Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

KeHE, a Naperville food distributor, assigns each of its “sales representatives” several stores of large chain retailers. The representatives are responsible for stocking shelves at their assigned stores and for reordering merchandise when a store is low on any KeHE products. In 2012, KeHE discharged several representatives as part of restructuring. Four of them sued, claiming that KeHE had failed to pay them overtime wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and seeking to certify a collective action. KeHE argued that many of the discharged employees had waived their right to participate in a collective action in their separation agreements, and that they are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA as “outside sales employees.” The district court upheld the validity of the waivers and certified a collective action consisting only of employees who had not signed or had modified their agreements. The district court then granted summary judgment for KeHE, holding that all of the plaintiffs were outside sales employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred with respect to the outside-sales-exemption issue and erred in excluding from the collective action those who had signed the waivers. View "Killion v. KeHE Distrib., LLC" on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

In 2002, Freeze was hired by the Decherd Police Department. He became Chief of Police in 2007. Colvin, Freeze’s brother-in-law, was hired as a patrolman in 2007. The Board of Aldermen is responsible for hiring and firing. During a February 2009 meeting, the Aldermen told Freeze that they “might need to just let [him] resign as the Chief and put [him] in as a sergeant at $15 an hour.” Freeze stated that “if it’s going to keep my job, yes, I will take a demotion.” After several confrontations during a March meeting, the Board terminated the employment of Colvin and Freeze. The city did not provide notice that terminations would be considered at the meeting, but claims that it provided oral notice that “general job performance may be discussed.” Neither officer was allowed to present witnesses or evidence. The separation notice regarding Freeze reads: “No reason given.” The city’s 1999 Personnel Resolution designates every city worker as an at-will employee with no property right in employment, but a 2000 Police Resolution states that “discipline shall be for cause and shall follow the basic concepts of due process.” The district court dismissed, finding that the officers possessed no property interest in continued employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the unequivocal language of the Police Resolution. View "Freeze v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

Hoven, a licensed pharmacist and a former at-will employee of Walgreen, is also the holder of a Michigan license to carry a concealed weapon. He experienced an armed robbery at work in 2007. Walgreen did not comply with his subsequent requests for additional security devices. In May, 2011, gun-wielding robbers entered Walgreen while Hoven was working the overnight shift. After one of the masked individuals pointed a gun at Hoven, Hoven drew his concealed weapon and fired it multiple times. No one was shot or injured during this incident. Eight days later, Hoven was terminated for violation of Walgreen’s non-escalation policy. Hoven brought suit alleging that he was terminated in violation of public policy for exercising his rights of self-defense, defense of others, and to carry a concealed weapon. The district court granted Walgreen’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Hoven failed to identify a public-policy source that supports his claimView "Hoven v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Brown claimed that he injured his shoulder while paving a road for his employer Ajax Paving, and sought workers’ compensation. Ajax introduced medical testimony suggesting that the injury occurred outside of work. While the case remained pending before the Michigan administrative agency, Brown and Ajax settled. Brown, however, thought that Ajax had introduced false medical testimony and that it had done the same to other employees, and sued Ajax and its insurers, claims administrators and the doctor, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Act, Brown must show that illegal racketeering activities have “injured [him] in his business or property.” The Sixth Circuit has held that “loss or diminution of benefits the plaintiff expects to receive under a workers’ compensation scheme does not constitute an injury to ‘business or property’ under RICO.” View "Brown v. Ajax Paving Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

After losing her job as an appraiser for St. Joseph County, Trayling filed a grievance with her union and a discrimination charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Department. The union refused to pursue the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement’s election-of-remedies clause prohibits use of the internal grievance process and an external process simultaneously. Trayling sued the county for age and disability discrimination, and sued the union and the county for implementing an allegedly unlawful election-of-remedies rule. The district court held that the election-of-remedies rule violated federal law. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not amount to a final decision; it did not even fully resolve the election-of-remedies claim (damages remain undecided), much less the whole case. An exception to the finality requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), does not apply because the order did not involve an injunction. View "Trayling v. St. Joseph Cnty. Emp'rs Chapter" on Justia Law

In 2003 Harris was hired as a resale buyer at Ford. Throughout her employment Harris suffered from IBS, an illness that causes fecal incontinence. On bad days, Harris was unable to drive to work or stand up from her desk without soiling herself. Harris began to take intermittent FMLA leave. Her absences started to affect her job performance. In 2005 Harris’s then-supervisor allowed her to work on a flex-time telecommuting schedule on a trial basis. The supervisor deemed the trial unsuccessful. Although her next supervisor did not approve remote work, Harris worked from home on an informal basis. The days that she stayed home were marked as absences. When Harris worked nights and weekends, she made mistakes and missed deadlines because she lacked access to suppliers. After Ford declined her request for a formal telecommuting arrangement, Harris complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Harris was terminated in 2009 and the EEOC sued, claiming that Ford discriminated against Harris on the basis of disability and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding find evidence that created a genuine dispute as to whether Harris was qualified to work as a resale buyer and whether she was terminated in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law