Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Javery began working for Lucent as a software engineer in 1998 and participated in Lucent’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, qualified disability plan, administered by CIGNA. In November 2002, he reported back pain. His family doctor, Dr. Dorado, prescribed medicine and testing, and recommended some time off work. In January 2003, after Lucent transferred him from Ohio to Illinois, Javery sought treatment from another physician, Seymour. The pain worsened. In May 2005, Javery stopped working on Dr. Seymour’s advice. Lucent approved and paid short term disability benefits from until those benefits expired in November 2005. Lucent notified CIGNA that it believed Javery might be eligible for long term benefits. Javery applied, submitting extensive medical evidence of his pain and resulting cognitive impairment and of his successful application for Social Security disability benefits, but the claim was denied. In addition to claiming that Javery had not shown that he was “disabled” as that term is defined in the Plan, CIGNA claimed that Javery should be judicially estopped from pursuing his ERISA claim because Javery failed to disclose the claim in his Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy action. The district court upheld the denial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Javery v. Lucent Tech., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan" on Justia Law

Deleon, a 53-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for 28 years. Beginning in 1995, he was an “Area Superintendent” and generally received positive reviews. Deleon alleges a pervasive atmosphere of racial insensitivity and derogatory comments. In 2008, a vacancy arose for an “Equipment and Facilities Superintendent,” described as being in a garage with exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes. After an interview, Deleon did not receive the position. His computer skills were insufficient. In 2009, Deleon was involuntarily transferred to the position. Deleon objected, claiming that, in applying for the position, he demanded a raise because of the “hazard posed by diesel fumes and poor ventilation.” He did not receive a raise. Deleon claims that he developed bronchitis, a cough, and sinus headaches, and would blow black soot from his nostrils. Deleon’s first evaluation indicated that his performance was “acceptable in most critical areas but [was] not sufficiently above minimum satisfactory level in all areas.” Days after a fractious meeting with his supervisor, Deleon was hospitalized for five days. He claimed a work-induced mental breakdown and took eight months’ FMLA leave. Deleon’s psychiatrist cleared him to return to work, but the Commission had terminated him. Finding that Deleon did not suffer an “adverse employment action,” the district court dismissed his claims of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence of conditions that would support discrimination claims and that the fact that Deleon applied for the position did not disqualify him from showing that the employment action was “adverse.”View "Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

The former miner sued in 1992 and an administrative law judge determined that he was not medically qualified for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 and indicated that Arkansas Coals was not the “responsible operator” required to pay benefits. About 17 years later, the miner filed a second claim. After finding that his medical condition had worsened and that he was now disabled, an ALJ awarded benefits and determined that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator. The Benefits Review Board and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the company’s finality, waiver, and collateral estoppel arguments; the miner was entitled to bring a second claim under 20 C.F.R. 725.309(d)(4) and the determination that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator was not “necessary” to the resolution of the initial claim. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Arkansas Coals is the responsible operator. View "Arkansas Coals, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Maynes, a miner who developed pneumoconiosis after working in Consolidated’s coal mine for 25 years, received benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, from 1997 until he died of respiratory failure in 2003. His widow sought survivors’ benefits. The then-current version of the BLBA conditioned her eligibility for benefits on proof that pneumoconiosis either caused or hastened her husband’s death. Her 2003 claim was denied. The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which amended the law so that survivors are automatically entitled to benefits if the miner received BLBA benefits during his lifetime. Congress specified that the changes would apply to claims filed after January 2005, but did not address whether persons whose claims had been denied under the previous eligibility framework, could receive benefits by filing a subsequent claim. The issue was answered in the affirmative by the Benefits Review Board and affirmed by the Third and Fourth Circuits. Although the Department of Labor, an administrative law judge, and the Benefits Review Board agreed Maynes was entitled to benefits, they disagreed about the appropriate commencement date for benefits. The Sixth Circuit rejected Consolidated’s appeal, upholding the 2009 commencement date. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Maynes" on Justia Law

Ogle, born in 1954, worked in underground coal mines for 21 years, most recently in 1996 in Kentucky. Ogle smoked since age 12. He sought black lung benefits in 2007. After the record closed but before the ALJ issued a decision, Congress revived a rebuttable statutory presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground mine for at least 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Ogle suffered from totally disabling respiratory impairment, a conclusion with which all medical opinions agreed. The ALJ stated that the presumption shifts the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that either the miner’s disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment or the miner did not, suffer from pneumoconiosis. The Fund demonstrated that Ogle did not suffer from clinical pneumoconiosis, but failed to rebut the presumption that Ogle suffers from legal pneumoconiosis. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no evidence that the ALJ improperly restricted the Fund’s ability to rebut the 15-year presumption or that the ALJ applied the wrong standard. View "Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle" on Justia Law

