Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Omni, a technology consulting agency, hired Messier to work as a temporary programmer for Thrivent pursuant to an agreement between Omni and Thrivent. After leaving Omni and Thrivent, Messier had a difficult time finding a new job and began to suspect that Thrivent was saying negative things about him to prospective employers who called for reference checks. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that during these reference checks, Thrivent was revealing information about Messier’s migraine condition to prospective employers in violation of the medical record confidentiality requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111. The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry, so that the confidentiality provisions did not apply, and granted summary judgment to Thrivent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Thrivent had no duty to treat its knowledge of Messier’s migraine condition as a confidential medical record because Messier had volunteered the information in responding to an inquiry about his absence from work. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, age 67, worked for 16 years as a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney’s Office until her voluntary retirement in 2007.Weeks before her retirement, Johnson had a verbal altercation with another legal assistant, Mosley. Management eventually decided that the office would best be served by Johnson’s reassignment to another floor, rather than by a formal reprimand. Johnson’s salary and benefits did not change. Her duties and some working conditions were altered. She sued the Department of Justice for discrimination based on her age, sex and race. She asserted that the trier of fact could infer discriminatory intent from a “mosaic of evidence” comprised of the DOJ’s arguably contradictory witness statements and from her assertions that similarly situated employees had received preferential treatment. She also contended that she could make out a prima facie case of discrimination because she belonged to a protected class, had met her employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment action when reassigned to the file room and was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOJ. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Johnson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

Anderson, a U.S. Postal Service worker, suffers from asthma. While he is virtually symptom-free outside of the workplace, his asthma regularly flared up at his job as a part-time mail processor. Between 2002 and 2009, Anderson filed numerous Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, an Occupational Health and Safety Administration complaint, and union grievances relating to his condition, requesting reasonable accommodations. He was absent from work for extended periods of time throughout the 2002-2009 period. Anderson sued USPS, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and the Americans with Disability Act, for retaliation, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Anderson cannot point to temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action on the part of USPS. Nor did he present evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that USPS acted pretextually. View "Anderson v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

In 2010, Dunne filed a discrimination complaint under 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), with the Mine Safety and Health Administration, a division of the Department of Labor, claiming that had terminated his employment for engaging in protected safety-related. The Secretary of Labor determined that the complaint was not frivolously brought, and Vulcan agreed to a temporary (economic) reinstatement pending a determination on the merits. The Secretary later determined not to prosecute Dunne’s complaint before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Vulcan moved to dissolve the reinstatement order. The Commission denied Vulcan’s motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Vulcan, which argued that the term “complaint” in the statutory phrase “final order on the complaint,” refers only to the complaint brought by the Secretary after she determines that section 815(c) has been violated. Placement of the temporary reinstatement provision in the same subsection that describes the Secretary’s investigation, merits determination, and complaint, suggests that Congress meant for temporary reinstatement to continue only during the Secretary’s involvement. View "Vulcan Constr. Materials, L.P. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

USA Cleaning is a proprietorship with fewer than 10 employees that provides janitorial services to a cement plant owned by Essroc. After an inspection of the plant the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered three janitors to undergo 24 hours of safety training. The Administration issued a “withdrawal order,” forbidding the janitors from reenterng the plant until they completed training, 30 U.S.C. 814(g)(1). Essroc provided legal assistance to challenge the order; within a week the lawyers billed $22,000. A week after issuing the order, the Administration vacated it, without acknowledging error. The review commission dismissed USA Cleaning’s contest proceeding. USA Cleaning requested $22,000 in legal fees that Essroc had paid (Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504). The Administration refused; the review commission upheld the refusal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that not the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, but a separate body, the Federal MineSafety and Health Review Commission, was named as respondent along with the Secretary of Labor. The review commission is the equivalent of a court. It did not issue the order challenged by the petitioner, but merely upheld the refusal of the mine-safety administration to award attorneys’ fees. View "USA Cleaning Serv. & Bldg. Maint. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Comm'n" on Justia Law

While working at an animal shelter, Povey injured her wrist moving a dog. She had surgery and underwent physical therapy. Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained that the shelter did not have light duty positions. Povey’s supervisor nonetheless limited her duties and exempted Povey from working weekends because it would entail heavy lifting. Co-workers complained. Although an investigation concluded that there was no illegal harassment, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint. Jeffersonville then received medical notice of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement or lifting, pushing or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm. Povey’s employment was terminated. Povey sued under 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Jeffersonville summary judgment, finding that Povey did not demonstrate that her wrist injury impaired her from completing daily tasks; her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting a broad range or class of jobs; she was perceived unable to perform manual tasks; she was a qualified individual as defined under the ADA; or that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Povey v. City of Jeffersonville" on Justia Law