Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employee injured her wrist as a result of an equipment malfunction while performing her job and was sent to the hospital, where she was tested for drugs in accordance with a drug policy negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement. She tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently terminated. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The arbitrator sustained the Union's grievance, finding that employer lacked just cause to terminate a nine-year and otherwise satisfactory employee, who was not given adequate advance notice of the drug policy and the consequences. The district court ruled in favor of the Union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The outcome reached by the arbitrator was based on his interpretation of the relevant contractual language, which is all a court is asked to determine in conducting "exceedingly deferential," "very limited" review.

Plaintiff became a firefighter-member in the department in 1991 and also became an administrative assistant in 1997. She alleges that defendant, fire chief until 2005, subjected her to unwanted sexual advances and verbal and physical contact of a sexual nature. She filed charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2004. In 2006 the EEOC determined that firefighter "members" are employees, even if not paid, and that plaintiff was sexually harassed and subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, but that there was insufficient evidence to support allegations of retaliation and constructive discharge. The district court dismissed Title VII claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court did not consider and weigh all aspects of the firefighters' relationship with the department in determining that they were not "employees" under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b); remuneration is a factor, but not decisive. The firefighters received a number of other benefits, including insurance.

Plaintiff was hired as a nurse by defendant in October 2006, had to take leave for cancer treatment, then was informed that she had been terminated on December 12, 2006 because she did not have "any accrued PTO time or FMLA." The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding that plaintiff assented to a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The employee handbook stated: "Dispute Resolution Process Please refer to the Eby Companies Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) for details." That policy does refer to arbitration and contains a signature line. Plaintiff claims she did not receive or sign the policy and defendant did not provide a signed acknowledgment. There was no indication that plaintiff was notified of the existence of the arbitration agreement, much less that she manifested an intent to agree to its terms.

Following their termination from appointed county positions, plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law. The positions were "unclassified" and not protected under the Tennessee Civil Service Merit System. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and its officials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had no legitimate property right to their positions and nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. Plaintiffs, in their positions five to 21 years, never previously challenged the unclassified nature of their jobs

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate.

Husband and wife married in 1996, when husband was a training officer at a juvenile correctional facility and wife was working as the youth-services administrator at the same facility. In 2005 husband was terminated, after a disciplinary incident. He was later reinstated. Wife was subsequently demoted. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs' right of intimate association was clearly established long before husband was terminated and wife was demoted and transferred; it was objectively reasonable to require defendants to be aware of and observe the constitutional right. There was sufficient evidence that defendants were substantially motivated by wife's marriage in removing her from her position. Defendants did not present sufficient evidence that wife would have been demoted and transferred absent her protected association.

The company fired a worker, claiming poor performance and misconduct; the union claimed that the termination was based on union support and filed an NLRB charge. The union also began a campaign against the company that included auto-generated calls and e-mail that clogged the company's systems. The company filed suit under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court denied the company's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. 101, 104) because the suit involves a labor dispute and the union's attempts to publicize that dispute. The court later dismissed the suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the preliminary injunction, noting that the company had not made "reasonable efforts" to settle the dispute, but remanded the dismissal. The company adequately alleged that the union knowingly caused "transmission" of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to a protected computer. The union did not adequately allege an "unauthorized access" claim.

Petitioner worked as an underground surveyor for a coal company for more than 22 years. He filed an unsuccessful claim for black lung benefits (30 U.S.C. 901) about a year after being laid off. He filed a second claim 10 years later, accompanied by medical opinions and x-ray interpretations. The DOL provided a pulmonary examination for each claim. The first diagnosed shortness of breath of unknown etiology but opined that petitioner suffered no impairment. The second resulted in diagnosis of restrictive lung disease, right mid lung density, bilateral hilar adenopathy and concluded that there was no impairment. An ALJ rejected the second claim. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated for consideration under an amendment to the Act, under which a miner who worked underground for at least 15 years and who demonstrates that he suffers from a total respiratory disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis (30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4)). Rebuttal requires an affirmative showing; it is not enough to show that medical evidence does not include a well documented opinion of pneumoconiosis. The ALJ failed to consider all evidence relevant to the issue of disability.

Plaintiff, employed by a company contracted to do grounds maintenance, was injured while mowing grass at an Army base. A deteriorating steam pipe fell, striking him in the head. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, reasoning that under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Law, the United States was an up-the-ladder contractor, or statutory employer, so that plaintiff's only remedy was the workers' compensation benefits he received from his direct employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the U.S. government is a "person" entitled to the up-the-ladder defense and that the waiver of immunity under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, provides for claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual. The government "secured the payment of compensation" by hiring a contractor and, therefore, cannot be treated as an employer that did not secure benefits. The work performed by plaintiff was a "regular and recurrent" part of work at the facility and the government was entitled to contractor immunity.

After being fired from his position as operations manager for a regional passenger airline, plaintiff sued, alleging "association discrimination" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4). Plaintiff is not disabled; his wife suffers from Polyarteritis Nodosa, a rare and debilitating autoimmune disorder. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While his wife's condition may have precipitated plaintiff's poor performance, plaintiff did not present evidence that he was fired because of her condition, rather than his performance.