Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The plant’s union and TRW negotiated collective bargaining agreements, which included provisions for healthcare benefits for retirees. The last CBA became effective in 1993 and was scheduled to expire in 1996. The plant closed in 1997. TRW and the union entered into a termination agreement that provided that any beneficiary, who is receiving or entitled to receive any payment and/or benefit under the CBA, “shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such payment and/or benefit as though the CBA and Pension Plan had remained in effect.” In 2011, TRW terminated prescription drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, replacing it with an annual contribution to a health reimbursement account. Plaintiffs claimed that this change modified their benefits in violation of TRW’s contractual obligation and filed a purported class action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted TRW’s motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the two named Plaintiffs, declining to address the rights of hypothetical plaintiffs. View "VanPamel v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Akron held promotional exams for fire department positions of Captain and Lieutenant. The exams were prepared, administered and scored by an outside testing consultant. Each exam contained a 100-question multiple choice section on technical knowledge and two oral assessment exercises. The Lieutenant exam also required a written work-sample; the Captain exam had an additional oral group exercise. Candidates were placed on an eligibility list in an ordered ranking. Plaintiffs alleged disparate-impact age discrimination against 23 firefighters based on age, 29 U.S.C. 621; that the exam for Lieutenant had an adverse impact on three African-American firefighters and that the exam for Captain had an adverse impact on 12 Caucasian firefighters based on race, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law violations. The district court concluded that the exam adversely impacted 12 Caucasian Captain candidates and three African-American Lieutenant candidates on the basis of race, and adversely impacted eleven Lieutenant candidates on the basis of their age and ordered promotion of 18 candidates. Each Lieutenant candidate was awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages and $72,000 in front pay. Captain candidate were awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in front pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howe v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

The Center, a licensed nursing home in Springfield, Tennessee, has about 100 employees, providing care to about 120 residents. An executive director oversees the facility, assisted by department heads, including a director of nursing for each of the facility’s two wings. There are 12 RNs, 10 licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and 46 certified nursing assistants (CNAs). RNs and LPNs, called “charge nurses,” report to the director of nursing. Two charge nurses are generally assigned to each wing at a time. The Union petitioned the NLRB, seeking to represent the RNs in collective bargaining. The Center objected, claiming that the RNs were “supervisors” under the Act, not permitted to unionize, 29 U.S.C. 152(3), 157. The regional director concluded that the RNs were not supervisors, certified the bargaining unit, and directed an election. The next day, the RNs elected the Union as their bargaining representative. The Center refused to bargain with the Union, which filed a complaint of unfair labor practices. The Board sustained the Union’s complaint and ordered the Center to bargain. The Sixth Circuit vacated and denied a petition for enforcement, finding that the the RNs have authority to discipline CNAs using their independent judgment and are supervisors. View "GGNSC Springfield LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Cleveland has had an age-65 mandatory retirement policy for police and fire department personnel since 1960. The policy allowed the chief of police or the fire department to allow a person to continue on active duty on a year to year basis, subject to approval of the Director of Public Safety, following independent medical evaluation. Extensions were routinely granted until 2010, when budget cuts caused lay-offs and the police chief denied all requests. The fire department continued to grant extensions. Former officers, forced into retirement, alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621., Ohio’s age discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code 4112, and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law includes an exception that allows state and local governments to set mandatory retirement ages for firefighters and law enforcement officers; the city established that its retirement plan exists for the efficiency of the police department and is not a subterfuge to evade the Act. View "Sadie v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

In June 2007, Louzon, a Ford product engineer, took an approved leave of absence to visit family in Gaza. While he was there, security issues in the region caused Israel to close its borders, making it impossible for Louzon to return to the U.S. before the end of his leave. Ford initially extended his leave, but by the time the State Department was able to evacuate Louzon in August 2007, the extension had expired. Ford terminated his employment. In 2009, Louzon filed suit, alleging age and national-origin discrimination, moved to exclude Louzon’s evidence of comparable employees on the basis that none were similarly situated as a matter of law. The district court granted Ford’s motion and then granted summary judgment to Ford. The Sixth Circuit reversed on the motion in limine, holding that the district court improperly considered nonevidentiary issues in-limine, and vacated the summary judgment. View "Louzon v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Davis sued Cintas, individually and on behalf of a class of female job applicants denied employment as entry-level sales representatives, alleging that Cintas’s hiring practices led to gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and caused Cintas to reject her application for employment twice. The district court denied Davis’s motion for class certification and granted summary judgment for Cintas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both denial of class certification and the entry of summary judgment on her individual disparate-treatment claim arising in 2004 and her disparate-impact claim. The court reversed with respect to a disparate-treatment claim arising in 2003, noting that she was at least as qualified as the male candidates at that time. View "Davis v. Cintas Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

Dodd, an African-American mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, was the subject of an investigation for failing to deliver mail. He was arrested and held for seven days before charges were dismissed. He filed suit, alleging claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Dodd’s FTCA claim because it determined that the claim was preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2301, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Dodd’s Title VII claim because Dodd failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the FTCA claim, noting that the Civil Service Reform Act does not apply to postal employee, but affirmed with respect to the Title VII claim. View "Dodd v. Potter" on Justia Law