Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

DiPonio Construction entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, which it subsequently terminated according to the terms of the agreement. DiPonio refused to bargain for a new agreement and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held that even if it possibly had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to decide this issue, it would be inappropriate to exercise it, and imposed sanctions (attorney fees) against DiPonio under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate issue is whether the CBA was entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a). If the CBA was a section 8 contract, DiPonio had no duty to negotiate for a new CBA; however, if it is a section 9(a) contract it did. DiPonio’s claims are clearly “primarily representational” and fall within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act guarantees returning veterans reemployment with their former employers and prohibits employers from discriminating against veterans based on their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335. Petty claimed that Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County violated USERRA in its treatment of him after he returned to Metro’s police department from active duty in the U.S. Army: Metro failed to restore him to his former position of patrol sergeant and discriminated against him on the basis of his military service. Metro had declined to reinstate him because of his alleged dishonesty concerning his military discipline history. Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Petty on his reemployment claims and ordered Metro to reinstate him to his former position as a patrol sergeant; the court awarded Petty back pay and partial liquidated damages on his reemployment claims and ruled in his favor on his discrimination claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Metro was on notice of its obligation to reinstate Petty, but never did so.

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit.

Chattman, an African American, worked as a shipping coordinator, and had been with the company for 20 years when Tullock, a Caucasian and then Human Resources Director, recommended that management terminate Chattman’s employment following an incident of “horseplay,” during which a worker was injured. Chattman cited three incidents in which Tullock made racial comments as evidence of his animosity toward African Americans. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on claims under Title VII, 42 U .S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Chattman has presented evidence of Tullock’s discriminatory animus and offered sufficient proof to create genuine issues of fact as to intent and causation, so that summary judgment was improper. The adverse employment actions alleged by Chattman and any damages are matters to be resolved by a jury.

Doe sued the Salvation Army and its warehouse supervisor, claiming employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The supervisor allegedly inappropriately asked him in an interview what kind of medications Doe was taking and refused to hire Doe as a truck driver when Doe responded that he was taking “psychotropic” medications. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, holding that material issues of fact existed as to Doe’s disability and the legitimacy of the warehouse’s safety concerns. On remand, the court granted the Salvation Army summary judgment on the basis that it was a religious organization and not principally engaged in social services. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The statutory definition of “program or activity” permits consideration of the whole organization if the organization is principally engaged in the business of providing social services. That the Salvation Army views its social service as a way of spreading its spiritual teachings is not dispositive; an activity can be both.

Keys filed a class-action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging claims of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court dismissed, finding that Keys failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of “McDonnell Douglas.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at the pleading stage and the complaint detailed several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances.

Gecewicz began working for the hospital in 1998. She took Earned Time Off leave and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, during her employment due to a number of surgical procedures. She was never disciplined for any of these absences. Over the years, her supervisor commented several times about her surgeries. In 2007, Gecewicz accrued a number of unscheduled absences from work. She received a written warning that she had accrued seven occurrences. In 2008, she received a written warning that she had seven occurrences and was eligible for termination at nine. According to her supervisor, Gecewicz failed to show up for work on May 22, 2008, accruing three “occurrences” under hospital policy. At a meeting with management, Gecewicz did not argue the number of absences and was fired. In March 2009, Gecewicz filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC), claiming that her termination violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12300. The district court entered summary judgment for the hospital, holding that she could not show that she was "regarded as" having a disability, and that the hospital had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The company services oil wells and hired Wasek as a derrick hand to work in the tower of an oil rig. It assigned Wasek to work on a four-man crew in Pennsylvania that included Ottobre, with whom he initially shared a hotel room. Ottobre discovered that he could rile Wasek with sexually explicit stories. On the rig, Ottobre began touching Wasek in a sexual manner and inflamed the situation with comments such as “you know you like it sweetheart.” Wasek found no help from his boss, who advised Wasek not to report to the Director of Operations or he would put Wasek on a “starvation schedule” and run him off the job. The problem escalated and Wasek left the job site. Wasek called the company on a regular basis thereafter, asking for immediate work. He became frustrated and started work with another company and filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(g), and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2201. The district court granted the company summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Wasek did not show that the bullying and harassment occurred because of his gender.

The 119-bed nursing home has 43 charge nurses, represented by AFL-CIO Local 1548 since 2003, when the Regional Director found the charge nurses to be statutory employees and the Board denied review. The 45 certified nursing aides are represented by the UAW. Seven stipulated supervisors manage the nursing department. After a 2004 collective bargaining agreement expired, the employer filed a unit-clarification petition to have the Board determine that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors under 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Regional Director denied the petition. The Board denied review, noting that it may have been error to allow the employer to relitigate the previously resolved supervisor issue. Because the employer refused the Union’s request to bargain and to provide information, the Union filed unfair-labor-practice charges. The General Counsel issued a complaint. The employer admitted refusing to bargain but claimed that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors. The General Counsel filed a summary-judgment motion, which was granted by the Board. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the Union, rejecting an argument that charge nurses are supervisors because they had the authority to assign, responsibly direct, discipline, hire, and transfer other employees, or effectively recommend these actions.

Defendant dismissed Lewis from her position as a registered nurse at one of the company's retirement homes. Lewis sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), in 2007, claiming that the company fired her because she had a medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and that occasionally required her to use a wheelchair. The company responded that it dismissed Lewis based on an outburst at work. The ADA prohibited discrimination "because of" the disability of an employee. The district court adopted the company’s proposed jury instruction: that Lewis could prevail only if "the fact that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was the sole reason for the defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff." The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, and stated that neither the use of "solely" nor plaintiff’s proposed "motivating factor" was appropriate.