Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for his former employer on his claims of hostile work environment and for constructive discharge. The court held that summary judgment was granted in error on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment based on age where the allegations at issue were for the trier of fact to resolve. As to the claim of hostile work environment based on religion, the court held that plaintiff had pointed to certain instances of acrimony based on religion that, based on the standard of review, supported the court's conclusion that the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was reversible error. The court further held that plaintiff's allegations regarding the claim of constructive discharge survived summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was a secretary of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. during his service as a district judge until Porteous was impeached and the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit suspended Porteous's authority to employ staff, which resulted in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff sued the Judicial Council and fifteen of its members seeking declaratory relief, reinstatement to her position, monetary relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order insofar as it dismissed her claims against the members of the Judicial Council. The court held that plaintiff lacked prudential standing to bring her constitutional challenge to the Judicial Council's action. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ultra vires exception applied to sovereign immunity where her claims for injunctive relief were moot in light of Porteous's removal from office; claims for back pay and retirement credits were barred by sovereign immunity; and plaintiff lacked the necessary injury-in-fact to pursue declaratory relief. The court also held that even if plaintiff had standing to seek declaratory relief, she had not pleaded a sufficient claim of ultra vires action by the Judicial Council to overcome the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Thomas E. Clemmons, the former director of operations for Ameristar Airways, Incorporated (Ameristar), filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting air safety issues to the Federal Aviation Administration. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (Board) found a violation of the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, ordering an award of back pay. The court held that because Clemmons had presented a prima facie case of retaliation and adduced evidence capable of rebutting Ameristar's proffered explanations, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of liability. The court held, however, that because the question of whether Clemmons' insubordinate email, which was after-acquired evidence, "was of such severity that [he] would have been terminated on these grounds alone" was a question of fact, the court remanded to the agency to make that determination and to adjust the back pay award if necessary.

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiff sued her former employer alleging various sex discrimination claims and a retaliatory termination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), Texas Lab. Code 21.001-21.556. A jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded her $3,450,000 in back pay and compensatory and punitive damages. Applying Title VII's damages cap, the district court reduced the jury's award to a total of $500,000, representing $300,000 in backpay and $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The employer appealed the judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's liability and punitive damages findings and plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its application of the damages cap. The court held that there was ample evidence by which the jury could conclude that the employer had a corporate culture hostile to women, that this discriminatory animus extended to its management, and that plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to terminate her. Consequently, the district court did not err in denying the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's discrimination termination claim and affirmed the compensatory damages award. The court also held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict as to liability on plaintiff's quota claim, there was insufficient evidence to support its back pay reward. The court further held that the district court did not err in applying Title VII's compensatory and punitive damages cap. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to the jury's $150,000 back pay award for plaintiff's quota claim and affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination when defendant terminated his contract. Plaintiff, who was white, served as the attorney for defendant for 24 years and was subsequently replaced by a black women as defendant's attorney. At issue was whether the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The court held that plaintiff did not meet his burden of presenting legally-sufficient evidence on which the jury could conclude that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on his race and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant under Rule 50(a)(1). The court also rejected plaintiff's claim that he had superior qualifications than the new attorney and plaintiff's argument that the district court erred by refusing to admit a certain article under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(c) and 802.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, University Healthcare System, L.C. (UHS), for sex discrimination, retaliation, breach of oral contract, violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), and violation of the Louisiana Wage Payment Statute (LWPS), La. Rev. Stat. Ann 23:631. Both parties raised challenges on appeal relating to either the admission or discoverability of evidence. The court reversed the district court's award in favor of plaintiff under the LWPS and vacated the judgment as to that claim where there was no evidence of any completed oral contract to pay plaintiff the bonus and the jury's conclusion that such an obligation existed could not be justified based on the record. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees related to the LWPS claim to plaintiff and vacated the judgment as to the amount of fees rewarded. The court further held that, in all other respects, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees attributable to plaintiff's EPA claim. Plaintiff's trial counsel's motion for leave to assert privilege for attorneys' fees and costs on judgment was denied without prejudice to asserting the rights claimed therein by other means.

New York Marine & General Insurance Company ("NYMAGIC") and Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania ("NUFIC-PA") were both insuring Bayou Steel Corporation ("Bayou") when an employee of Bayou's Illinois stevedoring contractor, Kindra Marine Terminal ("Kindra"), was injured during Kindra's unloading of Bayou's steel bundles from a vessel belonging to Memco Barge Lines ("Memco"). Memco had contracted with Bayou to haul the cargo for Bayou by barge from Louisiana to Illinois. At issue was whether Kindra was Bayou's contractor or subcontractor for purposes of the provision in NYMAGIC's policy that excluded coverage of Bayou's liability for bodily injury incurred by employees of Bayou's subcontractors but did not exclude coverage of such injuries incurred by Bayou's contractors. The court held that, because Bayou was the principal party, paying party, and not the prime contractor, performance party, under both its barge transportation agreement with Memco and its offloading agreement with Kindra, there was no way for Kindra to have been a subcontractor of Bayou within the intendment of NYMAGIC's policy's exclusion of coverage. Kindra contracted directly with Bayou, not with some contractor of Bayou, to offload Bayou's cargo, so Kindra was Bayou's contractor. Accordingly, NYMAGIC's coverage exclusion did not apply to the employee's injuries because he was the employee of a contractor of Bayou.

Plaintiff filed an original petition in Texas state court alleging violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, violations of Texas state law under the Texas whistleblower statute, and common law defamation. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the case to Texas state court after all federal claims had been deleted and only Texas state law claims remained. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to remand where the balance of the statutory and common law factors weighed heavily in favor of remanding the pendent Texas state law claims and where Carnegie Univ. v. Cohill did not permit the court to turn any allegation of improper forum manipulation into a trump card which could defeat the heavy balance of the other relevant considerations. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on each Texas state law claim, reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand, and remanded the case with instructions to the district court to remand the Texas state law claims to the Texas state court from which the case was removed.

Plaintiffs, employers at a terminal for a trucking company, brought claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment against defendant, their employer. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed each of plaintiff's claims. The court held that summary judgment was proper where the chief district judge's opinion granting summary judgment was thorough and well-reasoned, based on evidence that plaintiffs properly presented and where the district court had no duty to "comb the entire record" for evidence.