Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims against defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful termination. The court held that UTMB was entitled to immunity from suit where plaintiff conceded that UTMB was a state agency and failed to argue that Texas had consented to suit, nor had Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity from section 1983 suits. The court also held that, putting aside plaintiff's purported property interest in his employment, plaintiff failed to identify a genuine dispute that his termination was arbitrary or capricious, or that the decision was made without professional judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for appellees (GNOFCU and Cumis). The district court found that GNOFCU did not violate either the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. 1790b, or La. Rev. State. Ann. 23:967(A), by terminating plaintiff's employment after she complained of possible fraud in the company's lending practices. Because the court found that the district court minimized key evidence in finding no causal link between plaintiff's termination, demotion, and pay decrease, and her National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) complaints, and because section 23:967 seemed to offer broader protections than its federal counterpart, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zurich, SRS, and an insurance adjuster on his claim for wrongful denial and delay of workers' compensation benefits under Texas state and common law. At issue on appeal was whether appellees complied with the duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving appellant's claim. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that appellant failed to raise a material fact issue with respect to his common-law bad faith cause of action.

This case arose when Cat Tech sought indemnification from its insurers after Cat Tech damaged several components of a hyrotreating reactor owned by Ergon Refining, Inc. and arbitrators entered an award against Cat Tech for the damage. Insurers subsequently denied the claim, contending, inter alia, that the "your work" exclusion found in the policies precluded coverage for damage to the reactor. The district court found that insurers had no duty to indemnify Cat Tech. The court held that the information contained in the arbitration award was insufficient to properly apply the "your work" exclusion. As such, the court concluded that the district court erred when it relied on the award in granting insurer's summary judgment motion. On remand, the district court should conduct any additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether the damage suffered by Ergon's reactor was limited only to those components upon which Cat Tech worked, or instead included other components unrelated to Cat Tech's operations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 by a terminated employee against his former union, which represented him in a grievance hearing in connection with his termination. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against him on account of his race by failing to argue during the grievance hearing that he was being terminated for a racially discriminatory reason. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim for racial discrimination by the union under section 1981, and therefore the district court was correct to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff sued his former employer under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq., to recover profit sharing and retirement benefits that were allegedly withheld from him. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on his claims that the employer breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty and violated ERISA's disclosure requirements. The district court also awarded plaintiff statutory penalties and attorney's fees. The court affirmed the district court's award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty and attorney's fees. The court held, however, that the summary allocation report contained no information about how a participant could elect to receive a rollover distribution, nor did it inform the participant of her rights under the profit-sharing plan. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for additional findings on whether the employer failed to furnish plaintiff with the requisite documents under ERISA 104(b)(1), and if so, whether that omission served as a basis for statutory penalties.

Plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit against her former employer and at issue, on appeal, was whether plaintiff's claim was time barred. The district court held that plaintiff did not experience an adverse employment action until she was finally terminated on January 2, 2008. In the alternative, the district court found that the 180-day limitations period should be equitably tolled because the employer's actions induced plaintiff not to file suit until after the limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that the limitations period began to run upon the unequivocal notification that her employment would ultimately be terminated, absent any later equivocation which did not occur here. Based upon this record, plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The court also held that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer's actions prevented or discouraged her from filing a claim of age discrimination. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in holding that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim should be equitably tolled.

This case arose when plaintiff lost his right to previously awarded, but unexercised, Restricted Units under Merrill Lynch's "Long-Term Incentive Compensation Plan for Managers and Producers" (the Plan). Plaintiff asserted that he had a right to his Restricted Units under an exception to the general rule, that employees lost their rights to Restricted Units not heretofore unexercised, because he left the firm for "Good Reason" after a "Change in Control." The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff, holding that, under the applicable standard of review, Merrill Lynch's interpretation of the Plan was arbitrary. The court held that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing that no honest tribunal could have construed the Plan in any manner but his proffered reading and that Merrill Lynch had advanced an arbitrary reading of the Plan. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

The Union, representing certain employees at ExxonMobil's Baton Rouge refinery and chemical plant, brought suit to compel ExxonMobil to arbitrate two labor grievances pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court held that it was within the province of the courts to decide whether "a good faith claim by one party that the other party had violated a written provision" of the bargaining agreement had been asserted. The court also held that, in light of the clairty of the parties' agreement, the Union's claim that ExxonMobil violated Section 1131 of the agreement when the language of that section explicitly authorized its actions was not colorable and could not constitute a good faith claim within the meaning of the arbitration clause. The court agreed with ExxonMobil that Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp foreclosed reliance on Section 1151 of the agreement as an independent basis for the arbitrability of the contracting-out grievance. The court further held that for the same reasons that the court held that the contracting-out grievance was not arbitrable under Section 1151, Section 1151 could not serve as a basis for requiring arbitration of the post-reduction claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the contracting-out grievance, affirmed the district court's denial of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the post-reduction grievance, and reversed the district court's denial of ExxonMobil's motion for summary judgment.