Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of appellees. The district court held that appellant failed to submit sufficient evidence to meet his burden with regard to various Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, claims. Appellees cross-appealed on the ancillary issue of whether the number of employees of the National Red Cross and the Greenbrier Valley Chapter could be aggregated for purposes of determining "employer" status. The court held that appellant did not meet the ADA's definitions of disability and affirmed the district court with regard to appellant's primary ADA claim; appellant's retaliation claim based on appellant's lifting restriction and on his workers' compensation request both failed; and appellant did not have sufficient evidence to support his confidentiality claim. The court also held that Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. dictated that the ADA's employee threshold was not a limit on jurisdiction but, rather, an element of the claim itself; the cross-appeal was not properly taken; and the court vacated the district court's ruling on the employee aggregation issue. View "Reynolds v. American National Red Cross" on Justia Law

This dispute related to Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., contributions made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The district court ordered return of certain allegedly mistaken employer contributions even though the plan administrator determined that the contributions were not made by mistake. Because the court found that the administrator's decision was not an abuse of discretion, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. Foodservice, Inc. v. Truck Drivers & Helpers Union" on Justia Law

In April 2010, Mike Miller resigned from his position as Project Director for WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, Inc. (WEC). Twenty days later, he made a presentation to a potential WEC customer on behalf of WEC's competitor, Arc Energy Services, Inc. (Arc). The customer ultimately chose to do business with Arc. WEC contended that before resigning, Miller, acting at Arc's direction, downloaded WEC's proprietary information and used it in making the presentation. Thus, it sued Miller, his assistant Emily Kelley, and Arc for, among other things, violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed WEC's CFAA claim, holding that the CFAA provided no relief for Appellees' alleged conduct. Upon review of the trial court record, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the court's opinion and therefore affirmed.

Plaintiffs David McCorkle and William Pender appealed a district court order dismissing two of their class action claims against Bank of America Corporation for alleged violations of certain provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Their claims centered on the Bank's use of a normal retirement age (NRA) that allegedly violated ERISA in calculating lump sum distributions and further ran afoul of ERISA's prohibition of "backloading" the calculation of benefit accrual. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it affirmed the district court's judgment to dismiss those claims.

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs James Brooks and Donald Hamlette, corrections officers at the Correctional Unit in Rustburg, Virginia, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants unlawfully fired them for exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech. "The Supreme Court has been quite clear, . . .that 'complaints about . . . the employee's own duties' that are filed with an employer using an internal grievance procedure . . . do[ ] not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly 'may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.'" The Fourth circuit therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

In this case, a group of hourly-wage employees of Perdue Farms, Inc. (Perdue) filed a civil conspiracy action under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs alleged that certain corporate managers of Perdue, human resources staff, and plant managers conspired to hire aliens not authorized to work in the United States in an effort to reduce labor costs. They asserted that this illegal hiring practice has caused the depression of wages paid to all hourly-wage employees at certain Perdue facilities. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a civil conspiracy claim upon which relief could be granted. After review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy because they did not sufficiently allege a violation of two predicate RICO acts.

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments ("LFRDs") and several of their former administrative employees brought suit against Defendants Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials contending that Defendants eliminated part of their funding in retaliation for opposing to legislation supported by Defendants. The district court dismissed the LFRDs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

In August 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Gwyniece Hutchins, a letter carrier with the United States Postal Service, stepped on an improperly fitted manhole cover maintained by the Town of Ninety Six, South Carolina. The manhole cover flipped up, and Plaintiff fell into the manhole, sustaining serious injuries. Because she was injured in the course of her duties as a United States Postal Service employee, she filed a claim for workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). The Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted Plaintiff's claim as covered by FECA and paid her lost wages and medical benefits. In 2007, Plainitff accepted an offer of judgment arising from a South Carolina state court action that she brought against the Town. The Department of Labor asserted that it was entitled to recover a portion of that judgment. Plaintiff opposed the Department of Labor's assertion, arguing that the Town was not a "person" under 5 U.S.C. sections 8131 and 8132 and that if 5 U.S.C. section 8131 was construed to allow such a claim, it would be unconstitutional. The Office of Workers' Compensation rejected Plaintiff's arguments and determined that the Department of Labor was entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiff paid the sum but appealed the Office of Workers’ Compensation's decision to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board. The Appeals Board affirmed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Department of Labor that the Town qualified as a "person other than the United States," the Court upheld the district court's determination that Plaintiff reimburse the Department of Labor from her judgment.

After Racheal Wilson, a new recruit for the Baltimore City Fire Department, tragically died during a "live burn" training exercise, her survivors and estate commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that the fire department violated Wilson's substantive due process rights by staging the exercise with deliberate indifference to her safety, so as to shock the conscience. The court concluded that because the complaint did not purport to allege that the fire department staged the live burn training exercise with the purpose of causing harm to Wilson or to any other recruit, it fell short of alleging a substantive due process violation in the context of the facts alleged, even though it might well allege causes of action under state law, as the complaint purported to do in other counts.