Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

The Fund, a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA, has a Plan, providing for administration by a Board with authority to make benefit determinations and amend the Plan, including retroactively. No amendment may result in reduced benefits for any participant whose rights have vested, except in specified circumstances. Price began receiving Plan disability benefits under the “Total and Permanent Disability Benefit” category in 1990, after work-related injuries left him unable to work. In 2001, the Fund notified Price that he no longer qualified for benefits under this category, but that he could continue receiving benefits under provisions for “Occupational Disability Benefit.” His benefits were discontinued after 2006, according to an Amendment. Price became eligible for early retirement in 2012. The Board rejected an appeal. The district court granted Price judgment in his suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). On remand from the Sixth Circuit, for review determination of vesting under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the judge again ruled in favor of Price. The Sixth Circuit again reversed; the court failed to look to the terms of the plan but instead found that because the Board’s decision letter did not discuss whether the benefits vested, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Price v. Bd. of Trs. of IN Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Sexton, a smoker, spent 25 years working in coal mines. He first applied for Black Lung Act (30 U.S.C. 901) benefits in 1973. The application was unsuccessful as were two other claims. In 2001, two years after the denial became final, Sexton filed a subsequent claim. The district director recommended an award of benefits. Buck Creek Coal requested a formal hearing. While his claim was pending Sexton died. His widow filed her own claim and the district director issued a proposed order awarding benefits in the survivor claim. Buck Creek requested a hearing. The administrative law judge considered four medical opinions, and based on that new evidence, determined that Sexton suffered a total disability from clinical and legal pneumoconiosis and that Sexton established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 725.309 and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed with respect to Sexton’s claim and affirmed in part and vacated in part with respect to the survivor claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 20 C.F.R. 725.309 is valid and was correctly applied and that the Board’s decision did not violate principles of finality or res judicata. View "Buck Creek Coal Co. v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Martinez worked for Cracker Barrel until 1999 when she voluntarily left. She was rehired in 2000 as retail manager, a position she held until her termination in 2010, after she engaged in wide-ranging, heated series conversations with four employees, involving the Haiti earthquake, the plight of those in Haiti, and the use of a state public assistance program by several employees. An associate manager overheard the conversations and filed a formal complaint, alleging Martinez made inappropriate racial comments. Martinez claims that she was singled out while all four employees participated in the discussion. During an investigation, it became apparent that other employees, not managers, used inappropriate racial terms such as “ghetto card” and Cracker Barrel imposed policy reviews on those employees, all African-American. Cracker Barrel determined that Martinez had violated specific company rules prohibiting rude and boisterous conduct, or any form of discriminatory or harassing behavior. Martinez sued (42 U.S.C 1981; MCL 37.2101) , alleging “reverse” racial discrimination in the handling of her termination. Cracker Barrel offered reinstatement, but interpreted her response letter from counsel as a rejection. The district court entered summary judgment for Cracker Barrel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law

Keith has been deaf since his birth in 1980. Wearing a sound transmitter, he can detect noises. He is unable to speak and communicates using American Sign Language (ASL). In 2007, Keith successfully completed a lifeguard training program, with assistance from an ASL interpreter, and applied for a position at the county’s wave pool. Stavale, the county recreation specialist, explained to her supervisors that Keith had requested an ASL interpreter for meetings and classroom instruction. Having received no objection, Stavale extended an offer of employment, conditioned upon a pre-employment physical. During that physical, the doctor stated: “He’s deaf; he can’t be a lifeguard” and “I have to [fail him]. If something happens … they’re going to come after me.” Aquatic safety and risk management consultants expressed concern about whether a deaf individual could perform effectively as a lifeguard. Stavale identified accommodations that she believed could successfully integrate Keith. The employment offer was withdrawn. The district court granted the county summary judgment in his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that issues of material fact exist regarding whether Keith is otherwise qualified to be a lifeguard, with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland" on Justia Law

Diaz, a Michigan Department of Corrections employee, he was diagnosed with heart and abdominal conditions that forced him to take intermittent leave. Diaz alleges he was fired for attendance violations after taking leaves and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages and reinstatement, alleging: interference with Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612 (a)(1)(D) rights; retaliation for exercising FMLA rights; and deprivation of a protected federal right. Boden, an employee of the Michigan Department of Human Services, was placed on stress leave by her doctor; she claims that her supervisor dramatically increased her workload and disciplined her for petty infractions because of that leave. She brought suit with the same allegations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded the claim for reinstatement, but affirmed with respect to claims for damages. The Supreme Court has held that a state employee may recover damages for a state’s failure to comply with family-care provision of the FMLA, but the Sixth Circuit has held that the rationale did not extend to FMLA self-care provision. Suits against the states for damages under 2612(a)(1)(D) are barred by the states’ sovereign immunity and public employers cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA.View "Boden v. MI Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

The Office of the Racing Commissioner regulates the Michigan horse-racing industry. The ORC hires racing stewards as independent contractors to perform regulatory, judging, and enforcement functions in conjunction with three types of horse races. The plaintiffs were appointed as racing stewards in the 1980s and 1990s. Hall currently works as a state steward for the Michigan Gaming Board. Dye was appointed in 1988 and was promoted to Administrative Liaison Steward in 1998, but was demoted to State Steward in 2006 and was terminated in 2009. Perttunen was appointed in 1994, and remains employed as a racing steward for the Gaming Board. Erskine was appointed in 1999, and was terminated in 2009. The four claim that their Democratic supervisors retaliated against them for voicing support for or being perceived as affiliated with the Republican candidate in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although certain stewards openly endorsed the candidate in the workplace, others remained silent. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Dye’s protected-speech, holding that retaliation based on perceived political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doctrine. View "Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law

In 1992 Navistar attempted to reduce its costs for retired employee health and life insurance benefits. Navistar’s retirement benefit plan is a registered employee health benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 and Navistar is both plan administrator and fiduciary. In 1993, the district court entered judgment in a class action challenging the change, adopting an agreement between the parties and retaining jurisdiction. The Agreement established the Retiree Health Benefit and Life Insurance Plan. The Plan established the Health Benefit Program Summary Plan Description, which contains a description of the health benefits and is furnished to all beneficiaries. The Agreement divides health benefits into two plans: Plan 2 for those eligible for Medicare and Plan 1 for those who are not eligible. A prescription drug benefit was provided under the Agreement, identical for both Plan 1 and Plan 2. When Navistar moved to substitute Medicare Part D into the Plan, class members claimed violation of the Agreement. The district court ordered Navistar to reinstate, retroactively, the prescription drug benefit that was in effect before Navistar made the unilateral substitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed,View "Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp." on Justia Law