Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Retirees, dependents of retirees, and the union filed a class action suit against the retirees’ former employer, M&G, after M&G announced that they would be required to make health care contributions. The district court found M&G liable for violating a labor agreement and an employee welfare benefit plan and ordered reinstatement of the plaintiffs to the current versions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in until 2007, to receive health care for life without contributions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly concluded that the retirees’ right to lifetime healthcare vested upon retirement after concluding that documents, indicating agreement between the union and the employers to “cap” health benefits and several “side” letters were not a part of the applicable labor agreements. View "Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC," on Justia Law

While employed as an electrical line worker, Waldo was subjected routinely to sexual harassment. Her coworkers displayed sexually explicit materials in the workplace, locked her in a porta-potty, ridiculed her for bringing a purse to work, demanded that she “pee like a man” and clean up her male coworkers’ tobacco spit, ostracized and ignored her on job sites and during trainings, and referred to her using gender-specific demeaning language. Waldo sued, bringing six federal and state-law discrimination claims, and a state-law tort claim. Although a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the employer, the district court granted Waldo a new trial on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, finding that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After a second trial, the jury found in favor of Waldo, and the district court awarded her attorney fees and costs as a prevailing plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the granting a new trial and the award of attorney fees and costs. There was clear testimony that the employer was aware of Waldo’s complaints, but that no formal response or investigation was undertaken, contrary to company policies that “[c]omplaints will be fully investigated.” View "Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co." on Justia Law

Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

Findlay sought relief from a withdrawal liability payment it allegedly owed the pension fund under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461. Findlay had ceased making contributions to a pension plan administered by the fund as the result of a labor dispute. About three months after the strike began, the fund demanded Findlay pay withdrawal liability of more than $10 million. Findlay contended that withdrawal liability was improper because withdrawal occurred as the result of a labor dispute; that despite the Act’s arbitration requirement, it should not be forced to arbitrate the dispute because the withdrawal was “union-mandated;” and that despite the Act’s interim payment requirement, it should not be forced to make interim payments because doing so would cause it to suffer irreparable harm. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act required the dispute be arbitrated, and enjoined the fund from collecting withdrawal liability payments pending arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but reversed the injunction, stating that creating an exception to interim payments for employers that would suffer irreparable harm would contradict the congressional purpose of protecting funds from undercapitalized or financially precarious employers. View "Findlay Truck Line, Inc. v. Cen. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Aker’s Louisville team consisted of the project manager, Hudson; electrical and instrumentation (E&I) designers Ash, Kirkpatrick, Sharp, and Whitaker; three piping designers; an estimator/scheduler; and a drafter who was being groomed to become an E&I designer. Sharp began as a contract worker in 2003 and became an employee in 2005. In 2008-2009, several Aker employees, including Sharp, were laid off because customers had canceled or postponed projects. Sharp, then 52 years old, claimed that he was fired because of his age, citing Hudson’s decision to train Kirkpatrick, and not Sharp, as E&I design lead and noting Hudson’s alleged comments about the advancing age of the group and the need to bring in younger people. Aker asserted that Hudson and Ash considered Kirkpatrick a superior employee to Sharp. The trial court entered summary judgment for Aker in Sharp’s age-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding adequate evidence that Hudson played a determinative role in the layoff decision to attribute his motivation to the company, that Hudson’s remarks were direct evidence of age discrimination, and that Hudson’s expression of age as a factor in his decision was not merely a proxy for a legitimate business concern. View "Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006 White began working at a job that required him to lift parts weighing between 20 and 75 pounds. White was considered a good worker, but had consistent attendance problems. Between January 26, 2009, and September 24, 2009, White called in 19 absences for reasons, including emergency vacation leave, vacation leave, unpaid leave, and Family Medical Leave Act leave. White took FMLA leave in 2009 due to gout and unrelated back and foot pain. In September 2009, White began suffering complications related to abdominal surgeries following a 1995 car accident. On September 25, White’s surgeon scheduled his surgery for October 7. According to the employer, White did not use the word hernia and only indicated that he might be having surgery soon. White and his employer dispute whether he submitted paperwork concerning a restriction on lifting. White missed several more days and failed to call in, in violation of company policy, and was terminated. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The FMLA expressly permits an employer to enforce its “usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave,” 29 C.F.R. 825.302(d). View "Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC" on Justia Law

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws. View "Boaz v. FedEx Cust. Info. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Frazier, a sorter for Publishers Printing, was covered by Publishers’ employee benefit plan, which provided disability insurance. In 2009, at age 42, she left her job due to back pain that radiated down her legs, which she thought was caused by arthritis and a bulging disc, though she could not remember any fall or injury that initiated the pain. An MRI revealed mild disc dislocation. Her family physician diagnosed her with lower back pain and radiculopathy and in 2010 opined that Frazier was unable to return to work at regular capacity. Frazier participated in limited physical therapy. Another physician prescribed lumbar epidural injections and eventually permitted her to return to work. The plan denied Frazier’s claim for long-term disability benefits after reviewing medical evidence and job descriptions from Publishers and the U.S. Department of Labor. A Functional Capacity Evaluation indicated that Frazier “is currently functionally capable of meeting the lower demands for the Medium Physical Demand level on a 8 hour per day.” Frazier sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court granted judgment for the plan, reasoning that the administrator had discretion to deny Frazier’s claim, and that denial of benefits was not arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am." on Justia Law

Kinds was assaulted and threatened by her live-in boyfriend. She requested time off to find a new place to live, but did not have vacation time available and was not eligible for Family and Medical Leave Act leave because she had worked less than 1,250 hours for her employer during the previous 12 months, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A). The company granted her one week of discretionary leave. She returned to work for about a month, after which she was eligible for FMLA leave. She applied for leave the following day and returned part-time about two months later. Her employer notified the administrator of its short-term disability insurance plan. Three weeks into her leave, a licensed independent social worker diagnosed Kinds as having a severe depression episode. Following approval of disability benefits for part of Kinds’s absence, her employer approved the period after her diagnosis for FMLA leave and asked Kinds to submit medical certification for the period that was not approved. Neither Kinds nor her healthcare providers timely submitted documentation. After an extension, the employer denied FMLA leave, determined that Kinds’s absence during the period at issue was unexcused, and terminated Kinds’s employment. The district court dismissed her FMLA lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinds v. OH Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law