Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

These appeals arose from an ALJ's order, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, finding that Gary Looney suffered disabling obstructive lung disease arising out of his work as a coal miner and awarding his widow black lung benefits payable by Looney's former employer. The court determined that the award of benefits was supported by the record and affirmed the award of benefits to Looney, denying his former employer's petition for review.

Plaintiff brought this action, alleging that her former employer, the County, unlawfully discriminated against her by offering her a less favorable severance package than that offered to male employees holding similar positions. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the theory that the discriminatory denial of a non-contractual employment benefit could not constitute an adverse employment action; the district court's alternative rationale for dismissing the complaint, that she suffered no adverse employment action because the County fired her before it made its allegedly discriminatory offer, also failed because it ignored the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and because Title VII protects both current and former employees from discriminatory adverse employment actions. The court granted leave to the district court to consider, in the first instance, two additional arguments raised by the County. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

In this case, a subcontractor to a subcontractor to a prime contractor with a federal agency brought a procedural due process claim against that agency and tort actions against a separate contractor for allegedly causing the termination of his at-will consulting agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff's case involved both the wrong defendants and the wrong claims. Because permitting these claims to go forward would reward artful pleading and impermissibly constitutionalize state tort law, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.

This appeal arose out of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCA on plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Because the court found that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether PCA took "tangible employment action" against plaintiff, the court reached neither the question of whether the district court erred by not determining whether Bobby Mills was a supervisor nor the question of whether the district court correctly applied the Faragher-Ellerth defense test. The court also held that there was uncertainty about whether there was a nexus between the harassment and plaintiff's alleged termination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.

Plaintiff commenced this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, alleging that he was a seaman in the employ of defendants and that he had been injured in the course of his employment by their negligence. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated that (1) he was a seaman and (2) his injury occurred during the course of his employment as a seaman. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim where it generally had federal question jurisdiction over Jones Act claims and plaintiff's complaint in particular alleged a colorable Jones Act claim in that it was not "so substantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions . . . , or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Franklin Insurance commenced this action against its insured, School Board, for a declaratory judgment that Franklin Insurance owed no duty to defend the School Board in an action commenced by the School Board employees for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), nor any duty to indemnify the School Board for any judgment that might be entered in the action. The court concluded that the failure to comply with FLSA was a wrongful act and that, while a judgment awarding unpaid wages would not be a covered loss under the policy because payment of those wages was a preexisting duty, any obligation to pay liquidated damages and attorneys' fees would cause the School Board a loss from a wrongful act, covered by the policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin Insurance.

Wachovia appealed from the district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award entered against it after it sued several former employees on what the arbitrators determined were frivolous claims. Wachovia argued that the arbitrators violated section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(3), and "manifestly disregarded" the law when they awarded attorneys' fees and costs under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act (FCPA), S.C. Code Ann. 15-36-10. The court held that arbitrators have broad discretion to set applicable procedure and the court would not overturn an award for violating section 10(a)(3)'s protection against "any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" where the arbitrators attempted to address the one party's unhappiness with the fairness of the hearing and that party refused to take advantage of the opportunity provided. The court could not hold that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when they awarded the attorneys' fees and costs where, in this case, the court found whether the arbitrators erred by not applying the FCPA's procedural requirements was a question that was itself not clearly defined and was subject to debate. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued his employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., asserting that his inability to work more than eight hours per day and rotate day/night shifts as a result of physical impairments rendered him disabled under the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that an inability to work overtime did not constitute a "substantial" limitation on a major life activity under the ADA and the record contained no evidence indicating that plaintiff's inability to work overtime "significantly restricted" his ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Named Claimants filed "class proofs of claims" in these consolidated bankruptcy cases in which Circuit City and related entities are the debtors. Named Claimants alleged that they, together with unnamed claimants, were owed almost $150 million in unpaid overtime wages. The court affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court with a different procedural approach for allowing claimants to file class proofs of claim and to present Rule 9014 motions. With respect to the bankruptcy court's ruling that in the circumstances of this case, the bankruptcy process would provide a process superior to the class action process for resolving the claims of former employees, the court concluded that the court's ruling fell within its discretion. With respect to these Named Claimants' challenge to notice, the court concluded that the notice to them was not constitutionally deficient - a conclusion with which they agreed - and that, with respect to unnamed claimants, the Named Claimants lacked standing to challenge the notice.

Plaintiff was hired as a medical technologist on December 24, 2007. On May 6, 2008, plaintiff and others met with the chief operating officer to discuss plaintiff's belief that her supervisor willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by altering time sheets to eliminate overtime. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on May 12. Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected activity (FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)). The district court dismissed, finding that an employee's complaint lodged within her company, as opposed to with a court or government agency, does not trigger the protection of the FLSA antiretaliation provision. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that intracompany complaints may constitute protected activity.