Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 10, a budget repair bill proposed by recently-elected Governor Walker. Act 10 significantly altered state public employee labor laws, creating two classes of public employees: “public safety employees” and all others, “general employees.” The Act prohibited general employees from collectively bargaining on issues other than “base wages,” imposed rigorous recertification requirements on them, and prohibited their employers from deducting union dues from paychecks. The Act did not subject public safety employees or their unions to the same requirements. The enactment was controversial and received nationwide publicity. Unions filed suit, challenging the limitations on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a prohibition on payroll deduction of dues, under the Equal Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction provision under the First Amendment. The district court invalidated Act 10’s recertification and payroll deduction provisions, but upheld the limitation on collective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act is valid in its entirety. Act 10 is viewpoint-neutral and, while “publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ exercise of First Amendment rights, [states are] under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities.” The classifications and recertification requirement survive rational basis review. View "WI Educ. Ass'n v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law

Labor unions allowed non-union members, part of their bargaining units, to opt out of paying dues used to support political and other activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment, pursuant to CWA v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). The unions required that objections be renewed annually basis to remain opted-out. Nonmember employees filed unfair labor practice charges, arguing that the annual renewal policies violated the unions’ duty of fair representation by placing an undue burden on objectors. Although they did not seek refunds for themselves because they were always opted-out, they sought refunds for others who filed objections at one time, but failed to renew. The NLRB struck down the annual renewal policies, but did not grant refunds. The Seventh Circuit declined to address an appeal and an argument that the April 2012 final NLRB orders were not legitimate because the President’s January 4, 2012 recess appointments of three of the five NLRB members were invalid. Plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal since the NLRB struck down the annual renewal policies, which were the only source of injury each suffered. They no longer suffer an injury-in-fact and do not satisfy the statutory “aggrieved” requirement, 29 U.S.C. 160(f). View "Richards v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 1995 Chicago administered a civil-service examination for the fire department and initially hired those with scores of 89 to 100. From 2002-2006 it hired from the group who had scored 65 to 88. Plaintiffs contend that drawing a line at 89 had an unjustified disparate effect on black applicants, violating Title VII. Following a 2000 remand, in 2006 the district court held that the city had not proved justification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the charge had been filed after the limitations period expired. In 2010, the Supreme Court, reversed, holding that a new claim accrued with each use of the list to hire. The district court held that 111 class members must be hired; others receive damages. Prospective intervenors have worked as firefighters since 2005. Each contends that he thought that he would receive extra seniority, pension credits, or back pay in this litigation and that he is entitled to intervene, after judgment, because he did not know that class counsel had decided not to seek relief for persons hired from the 65-88 pool. The district judge found their motion untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Lewis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

While installing a natural-gas pipeline in Madison, Wisconsin, KS Energy was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for violating trench safety regulations that require companies to protect workers from dangerous cave-ins. After inspecting KS Energy’s trench, OSHA issued a citation alleging a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. 1926.652(a)(1) for failing to provide an adequate protective system. An ALJ upheld the citations, finding that the soil in the trench was “Type B,” so the slope was too steep based on and KS improperly used the technique of “benching” to configure its trench. The OSHA Review Commission made the determination final. The Seventh Circuit denied review. The parties agree that if the soil in the excavation was properly classified as Type B, the trench was impermissibly steep. Substantial evidence supports the determination that the soil was classified as Type B. View "KS Energy Serv., LLC v. Solis" on Justia Law

Kasten sued his employer, alleging unlawful retaliation for lodging oral complaints regarding the location of time clocks under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Kasten complained that the time clocks were placed in locations which caused him to frequently forget to punch in, notifying his supervisors on at least five occasions that the location away from the donning and doffing area was “illegal.” Kasten failed to punch in on several occasions, violating company policy. He was suspended and ultimately terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that oral complaints do not constitute protected activity under the FLSA; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated, holding that oral complaints may qualify as protected activity where they provide “fair notice” that an employee is asserting rights under the FLSA. On remand, the district court concluded that Kasten’s oral complaints did in fact provide “fair notice,” but concluded that Kasten had failed to create a dispute of material fact regarding causation and granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Kasten has provided evidence which would support a jury inference of retaliation. View "Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Home Depot and a personnel manager, claiming that the company had refused to hire him because of his national origin, Albanian, in violation of Title VII. Defendants claim that a manager called plaintiff on August 27, 2007, and told him he wouldn’t be hired. The plaintiff filed discrimination complaints with the EEOC and its Wisconsin counterpart on June 26, 2008, 304 days later. Title VII provides that the 300-day period to file an administrative complaint begins to run when the complainant is informed of the allegedly unlawful employment practice, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). Plaintiff denied that he had received such a call that day. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, distinguishing between the limitations period and the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Title VII does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. It states that “a charge . . . shall be filed . . . within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), but not that an administrative proceeding shall have been conducted before the employee can file suit. View "Begolli v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Raybourne was a quality engineer for 23 years. The employer provided a long-term disability plan that paid benefits for up to 24 months if disability prevented him from performing the duties of his regular job. After 24 months, the plan paid benefits only if he was unable to perform all material duties of any occupation for which he was reasonably qualified. Raybourne suffered degenerative joint disease in his foot, with severe pain. In 2003, he stopped working and underwent the first of the four surgeries. From December 2003 through February 2006, Cigna paid benefits, then determined that he was not disabled under the more stringent standard. Raybourne exhausted administrative remedies, then sued under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court ruled in favor of Cigna. On remand the court rejected Cigna’s “unconvincing” explanation for how the company determined that Raybourne was not disabled. The court found that Cigna relied on the report of a non-treating physician and on the Social Security Administration’s initial rejections of Raybourne’s claim, failing to consider the SSA’s final determination of disability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that denial of benefits was based on a conflict of interest rather than on the facts and the terms of the policy. View "Raybourne v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co. of NY" on Justia Law

Brown and Wilson began working as nurses at Advocate-Christ in 2005. Both are African-American. In 2008, the plaintiffs and 10 other nurses delivered a Petition for Change in Labor Practices to their human resources department, claiming that Advocate-Christ treated its Filipino nurses better than its African-American nurses by giving them easier assignments, more training, and more leadership opportunities. Human resources employees investigated and ultimately concluded that the claims could not be corroborated. Both plaintiffs resigned. In October 2008, they began working at Advocate South Suburban and became concerned that other nurses were sleeping on duty, that the culture was unprofessional, and that work assignments were unequal and unfair. When their supervisors failed to make changes that the plaintiffs recommended, they complained of race discrimination and started applying for positions at other Advocate facilities. Neither was hired. They filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and later filed suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Advocate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp. " on Justia Law