Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Pierson, a Plant Facilities Manager at QG with 39 years of experience in printing and seven years with QG, was terminated after the CEO announced a comprehensive company-wide cost-cutting initiative. Pierson, then 62 years old, had never received a negative performance evaluation and was never disciplined, reprimanded, or warned about performance deficiencies. After he was fired, his job duties were assumed by a 47-year-old employee engaged in energy-procurement and capital projects management functions at another facility. The district court entered summary judgment for QG. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the record established a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Pierson’s position was eliminated or whether he was simply replaced by a younger individual. View "Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp." on Justia Law

Some of Kaplan’s students obtain financial aid through the U.S. Department of Education. Some Kaplan employees have access to those students’ financial information. About 10 years ago, Kaplan discovered that some financial-aid officers had stolen students’ payments and that some of its executives had engaged in self-dealing, using relatives as vendors. Kaplan implemented measures to prevent abuses, including credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions and positions with access to company financials, cash, or access to student financial-aid information. Reports include whether: an applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy, is delinquent on child-support, has any garnishments, has outstanding judgments exceeding $2,000, or has a social-security number inconsistent with what the credit bureau has on file. The report does not note the applicant’s race. When the EEOC sued Kaplan, alleging disparate impact on African-Americans, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (k), EEOC relied on statistical data compiled by Murphy, who holds a doctorate in industrial and organizational psychology. The district court excluded Murphy’s testimony as unreliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the EEOC uses the same criteria for hiring. EEOC presented no evidence that Murphy’s methodology, which involved Murphy looking at copies of drivers’ licenses to determine race, satisfied any of the factors that courts consider in determining reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Murphy himself admitted his sample was not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp." on Justia Law

The Union sought a declaratory judgment to enforce a settlement agreement it had entered into with UPS in 2010 to resolve a labor dispute. UPS maintained that any allegation of failure to abide by the agreement fell within a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The district court agreed and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal based on the language of the CBA, which provides that “any controversy, complaint, misunderstanding or dispute” that concerns “interpretation, application or observance” of the CBA “shall be handled” in accordance with the CBA’s grievance procedures. The parties agreed that the alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement constituted a violation of the CBA. View "Teamsters Local Union 480 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

From 2004 to 2009, Russell worked at Citicorp’s Florence, Kentucky call center. He had signed a standard contract to arbitrate any disputes with the company. The agreement covered individual claims but not class actions. In 2012, Russell filed a class action against the company, claiming that the company did not pay employees for time spent logging into and out of their computers at the beginning and end of each workday. Citicorp did not seek arbitration. In 2012, with the lawsuit still in progress, Russell applied to work again at Citicorp’s call center and was rehired. Citicorp had updated its arbitration contract to cover class claims as well as individual ones. Russell signed the new contract and began work in the call center. Russell did not consult with his lawyers before signing the new contract. About a month later, Citicorp’s outside attorneys learned that he had been rehired and sought to compel Russell to arbitrate the class action, which by then had begun discovery. The district court held that the new arbitration agreement did not cover lawsuits commenced before the agreement was signed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Russell v. Citigroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Demyanovich, an employee of Cadon for more than 20 years, was terminated after he requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act to treat his congestive heart failure. He had previously taken leave and his condition had gotten worse over the course of about 10 years. He claimed that Cadon and his direct supervisor, Ensign, interfered with his exercise of his FMLA rights, retaliated against him for seeking FMLA leave, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability. Ensign denied the FMLA request because he believed that Cadon did not have enough employees to be subject to the Act, but referred to Demyanovich as a “liability” immediately after the request for FMLA leave. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Cadon. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting evidence that establishs a genuine factual dispute as to whether Demyanovich was permanently incapable of working at the time that he was terminated. View "Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coating, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law