Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The National Labor Relations Board determined that five assistant residential program managers at a facility that provides residential and other services to at-risk juveniles were not "supervisors" (29 U.S.C. 2(3), 152(3)) and could participate in a unionizing vote. The Third Circuit upheld the determination. The employer did not establish that the five were directly responsible for supervision of others or exercise independent judgment.

Petitioner, a bookkeeper, part-time receptionist, and house-cleaner, developed reflexive sympathetic dystrophy after she fell. After reducing her hours, she stopped working in April 2008. Her application for disability benefits and SSI was denied in June 2008. In June 2009, she had a hearing before an ALJ, who denied her applications, finding that she was not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with certain limitations and that jobs meeting those criteria were available. Eight months later, the Appeals Council denied review. The district court held that the ALJ's RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ adequately explained the decision and properly relied on a 2008 report by the state agency medical consultant.

An employee, injured on the job, returned to work and presented a specialist's note, restricting her lifting. After five days her supervisor told her that her restrictions made it impossible for her to work and advised her to seek permanent disability. She submitted copies of additional doctors' notes in an effort to be reinstated, but the company concluded that the notes contained conflicting dates, contradictory answers on whether the medical condition was work related, ambiguities about the employee's ability to lift, and illegible content. The employee did not respond to requests for clarification, but filed a Workers' Compensation lawsuit and contacted the EEOC. She then filed suit, and, during discovery, turned over new copies of the notes. After plaintiff failed to produce originals at trial, there was conflicting testimony about the existence and location of originals. The district court declared a mistrial. Plaintiff sent the original notes to the court five days later. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, based on spoliation of evidence. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. It is not clear that plaintiff intentionally withheld the documents or that the company suffered severe harm.

The municipalities that make up the fire protection district had populations that were 69.6% Hispanic, 22.9% white, and 3.4% African-American. In 2008, the district employed 302 firefighters: 240 whites, 58 Hispanics, and two African-Americans. When this litigation began, the district sought to fill 35 to 40 new firefighter positions. Six Hispanic applicants earned passing scores on the firefighter exam and satisfied a residency requirement. Based on their scores they ranked 21, 25, 26, 45, 49, and 70 on the residents-only list. They would rank much lower if non-residents were included on the same list. The NAACP successfully sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the residency requirement was invalid as having a disparate impact on African-American applicants. The fire district and the Hispanic applicants appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the district's claims of concerns about impact on Hispanic applicants.

Until January, 2010, Cambria County owned the nursing- rehabilitation center, subject to the Pennsylvania State Public Employee Relations Act, 43 P.S. 1101.301(1). Employees were in a union; the most recent CBA ended in December, 2008. The facility was purchased by a private company, which retained most, but not all, of the employees. Some union officials were not retained. The company refused to recognize the union. The regional office of the NLRB issued a complaint, asserting unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), and (5) and obtained a temporary injunction requiring the company to bargain with the union, but not requiring reinstatement of the union officials. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the interim bargaining order and remanded with respect to the employees. The district court erred in abandoning a two-prong approach to Section 10(j) petitions for temporary relief in unfair labor practice situations, which requires "reasonable cause" to believe that the alleged unfair labor practice was committed and relief that is "just and proper."

Plaintiff, a white male, applied for the position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He was rejected because he lived in Rutherford; Newark has a residency requirement for non-uniformed employees. Plaintiff claimed the rule had a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics because Newark's population does not reflect the racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding area. In a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1),the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Third Circuit reversed. Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate relevant labor market. Even if the city of Newark itself is the relevant labor market, the court erred in its statistical analysis and applied an incorrect standard when analyzing the business necessity defense.

A registered nurse initiated a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207 and 216(b), when they implemented a policy subjecting the pay of certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction whether or not they performed compensable work during breaks. Defendants made an offer of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in the amount of "$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys' fees, costs and expenses as determined by the Court." The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed, first noting that the FLSA does not contain conditional class certification language. The court nonetheless applied the "relation back doctrine," which allows a district court to retain jurisdiction over a matter that would appear moot after expiration of a named plaintiff's individual claims, to prevent use of a Rule 68 offer as a "sword."

Defendant began working for plaintiff in 2006 and entered into agreements that contained restrictive covenants and an arbitration provision. In 2009 defendant left the company and allegedly began acting in violation of the covenants. The company filed suit, but did not mention the arbitration clause. The district court denied the company's request for a preliminary injunction; months later, it denied the company's motion to stay pending arbitration and enjoined arbitration. The company made the demand under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, more than 10 months after it initiated suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The company waived the right to enforce the arbitration agreement. The existence of a contractual "no waiver" provision did not require a court to disregard the company's conduct; its failure to notify defendant of its intent to seek arbitration substantively prejudiced defendant's approach to the case. In addition to substantive legal prejudice, defendant spent considerable time and money to educate his attorney in preparation for a trial.

A Caucasian former police officer claimed that disciplinary action against him and his 1999 termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, because it was retaliation for his opposition to the city's racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The Third Circuit affirmed, using the analysis from the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Once plaintiff established a prima facie case that his termination was motivated by his supervisor's retaliatory animus, it was the city's burden to come forward with evidence that it terminated plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action in preferring charges against plaintiff. The jury was properly instructed that it was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated after engaging in protected activity and that there was a causal connection between the termination and the protected activity.

The Township filed disciplinary charges against an officer, which were suspended pending state investigation, and placed him on paid leave. The state and county declined to investigate. The Township reinstituted charges. Before his hearing, the officer filed suit claiming violation of due process rights by publicizing charges and failing to provide a hearing before suspension; violation of the First Amendment by retaliating for requesting a hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the Township on due process claims, but denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. After a hearing, the board fired the officer. Because the officer waited until just before trial, the district court denied a motion to amend. He filed a new complaint, alleging retaliatory termination. The jury found for defendants on the First Amendment claims. The court dismissed the second suit, citing res judicata. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Res judicata does not bar claims predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint. The court properly instructed jurors that the township should prevail if it showed that it would have reached the same decision absent protected conduct. The officer's interest in a hearing before suspension with pay was outweighed by the township's interest in maintaining the integrity of its police force.