Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Mandel was hired by M&Q. She claims that, throughout her employment, she was sexually harassed and discriminated against by male managers, supervisors, and owners. In 2007, during a meeting, a manager became angry, repeatedly called Mandel a “bitch,” and screamed “shut the fuck up.” As a result, Mandel resigned; she then accepted another position. In her resignation, Mandel did not complain of harassment or discrimination, apparently concerned she would be denied her vacation time. Although Mandel complained about being told to make coffee, she did not complain about other alleged incidents. Mandel testified that she understood policies in the employee handbook but felt uncomfortable going to the named managers. Mandel occasionally used profanity and sent emails containing sexual humor, but was never disciplined. The EEOC dismissed her request for charges. Mandel sued, alleging discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e), violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted M&Q summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the retaliation, PHRA, and Title VII sex discrimination claims, but reversed on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.View "Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp" on Justia Law

Sandy, hearing and speech impaired, applied to work as a grocery store cashier and stocker. As part of the application, Sandy took a Customer Service Assessment created by Kronos and received a score of 40%. Kroger relied, in part, on the Assessment in deciding not to hire Sandy, who filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a third-party administrative subpoena to Kronos, denied a petition to revoke the subpoena, and, after Kronos failed to provide requested information, filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in district court, which limited the scope of the subpoena. The Third Circuit reversed geographic and temporal restrictions, and restrictions related to job description, and affirmed refusal to allow discovery into racial discrimination. On remand, the district court expanded the scope of its original order, but again limited disclosure of information related to the Kronos tests and foundt entered a modified version of the confidentiality order. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of how specific limitations are tied to Kronos’s justifiable fears regarding disclosure of proprietary information and for individualized determination of whether costs of production under the expanded subpoena are outside the scope of what Kronos can reasonably expect as the cost of doing business. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kronos, Inc" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart cleaning crew members sought compensation for unpaid overtime and certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, civil damages under RICO, and damages for false imprisonment. The workers, illegal immigrants who took jobs with contractors and subcontractors Wal-Mart engaged to clean its stores, alleged: Wal-Mart had hiring and firing authority over them and closely directed their actions such that Wal-Mart was their employer under the FLSA; Wal-Mart took part in a RICO enterprise by transporting and harboring illegal immigrants, encouraging illegal immigration, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and involuntary servitude (18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(F)); Wal-Mart‘s practice of locking some stores at night and on weekends, without always having a manager available with a key, constituted false imprisonment. Over eight years and multiple opinions, the district court rejected final certification of an FLSA class and rejected the RICO and false imprisonment claims on several grounds, and rejected the false imprisonment claim on the merits. The Third Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 626(b). View "Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Lichtenstein began working with UPMC in 2005. Although Lichtenstein received a merit-based raise in October 2007, from October through December, she was tardy six times, absent twice, and requested changes to her schedule several times after the deadline for requesting changes had passed. Lichtenstein was scheduled to work a 16-hour shift on December 1. Co-workers complained that Lichtenstein was planning to call-off because she needed the day off to do school work or attend a concert. Although her supervisor denied a request for the day off, Lichtenstein called off, alleging she was sick. On December 30th, according to time logs, Lichtenstein arrived hours late and departed several hours early. On January 3, 2008 Lichtenstein’s mother was rushed to the hospital after collapsing from a sudden excruciating pain. Lichtenstein followed UPMC procedures for calling off sick. On January 10, Lichtenstein’s employment was terminated. The district court rejected her claim under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The Third Circuit vacated. Genuine factual disputes exist about whether Lichtenstein‘s notice of unforeseeable FMLA leave was adequate, whether her invocation of FMLA rights was a factor precipitating termination, and whether UPMC’s proffered justification for its action was mere pretext for retaliation. View "Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former assistant branch manager at Enterprise, filed a nationwide class action, claiming that Enterprise violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), by failing to pay required overtime wages. The district court held that the parent company, which is the sole stockholder of 38 domestic subsidiaries, was not a “joint employer,” and granted summary judgment in favor of the parent company. The Third Circuit affirmed after examining a number of factors concerning the relationship between the parent company and the direct employer.

