Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former assistant attorney general for the Louisiana DOJ, claimed that LDOJ discriminated against her by declining to provide a free on-site parking space to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and violated the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., by terminating her employment in retaliation for charges she filed with the EEOC. The court concluded that, because the district court erred in requiring a nexus between the requested accommodation and the essential functions of plaintiff's position, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of the retaliation claim because the LDOJ has offered a non-retaliatory explanation for plaintiff's dismissal and because plaintiff has presented no evidence of pretext. View "Feist v. State of Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her secondary employer, Keppel Amfels, alleging that it violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), by discouraging her primary employer, staffing agency Perma-Temp, from seeking her reinstatement after an FMLA-authorized maternity leave. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to create a fact issue that Keppel Amfels's actions went beyond what the relevant FMLA statutory regulatory provisions allowed, her claims failed regardless of whether intent was an element of her claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Keppel Amfels. View "Cuellar v. Keppel Amfels, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq., requires that certain employers provide written notice within 60 days in advance of any "mass layoff" at a "single site of employment." Plaintiffs filed suit against Signal, alleging that Signal's reduction in employment constituted a mass layoff under the WARN Act and Signal violated the Act by failing to provide proper notice. The district court concluded that Signal's two facilities constituted a single site of employment because they fell into a regulatory exception for "truly unusual organizational situations," and thus, workforce levels were to be measured across both facilities. The district court also concluded that the "snapshot" date of June 24, 2009, was representative of ordinary employment levels at Signal. The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that there was a mass layoff under the Act where the parties have stipulated that there was a mass layoff during the 90-day period following July 24, 2009, the date of the first layoff alleged by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis, et al. v. Signal Int'l Texas GP, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employer seeking deferred compensation payments. The district court held that plaintiffs' deferred compensation arrangements in their Employment Agreement contracts with the employer constituted a plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Because plaintiffs' deferred compensation arrangements did not necessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, there was no ERISA plan. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted by ERISA. View "Cantrell, et al. v. Briggs & Veselka Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs became eligible for an award of overtime wages after a jury found plaintiffs, executive managers of Party City, were misclassified by their employer as exempt under the the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. At issue on appeal was how much overtime pay Party City owed to its employees under the FLSA. The court held that the record evidence clearly showed that plaintiffs were paid a fixed weekly salary and were expected to work fluctuating weekly hours. Therefore, the district court's 55-hour method of calculating unpaid overtime damages was error, because it miscomprehended the employment arrangement and utilized a divisor of 55 in calculating plaintiffs' regular rate of pay rather than applying a divisor equal to the number of hours actually worked in such workweek. Accordingly, the court reversed the erroneous amount of damages awarded and vacated the amount of actual damages, remanding for recalculation. The court also vacated the award of liquidated damages and the amount of attorneys' fee award, remanding for reconsideration. View "Ransom, et al. v. M. Patel Enterprises, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a nonsubscriber action under Texas Labor Code 406.033 against her employer, Home Depot, claiming that Home Depot's negligence caused her on-the-job-injury. On appeal, Home Depot appealed the district court's remand after Home Depot removed the case to federal court. Because the policy underlying 28 U.S.C. 1445(c) and this court's instruction that ambiguities in removal statutes should be construed against removal, the district court construed section 1445(c) in favor of remand. Accordingly, the court had no authority to review such remand orders and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "Ernewayn v. Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, W-G, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., after W-G terminated his employment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for W-G on the ADA claim, concluding that plaintiff was "currently engaging" in illegal drug use and was fired "on the basis of such use," and that plaintiff did not qualify for the safe harbor under section 12114(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of W-G on plaintiff's FMLA claim where no reasonable jury could find that he was denied reinstatement for any reason other than his refusal to continue his FMLA leave period for the express purpose for which it was taken, which was completing his drug dependency treatment. View "Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., et al." on Justia Law

KBR allegedly accepted kickbacks from two companies angling to win subcontracts on KBR's prime contract to service American armed forces in military theaters across the world. At issue on appeal was whether, and if so under what conditions, the Anti-Kickback Act's (AKA), 41 U.S.C. 55(a)(1), civil suit provision extended vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its employees. The court discerned no persuasive evidence of congressional intent in section 55(a) to vary from the common law norm of permitting vicarious liability for employee actions taken under apparent authority. The court reversed the district court's ruling granting KBR's motion to dismiss the government's AKA claim, concluding that the district court erred in finding that section 55(a)(1) did not allow the government to allege vicarious liability. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Hays County Sheriff's Office for over twenty years, filed suit alleging constitutional violations against Hays County; the Sheriff's Office; and Sheriff Gary Cutler, in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff claimed that the comments he made during the Sheriff's Election motivated his demotion. The court found that defendants failed to show that they would have terminated plaintiff in the absence of his protected speech and, in the alternative, plaintiff was speaking as a citizen and his letter to the editor was protected speech under the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact relating to his claim of First Amendment retaliation and that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Haverda v. Hays County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against GE Energy, alleging violations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h) (the "whistleblower-protection provision", because GE Energy terminated him after he made an internal report of a possible securities law violation. The court concluded that the plain language of section 78u-6 limited protection under the whistleblower provision to those individuals who provided information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. In this instance, plaintiff did not provide any information to the SEC and, therefore, he did not qualify as a "whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his claim. View "Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C." on Justia Law