Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

Williams had worked at Marathon’s Ashland, Kentucky, facility for 25 years, most recently as a senior barge welder. Williams alleged that he sustained a long thoracic nerve injury to his right shoulder while replacing parts of a barge in 2003. His injury was likely the result of the cumulative effect of his heavy lifting. Williams has not returned to work and has been seen by several physicians, but they do not agree on a common diagnosis. Following a remand the Benefits Review Board of the U.S. Department of Labor affirmed an administrative law judge’s award of permanent and total disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901. On a second appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Williams is permanently and totally disabled and is unable to perform the alternative employment identified by Marathon’s vocational expert. The court granted Williams leave to seek attorney fees under 33 U.S.C. 928(a). View "Marathon Ashland Petroleum v. Williams" on Justia Law

Rachells, an African-American account executive in the Cleveland region since 2001, received numerous sales awards, consistently exceeded company sales goals by the greatest margin among his co-workers, and, in 2003, earned the top performance review among his Cingular peers. In 2004, Cingular acquired AT&T and eliminated five of nine existing Cingular and AT&T account executive positions. Although Rachells exceeded his 2004 sales goals by a greater margin than in 2003, he received the lowest 2004 performance review score of any candidate for retention and was ranked seventh out of nine in the overall selection process. Rachells was notified that he would be terminated and sued for racial discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Cingular on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Rachells had produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. View "Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Peoplemark is a temporary-employment agency that used an application form that asked applicants whether they had a felony record and conducted an independent investigation into the criminal records of all applicants. Scott, an African American with a felony conviction, submitted an application and was not referred for employment. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Peoplemark’s attorney stated that clients knew of the policy and some had told Peoplemark not to refer felons. A review of more than 18,000 documents showed that Peoplemark had referred felons to job opportunities. The EEOC sent a letter indicating that Peoplemark had violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(A), based on its conclusion that a companywide policy of rejecting felon applicants had a disparate impact on African Americans. Attempts to conciliate failed. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Scott and a class of similarly situated persons. Additional discovery revealed that there was no company policy and the case was dismissed. The district court awarded Peoplemark $751,942.48 in fees and costs, including attorney’s fees from October 1, 2009, finding that as of that date the claim was unreasonable. The award also included Peoplemark’s expert fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peoplemark, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, working for Defendant since 1967, was a brakeman on a crew taking a freight train from Defendant’s Cleveland yard to Medina County, Ohio, in 2006. At a Valley City stop, Plaintiff operated a ground switch to move the alignment of the track. Plaintiff stood behind the switch and operated it for 30 minutes to an hour. Witnesses testified and pictures indicated that the ground where Plaintiff worked was muddy and was not covered with ballast. Plaintiff had to urinate while operating the switch and planned to urinate outside, rather than in the toilet compartment of the locomotive, because he found that compartment to be “dirty” and “unusable.” Once Plaintiff completed his tasks, he began to walk from the switch to a field behind the tracks. Within steps of the switch, Plaintiff slipped and twisted his knee. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a torn right meniscus and underwent surgery to repair the cartilage. The district court rejected jury verdicts in favor of Plaintiff on his claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient proof of causation between the jury-determined violations under FELA and LIA and Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of Coca-Cola, suffered work-related injuries and applied for workers’ compensation benefits through Sedgwick, Coca-Cola’s third-party benefit claims administrator. Sedgwick disputed the claims. Plaintiffs claim that Coca-Cola and Sedgwick “engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving the mail . . . to avoid paying benefits to injured employees,” and filed suit under the civil remedies provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The district court dismissed. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs did not plead an injury to their “business or property” that is compensable under RICO. The RICO theory advanced in this case would throw the viability of workers’ compensation schemes into doubt; RICO “does not purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce.” The Michigan workers’ compensation scheme provides ample mechanisms by which the employee can contest denials. View "Jackson. Segwick Claims Mgmt. Servs." on Justia Law

Project labor agreements (PLAs) are used in the construction industry to set common conditions of employment for large projects involving multiple subcontractors and unions. On a public construction project, a PLA can be entered into by the governmental unit paying for the project or by its general contractor; the other party is a labor organization. If the governmental unit enters into a PLA, all contractors bidding on the project must agree to abide by it. Opponents argue that PLAs discourage nonunion contractors from bidding on government contracts and increase construction costs. Proponents, such as the trades councils, claim that PLAs enhance job-site cooperation and reduce labor disputes. The federal government has gone back and forth on allowing PLAs. Michigan passed the first version of the Fair and Open Competition in Governmental Construction Act in 2011, restricting the use of PLAs on publicly funded projects. Following entry of an injunction, that version was superseded by an amended act, passed in 2012. The district court enjoined the current version as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the act furthers Michigan’s proprietary goal of improving efficiency in public construction projects, and is no broader than necessary to meet those goals. View "MI Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Kindred, a nursing home and rehabilitation center in Mobile, has beds for about 170 residents and eight departments into which employees are classified: nursing, nutrition services, resident activity, maintenance, administration, medical records, central supply, and social services. The nursing department has 53 Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) not including the Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) and Registered Nurses (RNs). The LPNs supervise the CNAs; RNs supervise the LPNs and report to the nursing director. The union petitioned to represent the CNAs. , Kindred argued that the bargaining unit should be expanded to include an additional 86 non-supervisory, non-professional service and maintenance employees. The NLRB regional director certified the CNAs as an appropriate bargaining unit and the union won a representation election. Kindred refused to bargain. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for enforcement, applying the “community of interest” approach. View "Kindred Nursing Cts. E. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Mendel was employed by the City of Gibraltar as a police department dispatcher. After his employment was terminated, he sued under the Family Medical Leave Act. At that time, the city employed 41 employees, excluding 25-30 “volunteer” firefighters, who are not required to respond to any emergency call, but are paid $15 per hour for time they do spend responding to a call or maintaining equipment. They have no consistent schedule and receive a Form–1099 MISC to report their income. They do not receive health insurance, sick or vacation time, or social security benefits, but may be promoted or discharged. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that Mendel was not an “eligible employee” under FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2611(4), because the city did not have more than 50 employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The substantial wages paid to the firefighters constitutes compensation, not nominal fees, so that they are employees, not volunteers, for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and FMLA. View "Mendel v. City of Gibraltar" on Justia Law

Adamov immigrated to the U.S. in 1992 and began working at the bank in 1998. He became a district manager in Louisville, with an excellent employment record. In 2005, the bank hired Hartnack as Vice-Chairman, three levels up from Adamov. During the few times Hartnack and Adamov interacted, Hartnack made statements that Adamov found offensive, concerning his accent and being an immigrant. While giving a speech, Hartnack made the comment “I was talking to my managers and they looked at me like I was speaking Russian.” Adamov believed that he had not been promoted because Hartnack harbored animus based on Adamov’s national origin. Adamov spoke to his direct supervisor, who spoke with Hartnack and assured Adamov that Hartnack was not prejudiced against him. The bank subsequently investigated Adamov, concluded that his loans violated its ethics policy, and terminated his employment. The ethics policy went into effect after the date of the loan and no prior policy was introduced at trial. The district court dismissed Adamov’s retaliation claim, based on failure to exhaust remedies and entered summary judgment that Adamov’s discrimination claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the discrimination claim. The retaliation claim should not have been dismissed because the administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. View " Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law