.5 hours in 2008, a total $11,955.05 in fringe benefit contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting DLF’s argument that, under the MOA, it is not contractually bound to make contributions for non-bargaining unit work. The MOA binds DLF to the CBAs and establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA. It was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions.

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself.

Plaintiff, hired in 2003 by Northwestern University, was denied tenure in 2007 and fired in 2008. The district court dismissed her sex discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding that only the denial of tenure occurred within the 300-day window for filing a charge of discrimination, and finding that no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff was denied tenure because she is a woman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff’s history with respect to publication and obtaining grants.

Plaintiffs are current and former drivers for FedEx delivery service who allege that they were employees rather than independent contractors under the laws of the states in which they worked and under federal law. The district court used the Craig. case, which was based on ERISA and Kansas law, as its “lead” case; certified a nationwide class seeking relief under ERISA and certified statewide classes under FRCP 23(b)(3). The Kansas class has 479 members. They allege that they were improperly classified as independent contractors rather than employees under the Kansas Wage Payment Act, Kan. Stat. 44-313, and that as employees, they are entitled to repayment of costs and expenses they paid during their time as FedEx employees. They also seek payment of overtime wages. The district court granted FedEx summary judgment in Craig and other cases; 21 cases are on appeal. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings and certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court: Given the undisputed facts, are the plaintiff drivers employees of FedEx as a matter of law under the KWPA? Drivers can acquire more than one service area from FedEx. Is the answer different for plaintiff drivers who have more than one service area?

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation.

In 2000, C&D hired Jones, who had periodic leg and back pain and bouts of anxiety, requiring him to see a physician once every two or three months and to undergo tests two or three times per year. He took prescription medication. In 2003, C&D implemented an attendance policy that assesses points for policy violations. Points are not assessed for preapproved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 260. By October 1, 2009, Jones had accrued two and one-half points; three points results in termination. In September 2009, Jones spoke with C&D’s FMLA Coordinator, about his medical condition. His treating physician, Lubak, faxed FMLA certifications indicating that Jones required periodic treatment. Jones missed his entire scheduled shift on October 1. He claims to have left a voicemail for his supervisor prior to his absence, but the company disputes this. On October 1, he visited the doctor’s office to check on paperwork and obtain a prescription refill, but was never examined or evaluated by Dr. Lubak. C&D terminated Jones’s employment. The district court granted C&D summary judgment, reasoning that Jones was not entitled to leave on October 1 because he did not receive medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Ekstrand taught kindergarten from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, she was reassigned to teach a first-grade class at her own request. She was relocated to a classroom with no exterior windows in a busy, loud area of the school. Ekstrand repeatedly requested a change of classroom. The principal worked to make the classroom more hospitable, but denied requests to switch rooms. After the school year began, Ekstrand experienced symptoms of seasonal affective disorder, a form of depression. Both her psychologist and her primary care physician recommended a leave of absence. Her initial leave was only three months, but the following winter, her doctor advised that Ekstrand would be unable to return to teach for the remainder of the 2005-06 term. The leave of absence was later extended to include the 2006-07 term. The district court granted the district summary judgment, but on remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ekstrand under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that Ekstrand was a qualified individual with a disability and that the school district knew of that disability, but failed to accommodate her with a new classroom.