Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants were employed as grips with Spring Break Louisiana (Employer) for the filming of Spring Break '83 (the movie). Throughout the filming period, Appellants were members of a union (Union), which entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Employer. Later, Appellants filed a grievance against Employer alleging they had not been paid wages for work they performed. Union and Employer entered into a settlement agreement pertaining to disputed hours allegedly worked by Appellants. Before the settlement agreement was signed by Union representatives, Appellants filed a lawsuit against Employer and several individuals (Appellees), alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the individual Appellees were not employers under the FLSA; and (2) Appellants released any FLSA claims against Employer by accepting settlement payments for those claims.

Petitioner, the former employer of a retired longshoreman, challenged a Benefits Review Board (BRB) decision that overruled an ALJ twice and held petitioner liable for the longshoreman's hearing loss. The court held that the BRB erred in rejecting expert evidence in part and in then rejecting the ALJ's first conclusion based on his evaluation of the evidence. Further, the court need not reach the aggravation rule issue raised by petitioner. Because the BRB initially applied the wrong legal test and standard of review to the ALJ's decision, the court reversed.

The Board found that EPE, an electric utility, engaged in unfair labor practices prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151-169, in response to the Union's successful organizational efforts to add employee groups in the bargaining unit. EPE contended that the record did not support the Board's findings. The court held that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and affirmed the judgment.

This case arose when plaintiff sought workers' compensation from Wal-Mart's carrier after she suffered a lower-back injury on July 28, 1997. At issue was whether a claim for a bad faith denial of workers' compensation benefits was untimely brought by plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff's original claim was barred by Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations. Her new allegations as to a continuing violation and other instances of bad faith did not state a claim. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the entirety of her second amended complaint.

A Texas jury found that a corporate staffing company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., when it refused to allow a deaf woman to apply for a warehouse job, awarding her back pay, compensatory, and punitive damages. On appeal the company raised several issues. The court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute; the district court's finding - that the company's failure to account for its delay was dispositive, outweighing the other three factors for assessing good cause - was well supported and squarely within its sound discretion; the court rejected the company's claim that because the EEOC failed to provide computations for compensatory and punitive damages, the EEOC should have been precluded from seeking any damages whatsoever; the district court's analysis of punitive damages was considered, fair, and in no way an abuse of discretion; and the court rejected the company's challenges to the district court's imposition of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, 64 former employees of DuPont who worked at the company's manufacturing facility in La Porte, Texas, filed suit against DuPont alleging that they were fraudulently induced to terminate their employment with DuPont and accept employment with a wholly owned subsidiary. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims and entered a take-nothing final judgment in favor of DuPont. The court deferred to the Texas appellate courts and concluded that the 60 day termination clause at issue rendered the covered employees' employment with DuPont at-will for the purpose of Texas law. Accordingly, they could not bring fraud claims against DuPont for loss of their employment and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a law enforcement park ranger, was transferred to a staff ranger position based on the conclusion of a medical review board constituted by the National Park Service that his uncontrolled diabetes could prevent him from safely performing his duties. Plaintiff filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming that his transfer amounted to discrimination on the basis of his alleged disability. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the record supported the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the business necessity defense and its grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department was proper.

Plaintiff asserted federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and under 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, asserting that his employer subjected him to racial discrimination. At the time plaintiff filed both his EEOC charge and his complaint initiating the instant case, plaintiff was a debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding, having filed a petition for bankruptcy. The employer subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff should be judicially estopped from pursuing his claims against the employer because he failed to disclose those claims to the bankruptcy court. The district court granted the motion, dismissing plaintiff's case, and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to plaintiff's claims after finding that plaintiff failed to create a fact issue regarding his purported inadvertence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in denying their motions to remand and in dismissing their workplace safety claims as time-barred. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Dresser failed to properly monitor and mitigate exposure to loud noise at Dresser's industrial facility and that these failures led to long-term hearing loss. The court concluded that Dresser owed plaintiffs duties under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and simultaneously owed non-negotiable, independent duties under Louisiana tort law. These duties formed the bases for two distinct types of claims - contract and tort - either of which plaintiffs could have brought before the district court. Plaintiffs chose to sue in tort, without reference to the CBA, and their claims could be adjudicated by sole resort to Louisiana tort law. Applying the Supreme Court's construction of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), the district court was without jurisdiction and therefore erred in denying the motions to remand and in granting the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

In this employment discrimination case, the EEOC and Thomas D. Turner (collectively, plaintiffs), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing all plaintiffs' claims that the decisions to discipline Turner and three other African American employees for putative work-rule violations were based on race in violation of federal and state law. The court affirmed with respect to the claims based on the decisions to discipline Jesse Frank and Clarence Cargo because the court concluded that the EEOC had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to those decisions. However, the court reversed with respect to the claims based on the decisions to discipline Turner and Lester Thomas because the court concluded that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination; and that defendant failed to produce admissible evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for those decisions. Thus, a jury question existed as to whether the decisions to discipline Turner and Thomas were impermissibly based on race.