In lieu of providing employees with a paycheck, attorney Maynard paid cash, requiring that employees endorse an unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment. After receiving a cash remuneration in 1996, one employee refused to endorse the paycheck. Maynard firex her for noncompliance. At a hearing before the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, the employee testified that she needed a signed paycheck to apply for government financial assistance. She had never shared this information with Maynard before the hearing. The district court held that Maynard's order was unreasonable and that the resulting termination was in violation of the VI Wrongful Discharge Act, which permits termination of an employee who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions of the employer, and awarded back pay. The Third Circuit reversed. The lower court erred by considering the employee's individual needs in determining reasonableness of the order.

Plaintiff, a maintenance director, had a stroke and began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 612(a)(1) in January 2008. He received disability benefits from Unum. The doctor cleared him to return to work starting on May 1, with conditions that he not work more than four hours per day or lift loads in excess of 20 pounds. The administrator notified plaintiff that part-time work was not available. The doctor cleared him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting restriction. On April 20, the employer terminated plaintiff's employment and notified him that he would not be rehired with lifting restrictions. Until July 2008, when the restrictions were lifted, he received benefits from Unum. The district court rejected claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the FMLA. The Third Circuit affirmed. The FMLA does not require an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate return to an equivalent position following leave. Entitlement to restoration requires that the employee be able to perform essential job functions without accommodation. Having represented to Unum that he was disabled, plaintiff was estopped from claiming that he was able to perform all essential functions.

Assistant managers at Rite Aid stores in Maryland and Ohio joined a nationwide opt-in action in a Pennsylvania federal court, seeking back pay for misclassification of assistant managers as overtime-exempt (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b)). One of them (Fisher) then initiated an F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland, seeking damages for alleged misclassification under Maryland laws. Following dismissal without prejudice under the "first-filed" rule, Fisher refiled in Pennsylvania, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Another plaintiff initiated a class action in the District of Northern Ohio seeking damages for alleged misclassification under the Ohio Act, asserting diversity jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Pennsylvania based on the forum selection clause in the employment contract. The Pennsylvania district court dismissed, holding that state law is not preempted, but that Rule 23 opt-out class actions based on state laws paralleling the FLSA are incompatible with the opt-in procedure under the FLSA, which was designed to prevent litigation through representative action. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to preemption, but reversed with respect to inherent incompatibility.

Plaintiffs brought a class action against their former employer, Siemens, and its retirement plans, claiming violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in refusing to provide permanent job separation (PJS) pension benefits when Siemens terminated their employment. The Third Circuit reversed in part and directed entry of judgment in favor of Siemens on all issues. By their plain terms, the Siemens plans do not provide for PJS benefits. Siemens did not establish an ERISA section 204 "transition" plan by virtue of 13-day arrangement in 1998 that was part of Siemens' purchase of a business unit from Westinghouse, nor was Siemens obligated to provide PJS benefits under section 208, based on the purchase from Westinghouse.

In 1988, plaintiff began working for Lawrence County; her supervisor was Mancino. Plaintiff has health problems and missed work frequently. According to plaintiff, Mancino expressed dissatisfaction with her absences and, in 2004, put her on a six-month probationary period. Mancino claims that he did not have authority to terminate plaintiff, but that his supervisor authorized him to do so after the probationary period. The district court dismissed some claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Const. Stat. 951, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The county settled the Rehabilitation Act claim and plaintiff conceded the PHRA claim against Mancino. On the FMLA claim against Mancino, the district court held that, while the FMLA permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies, an individual supervisor is an "employer" for FMLA purposes only if he has sufficient control over conditions and terms of employment. Because Mancino lacked final authority to fire plaintiff, he did not have sufficient control. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that a rational jury could find that Mancino had sufficient control to qualify as an employer under the FMLA.