Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The original named defendants in the case, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to overtime pay, were JT Packard, the plaintiffs’ employer, and Packard’s parent, Bray. A parent corporation is not liable for FLSA violations by its subsidiary unless it exercises significant authority over the subsidiary’s employment practices. The district judge allowed substitution of Betts, which had purchased Packard’s assets and placed them in a wholly owned subsidiary. After a conditional settlement for $500,000 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, Betts appealed the substitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no good reason to reject successor liability in this case. Packard was a profitable company. It was sold, not because it was insolvent, but because it was the guarantor of its parent’s bank loan and the parent defaulted. View "Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Northington worked for H & M. She dated a fellow employee who was also involved with employee Sims. Sims made threats. Northington reported Sims’ behavior to manager Collins, who was then dating (subsequently married) Sims’ mother, the assistant manager. Sims ultimately physically assaulted Northington away from H & M property. The state court issued a protective order. Northington provided the order to the Union, but not to H & M. Northington complained to H & M officers, but did not complain that the harassment was based on race or gender. Based on her behavior during a safety inspection, the inspector suspected that Northington was under the influence of drugs. Northington left the testing facility without giving a required urine sample. Three company officers concurred in terminating her employment, unaware of her criminal complaint against Sims. Northington claimed retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court found that H & M’s conduct in deleting inactive email accounts was negligent but not willful; assessed H & M costs and fees; deemed specific facts admitted; and precluded H & M from making certain arguments, but granted H & M summary judgment, finding that Northington did not establish that she had participated in protected activity under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The discovery sanction did not preclude summary judgment. View "Northington v. H & M Int'l" on Justia Law

Tompkins began working in 1978 and was a participant in the Fund, a multi-employer pension fund established and administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. In 1999, Tompkins was granted a disability pension based on chronic asthmatic bronchitis, which he attributed to working with cement dust for 22 years. Tompkins’s application included agreement to be bound by all the Fund’s rules and regulations, although he did not inquire about those rules or make any effort to find out what they were. Upon receiving his first monthly payment of $2,115.43, he was required to sign a Retirement Declaration that provided notice of disqualifying employment for plan participants receiving retirement pensions but did not include the rules and regulations specific to disability pensioners. In 2007, the Fund suspended his disability pension, claiming that his full-time employment in 2005 and 2006 indicated that he no longer met the definition of “total and permanent disability.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the Fund acknowledged ambiguity, it based its decision on a reasonable interpretation. View "Tompkins v. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

Vaughn started working for the U.S. Forest Service in 1974. Vaughn filed internal complaints in 1997, 2004, 2005 and 2006, asserting discrimination based on race and age, and retaliation for exercising his right to bring such complaints. Vaughn filed suit, but in 2007 signed a settlement agreement. Two days later, he received a “letter of direction” describing a change in his work schedule. He would no longer work regular weekday hours. After receiving the letter, Vaughn was passed over for a temporary assignment and was denied overtime. During roughly the same period, Vaughn’s relationship with a co-worker ended, she accused him of harassment, and he was placed on administrative leave. She continued to complain after he returned and filed an EEOC complaint and a state court order of protection. Vaughn sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, claiming retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vaughn failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has failed to demonstrate that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. The employer put forward, and he failed to rebut, a legitimate reason for the action that was taken. View "Vaughn v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Collins, an African-American woman, worked for Red Cross. In 2006, Collins called the Red Cross’s 24-hour confidential hotline to complain that her co-workers put tacks on her chair, damaged her property, demanded private information, stole her files, required her to pay business costs from her own pocket, and otherwise harassed and sabotaged her. She later filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which gave her a “right-to-sue” letter. Collins did not sue at that time. A few months later, several of Collins’s co-workers complained that Collins told others that the Red Cross was out to get minorities; said she could not work with homosexuals; instructed an employee to falsify records; coerced a subordinate into teaching a class for free; and gave out blank certifications for Red Cross courses. Red Cross fired her after an investigation concluded that Collins committed multiple acts of employee misconduct. Collins sued under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), claiming that she was really fired because of illegal retaliation and discrimination. The district court granted Red Cross summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Collins v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Sanchez sued her employer for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Before trial, Sanchez accepted an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which permits a defendant to serve on an opposing party “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” If the offer is rejected and the “judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” The district court entered judgment in Sanchez’s favor but denied her request for attorney fees and costs in addition to the amount specified in theoffer. The employer’s offer said that it included “all of Plaintiff’s claims for relief” but made no specific mention of costs or attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the Rule 68 offer was silent as to costs and fees, so costs and fees were not included. Offers of judgment under Rule 68 are different from contract offers; plaintiffs who receive Rule 68 offers are “at their peril whether they accept or reject a Rule 68 offer.” Therefore, any ambiguities are resolved against defendants. View "Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law

Yassan sued his former employer, Chase, approximately nineteen months after the termination of his employment, claiming that Chase had terminated him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and public policy and that Chase had committed fraud by inducing him to sign a severance agreement through “explicit and false representation[s].” Before Chase’s deadline to answer the complaint, Yassan’s counsel failed to appear at a status hearing and the state court judge dismissed for want of prosecution. Unaware of this dismissal, Chase filed a notice to remove the case to federal district court. The district court concluded that the removal after dismissal constituted a procedural defect that had been waived by Yassan’s failure to object within 30 days, then granted Chase’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that removal of the case to federal court was properly accomplished and noting that Yassan received valuable consideration for a release he signed when his employment was terminated. View "Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

Alam filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Miller Brewing, his former employer. The case settled in 2006. Subsequently, Alam, whose company provides software and consulting services to the brewing industry, approached MillerCoors about developing a software prototype for MillerCoors and its distributors. MillerCoors is a joint venture between Miller Brewing and Coors Brewing Company. After Alam spent two months working to develop the prototype and collaborating with MillerCoors employees, an executive at MillerCoors indicated that it would no longer consider working with Alam because of Alam’s prior lawsuit. Alam received a letter from counsel for MillerCoors, quoting the settlement agreement provision that: “I agree not to reapply for employment with or otherwise work for or provide services to Miller Brewing Company . . . or any of its parent, affiliates or subsidiaries.” After the EEOC issued Alam a right-to-sue notice, he filed a retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and a state law claim for promissory estoppel. The district court ultimately dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Alam had not exhausted EEOC remedies with respect to Miller and, with respect to MillerCoors, was not an employee nor seeking employment opportunities for purposes of Title VII. View "Alam v. Miller Brewing Co." on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law