Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, alleging that after fulfilling his two-week training obligation with the Army Reserve, he was terminated in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4335, and Texas Government Code 613.001-613.023. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to apply collateral estoppel to the ALJ's finding in a state administrative proceeding where a finding that plaintiff was discharged due to a disagreement about military service was not the equivalent of a finding that the County was motivated by his military status to discharge him; the court did not analyze the possible collateral estoppel effects of the ALJ's decision on a section 4312 claim because no one has briefed it; and the technical failure to plead all the currently presented defenses did not prevent consideration of them. The court also concluded that section 613.021 established venue in state court and had no effect on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment. View "Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff became eligible for an award of unpaid overtime wages after her employer misclassified her as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court's application of the "Fluctuating Workweek" (FWW) method of calculating overtime was not warranted in this case. The court held that the record evidence showed that there was no agreement between plaintiff and her employer that she would receive a fixed weekly wage to work fluctuating hours. Therefore, there was no basis on these facts to apply the FWW method of calculating plaintiff's overtime premiums using the half-time multiplier. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for recalculation. View "Black v. SettlePou, P.C." on Justia Law

The Benefits Review Board ordered Sherwin to pay respondent benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, when respondent, a dockworker, was injured in one of Sherwin's waterside ore processing facilities. The court concluded that respondent's injury did not occur on a LHWCA-covered situs because the underground transport tunnel where respondent was injured was not used in the vessel-unloading process under section 903(a). Accordingly, the court granted Sherwin's petition for review and remanded to the Board to dismiss respondent's claim. View "BPU Mgmt., Inc., et al. v. DOWCP, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of an accident aboard Estis Rig 23, a barge supporting a truck-mounted drilling rig. The principal issue was whether seamen could recover punitive damages for their employer's willful and wanton breach of the general maritime law duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Like maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness was established as a general maritime claim before the passage of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104; punitive damages were available under general maritime law; and the Jones Act did not address unseaworthiness or limit its remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that punitive damages remained available as a remedy for the general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness. View "McBride, et al. v. Estis Well Service L. L. C." on Justia Law

Police officers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, alleging, inter alia, that the Lafayette PD Defendants imposed a "code of silence" to prevent police officers from reporting certain civil rights abuses and corruption within the police department and that these defendants retaliated against them for objecting to these practices. On appeal, police officers challenged the district court's grant of a protective order requiring, among other things, that a particular website they operated be "taken down" in its entirety, which was issued at the request of officials and entities within the Lafayette PD. Concluding that the court had appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the entirety of the website was substantially likely to cause prejudice; the district court's determination that the entire website demonstrated a substantial likelihood of impacting the jury venire was overbroad and clearly erroneous; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Marceaux, et al. v. Lafayette City-Parish Con. Gov't, et al." on Justia Law

The DOJ filed suit against the City in order to remedy the patterns or practices identified in an investigation of conduct by the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) that subjected individuals to excessive force, unlawful searches and seizures, and discriminatory policing practices. On the same day the complaint was filed, the City and the DOJ agreed to a proposed consent decree outlining reform measures for the NOPD. On appeal, the City challenged the district court's orders entering judgment on the consent decree and denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b). The court concluded that the City consented to both consent decrees at issue; the City could afford to fund both consent decrees; the secondary employment provisions of the NOPD consent decree did not violate federal or state law; the investigations and negotiations with the DOJ were not tainted by the actions of DOJ employees; and procedural deficiencies did not taint the district court's approval process and further erode the City's consent. Accordingly, the court rejected the City's contentions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer after he was injured in a slip and fall accident on the job. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment based in part on plaintiff's subjective awareness of the risk the spill presented. The court held that the district court erred in relying on plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the spill to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer because Section 406.033(a) of the Texas Labor Code took the employee's own negligence off of the table for a non-subscriber like the employer; there was a fact issue regarding the necessity of the product at issue to clean the spill; and the district court improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's premises liability claim. In regards to plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim, the court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether plaintiff's necessary-instrumentalities theory was sufficient to support a stand-alone ordinary negligence claim. In regards to plaintiff's gross negligence claim, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable juror could conclude that the employer was consciously indifferent to the safety of its employees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Department of the Army, alleging age discrimination and retaliation claims. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., federal sector provision applied here, and the court need not decide whether a federal plaintiff must prove but-for-causation or some lesser standard under 29 U.S.C. 633a because plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim for relief under the heightened, but-for standard in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief could be granted under section 633a where plaintiffs were within the protected class under the ADEA, plaintiffs were qualified for the two newly-created positions at issue; plaintiffs were not selected for the positions; a "substantially younger" employee was selected for one of the positions instead; and one of the officials with decision-making authority over the younger employee's selection said that the department needed "new blood." Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' age discrimination claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Leal, et al. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chevron alleging that it terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron. Under the mixed-motive framework, plaintiff was assumed to have established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. At issue was the second step of the framework requiring that Chevron articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The court concluded that Chevron failed to meet its burden and establish as a matter of law that it would have fired plaintiff despite its retaliatory motive where, inter alia, Chevron's evidence of plaintiff's history of attendance and performance-related deficiencies was insufficient to establish that it would have fired plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., against the Army after plaintiff, an employee of a private Army contractor, was injured on the job when he tripped and fell. Plaintiff sued the Government for negligence and premises liability because he found that the workers' compensation benefits he received through his employer's policy was insufficient to cover his needs. Under Texas law, general contractors who require subcontractors to provide workers' compensation insurance to their employees and who pay for that coverage were "statutory employers" protected by the exclusive-remedy provision. In this instance, the parties agreed that the Government has taken the basic steps it needed to take to avail itself to the exclusive-remedy rule as a statutory employer. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not allege a lack of notice or prejudice from any lack of notice, the federal government was in "like circumstances" as a Texas statutory employer. Accordingly, plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were his exclusive remedy, and his claims against the Government were properly dismissed. View "Willoughby, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law