Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of the Railroad for nearly 40 years, filed suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., claiming that the injuries to his knees, diagnosed after his retirement, were partly the result of the Railroad's negligence. A jury found such a connection and awarded damages. The court held that the evidence was insufficient on causation where no evidence was introduced to connect the worker's specific condition to the work that he performed. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment.

Plaintiff claimed and a jury found that he was constructively discharged from his UTSW faculty position because of racially motivated harassment by a superior. The jury also found that UTSW retaliated against plaintiff by preventing him from obtaining a position at Parkland Hospital after he resigned from UTSW. The court held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim, there was insufficient evidence of constructive discharge. Therefore, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for reconsideration of plaintiff's monetary recovery and attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff sued his employer and one of its owners, defendant, for violating the minimum wage standards under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206(a). Plaintiff argued that as a member of this Texas limited liability corporation, defendant was an "employer" under the FLSA and was therefore personally liable for the employer's violations. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. Applying the economic reality test to defendant, the court reaffirmed the district court's conclusion that no reasonable jury could have found him to be an employer where defendant was simply not sufficiently involved in the operation of the club. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose from the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151, 181, exclusive and mandatory dispute resolution process that applied to plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the RLA did not apply to them because they were no longer "employees" as contemplated by the RLA. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that even if the RLA applied to them as former employees, they complied with the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which allowed them to bring an action in federal district court pursuant to section 501(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court held that plaintiffs were employees under the RLA pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. In the alternative, plaintiffs were explicitly looking for a "contracted-for" judicial remedy following an adverse RLA-established Retirement Board ruling without showing any of the narrow exceptions to RLA exclusivity. Therefore, the court declined to depart from established precedent preventing parties from creating federal court jurisdiction where there was none. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In 2005, during plaintiff's employment, defendant issued an employee handbook, including a provision that all employment-related disputes, whether initiated by an employee or by defendant, would be "resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration," that disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act were among those subject to the arbitration policy, that disputes cannot be brought as class actions or in representative capacities, and that the Federal Arbitration Act was its governing authority. Plaintiff signed a receipt that reiterated the arbitration policy. After his employment ended, plaintiff filed a class action, alleging violation of the FLSA by failing to adequately compensate him and other similarly-situated employees for overtime work. The district court denied a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, finding that the provision was illusory because the employer retained the right to terminate or modify the provision at any time. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that under the provision the company could make amendments almost instantaneously.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law as to his claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, loss of overtime, and for punitive damages. The court concluded that the district court correctly found that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims for retaliation, loss of overtime and punitive damages, but that the evidence presented did support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was sexually harassed and that his employer failed to promptly respond to the harassment. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment on those claims.

This interlocutory appeal arose out of the deaths of two civilian drivers in a United States military supply-truck convoy in Iraq when insurgents attacked in April 2004. State tort claims were brought by or on behalf of spouses and family members of the decedents against KBR. KBR contended that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in which it argued that the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, provided plaintiffs exclusive remedy and preempted all state tort claims that have been asserted. The court concluded that the DBR preempted plaintiffs' state law claims and therefore did not consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the alternative grounds on which KBR sought dismissal.

Plaintiff brought a retaliation action against his former employer under the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a), 3730(h), 178 days after his termination. The district court, applying a 90-day limitations period borrowed from Texas state law, held that plaintiff's suit was untimely. The court held that because plaintiff filed his complaint within 178 days of his termination, he fell comfortably within either a two-year or three-year statute of limitations, and the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs.

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning the employer's proffered reason for firing her, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a trial on the merits.