Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Buban participates in union politics as part of the dissident “Teamsters for a Democratic Union,” and served as secretary-treasurer of his local from 2004 to 2006. He lost his bid for reelection in 2006, after an acrimonious campaign against rival “Teamsters 4 Teamsters” candidates. Before leaving office, Buban referred himself for work as a shuttle driver, transporting workers to and from a construction site. The company laid Buban off (along with all other drivers who lacked a certain license) in 2007. During the grievance process, Buban clashed with union leadership, his former political rivals. Despite repeatedly stating that he wished to return to work, he remained unemployed. A political ally of Buban’s informed Buban that officials told her that Buban “hasn’t put his name on the out-of-work list.” Buban was unaware of such a list, but was promptly added after his request. Officials referred other members for positions. Buban fled charges, 29 U.S.C. 158(b), and an ALJ found that the union: violated the NLRA by operating an exclusive hiring-hall without consistently applying objective criteria; by discriminatorily failing and refusing to refer Buban for employment; and by failing and refusing to provide him with pertinent information. The Board and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Teamsters "Gen." Local Union 200" on Justia Law

Ten years ago Certco had one food-distribution warehouse; it now has four. As the new warehouses grew, jobs at the original Madison site dwindled. Certco staffed the three new locations with non-union labor, paid them more per hour than it paid union members and offered a defined-contribution pension plan that cost less than the expensive defined-benefit plan that the union sponsors. In 2006 the NLRB concluded that work at one of the new facilities did not accrete to the union under 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(5). The union later asked an arbitrator to order Certco to return bargaining-unit work to union members. The arbitrator concluded that much of the labor at the two newest warehouses is bargaining-unit work under the collective-bargaining agreement, which covers all of Certco’s warehouse labor regardless of work site and forbids the transfer of bargaining-unit work to non-union workers. The district court enforced the award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the arbitrator did not require Certco to recognize the union as representative of workers at two new facilities, but only ordered that work formerly done at the old warehouse be returned there or be performed by bargaining-unit members. View "Certco, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Almy lives in Indiana. He began working for Kickert School Bus Line in 2000, at a terminal located in Illinois. He picked up children at private schools in Illinois and took them to homes in Indiana, drove charter trips for Illinois schools, and would occasionally pick up children at Illinois schools and drive them to Indiana. Almy believed that Kickert was under-paying him because, under the collective bargaining agreement, he did not receive a higher hourly rate of pay for overtime, even though he worked more than 40 hours per week; he was not paid for the 20 minutes it took him to prepare his bus each morning or for time required for fueling, cleaning, and paperwork; and was not paid during charter trips for time it took to drive the empty bus to the school and then back to the bus terminal. Kickert began providing overtime pay in 2008. Almy sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for back pay. The district court entered summary judgment for his former employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an exemption from overtime provisions for interstate drivers whose maximum hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). View "Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc" on Justia Law

Hobgood was the subject of repeated, intensive investigations that resulted in disciplinary proceedings and termination of his employment with the Illinois Gaming Board, though another state agency ultimately ordered that he be reinstated. Hobgood contends he was targeted because he helped a fellow Board employee with suits against the Gaming Board under Title VII and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Hobgood sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Hobgood was fired, not because he had assisted his friend, but because the “nature” of that assistance involved providing confidential information. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of fact concerning the defendants’ motives for investigating, disciplining, and terminating Hobgood, who presented a “convincing mosaic” to show that his employer acted for unlawful reasons. When the evidence is viewed as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that the Board investigated and fired him because he assisted in lawsuits against the Board. View "Gnutek v. IL Gaming Bd." on Justia Law

Luevano works as a greeter at Wal-Mart. She complained to her supervisor that a male co-worker was repeatedly harassing her. The supervisor refused to act. The harassment continued. Luevano unsuccessfully complained to the district manager of human resources. Her working hours were cut. She filed a gender discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued a right to sue letter. Two days before the 90-day filing deadline expired, Luevano filed a pro se complaint, with requests to proceed in forma pauperis and for recruited counsel. Using the court's four-page form, she checked boxes for sex discrimination, failure to stop harassment, and retaliation based on a protected activity, supplemented by two handwritten pages alleging that her co-worker harassed her because she was a woman; her male supervisor refused to correct her co-worker’s behavior; and her supervisor retaliated by reducing her hours and intimidation. The district court dismissed without prejudice, stating that Luevano had failed to allege properly that the harassment or retaliation had occurred because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Luevano’s claims in amended complaints relate back to the initial timely filings and adequately alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. View "Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Sroga filed a 54-page complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against employees of Chicago Public Schools and the Board of Education, alleging that they got him fired from his job as an instructor. The district court dismissed for violation of FRCP 8(a)(2), stating that “the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations” made it “impossible” to evaluate the complaint, but allowed submission of an amended complaint. Sroga timely filed an amended complaint asserting various constitutional and tort-law claims. After five months with no indication of whether Sroga would be permitted to proceed, the district court dismissed most of the claims, leaving claims for retaliatory discharge against an individual and for indemnification against the Board. The court scheduled a status hearing two months later and warned that if Sroga failed to appear, “the Court may dismiss the case for want of prosecution.” The U.S. Marshal’s Office mailed Sroga a letter requesting information about how to serve summonses. Sroga did not respond, and the summonses were returned unexecuted. When Sroga did not appear for his status hearing, the court dismissed. Sroga unsuccessfully moved to vacate, asserting that he was working out of town and did not receive any notification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting Sroga’s history of compliance and that one missed date is not generally a basis for dismissal. View "Sroga v. Huberman" on Justia Law

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Union members, working at Navistar’s Indianapolis engine-manufacturing plant, were represented by a union and were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. They claim that on unidentified dates they were laid off, ostensibly for lack of work, but that Navistar actually subcontracted their work to nonunion plants in violation of the CBA and that Navistar failed to recall them as work became available. They claim to have filed hundreds of grievances that were diverted or stalled. In 2009, Navistar closed the Indianapolis plant. The union members sued. When union members sue their employer for breach of contract under the Labor Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. 185, they must also claim breach of their union’s duty of fair representation. The district court dismissed, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead the prerequisite union breach of fair representation. A separate interference-with-benefits claim under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, was resolved by summary judgment in favor of Navistar. The 29 remaining plaintiffs appealed only the LMRA claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that all of the allegations concerning the duty of fair representation were conclusory, so that the complaint lacked the required factual content. View "Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law

Hitchcock worked for Angel Corps, which performs non-medical care services. Upon learning that Hitchcock was pregnant, her supervisor questioned Hitchcock about whether she would return to work after giving birth, significantly increased Hitchcock’s workload, and reviewed Hitchcock’s work more often. On April 5 Hitchcock went to the home of a new client who was 100 years old and living with her son. Hitchcock claims that felt like she had stepped “into a horror movie” and feared for her safety. Hitchcock told her supervisor that the client “was possibly dying, or already dead.” An ambulance was sent. Angel Corps suspended Hitchcock’s client visits pending investigation, which revealed that the client had been dead for two or three days by the time of Hitchcock’s visit. On May 3, Hitchcock was fired, with a statement that, had Hitchcock done her assessment as originally scheduled on March 31, Hitchcock would have compromised the safety of the client by not conducting a proper assessment. Hitchcock sued, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). The district court entered summary judgment for Angel Corps. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Hitchcock submitted evidence that her supervisor expressed animus toward pregnant women and treated Hitchcock differently after learning she was pregnant; explanations for Hitchcock’s termination were “shifting, inconsistent, facially implausible, or all of the above.” View "Hitchcock v. Angel Corps Inc." on Justia Law