CCRC employee Henschel was covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provided for seniority rights. Hel was involved in a motorcycle accident that resulted in amputation of his left leg. CCRC hired a temporary excavator operator for Henschel’s position. Henschel had hauled the excavator to the site 70 percent of the time and other CCRC employees, 30 percent. CCRC specified hauling as a function of Truck/Tractor Driver, but did not include hauling in its Operator-Excavator job description; it included an “Other duties assigned” task. Henschel sought a waiver to maintain his commercial driver’s license. The Michigan Traffic Safety Division requested, from CCRC, an evaluation of Henschel’s ability to perform essential job functions of a truck driver, including driving a manual transmission. CCRC did not limit testing to essential functions of a truck driver, but tested Henschel for every CCRC position. The Division allowed Henschel to retain his CDL, limited to automatic-transmission vehicles. CCRC did not try to return him to the excavator but attempted to find him a truck driver position in an automatic transmission truck. The lowest seniority truck driver declined to give up his truck. Before firing Henschel, CCRC did not ask other qualified drivers if they would be willing to haul the excavator. The district court entered summary judgment or CCRC. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the essential functions of the excavator operator position. View "Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Krafsur, a federal administrative law judge, hears social security disability claims, including deciding how much to award successful claimants in attorney’s fees. Krafsur alleges that Davenport, the chief judge in his office, told him that his fee awards were too low. Krafsur’s refusal to make higher awards allegedly prompted Davenport to reprimand him, deny him leave and withhold paychecks. Krafsur complained about Davenport’s actions to the Office of Special Counsel, which handles grievances from federal employees. Before the Special Counsel responded, Krafsur filed suit, claiming that Davenport’s actions violated the First and Fifth Amendments, citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, which creates a cause of action against federal officers for constitutional violations; the Administrative Procedure Act; and the Tucker Act, which authorize lawsuits against the United States for constitutional violations, 5 U.S.C. 702, 28 U.S.C. 1346. The district court dismissed on the ground that the Civil Service Reform Act remedial framework is exclusive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Krafsur’s interpretation of the Act would make a muddle of its text, a shambles of its structure and a lost cause of its purpose. View "Krafsur v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Sections 401 and 402 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 481, 482, regulate union elections and authorize the Secretary of Labor to bring suit to enforce these provisions, after a union member exhausts or attempts to exhaust internal union remedies and files an administrative complaint with the Secretary. The complaining member has one calendar month to file his administrative complaint, measured from the latest of either the date he “exhausted” his internal union remedies or the date three months after the member invoked internal union remedies “without obtaining a final decision.” In this case, the Secretary argued that a member exhausted the union’s remedies when he received the union’s final decision. The union, representing police officers working for the United States Postal Inspection Service, argued that the member’s one-month limitations period ran from the date the union sent out its final decision. The district court dismissed on the grounds that the complaining member had not filed his administrative complaint within the prescribed time period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a member has not “exhausted” his internal union remedies until he receives the union’s final decision. View "Solis v. Postal Police Officers Ass'n" on Justia Law

Tillman filed suit pro se, alleging that Macy’s discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII when it terminated her employment in 2009. Macy’s filed a motion to compel arbitration, based on a claimed agreement between the parties to participate in a dispute-resolution program called Solutions. The Solutions process had four steps, the last of which is binding arbitration. After the May’s store at which she had worked since 2001 was acquired by Macy’s, Tillman received a document describing the Solutions process and noting that employees were automatically “covered” by arbitration by virtue of continuing employment, but could opt out of binding arbitration. Tillman’s packet was mailed and was not returned as undeliverable. Tillman stated that she did not receive it. In 2006, Tillman attended a mandatory video describing the Solutions Program. Tillman does not deny receiving a brochure distributed at the meeting. In 2007, Macy’s sent another brochure that stated that she had the entire Solutions program, specifically including Step 4 Arbitration. Tillman stated that she did not receive this mailing. Macy’s sent another Election Form and brochure. Tillman did not return the form; again claiming that she did not receive it. The district court denied Macy’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Macy’s provided sufficient notice of its offer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and Tillman accepted by continuing her employment and not returning either opt-out form. Arbitration should be required, notwithstanding the absence of an employee-signed agreement. View "Tillman v. Macy's Inc." on Justia Law

Allied, a union contractor, sued local unions, claiming that the unions colluded to withhold otherwise available job-targeting funds from Allied. The job-targeting-fund program provided union contractors with money to enable the employers to lower bids on certain jobs so that union contractors could have a competitive advantage over non-union contractors. Under the program, Local 7 collected dues from its members, including Allied employees, to subsidize union contractors who were part of the program. In 1998, Local 7 made job-targeting funds available for a job for the Kalamazoo Red Cross. Although Allied had previously received job-targeting funds from Local 7, the union did not allow Allied to receive funds for the Red Cross job and for other projects. Allied believed that it was denied funds because it had not signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the plumbers and pipe-fitters union. The district court dismissed and the NLRB later determined that bringing the federal suit constituted an unfair labor practice that interfered with employees in the exercise of rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining. The Sixth Circuit denied the NLRB’s petition for enforcement, rejecting an argument that Allied lack an objective basis for the suit. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Allied Mech. Serv." on Justia Law