Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
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Roldan, a pretrial releasee under supervision of the Virgin Islands Probation Office, was found murdered. Probation officer Semper was fired, as “extremely negligent in the supervision” of Roldan. Semper claimed that he was not the officer assigned to Roldan. He sought reinstatement and back pay, alleging violation of his due process rights and 18 U.S.C. 3602, which provides that a district court shall appoint probation officers and “may, for cause, remove a probation officer appointed to serve with compensation.” ‖The district court dismissed. Rejecting the government’s argument Roldan was not among those excepted service employees eligible for review of adverse agency actions under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Semper failed to set forth a money-mandating statute or regulation giving him the right to contest his termination in a Tucker Act proceeding. Following denial of certiorari, Semper filed another suit, citing federal question jurisdiction, and asserting a Bivens claim against the chief judge in his individual capacity; a claim against that judge in his official capacity; a claim against the United States pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act; and a claim under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, against the judge. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of three claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded with instructions to dismiss his individual capacity claim against the judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Semper v. Gomez" on Justia Law

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Bason was an Assistant Attorney General with the Virgin Islands Department of Justice, subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The Governor of the Virgin Islands approved Bason’s immediate termination. The Union submitted a grievance challenging the decision. An arbitrator found that the Governor lacked just cause to remove Bason and awarded immediate reinstatement. The Virgin Islands Superior Court vacated the award “only to the extent that it grants relief prior to July 23, 2010.” The Government filed a notice of appeal. The Union moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because neither the court nor the arbitrator ever established the amount of back pay owed to Bason, rendering the judgment non-final. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court held that an order mandating immediate reinstatement constitutes an appealable injunction and reversed the reinstatement. The Union sought certiorari, but on December 28, 2012, the President signed H.R. 6116, to eliminate Third Circuit certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court and replace it with direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Third Circuit concluded that it retained certiorari jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in Virgin Islands courts before the enactment of H.R. 6116, but dismissed the petition as moot because Bason had died.View "United Indus., Serv., Transp., Prof'l, & Gov't Workers v. Gov't of the V.I." on Justia Law

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In 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a new regulation governing calculation of the minimum wage an employer must offer (prevailing wage) under the H-2B visa program, which permits U.S. employers to recruit foreign workers to fill unskilled, non-agricultural positions that no qualified U.S. worker will accept, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). Associations representing employers in non-agricultural industries that recruit H-2B workers, concerned about higher labor costs as a result of the 2011 Wage Rule, challenged its validity. The district court and the Third Circuit upheld the regulation, rejecting arguments that DOL lacked authority to promulgate legislative rules concerning the H-2B program and that, even if the DOL has such rulemaking authority, its violation of certain procedural requirements invalidated the Rule.View "LA Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

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Egg Harbor Township authorized construction of a Community Center and, as required by N.J.S. 52:38-3 adopted a project labor agreement (PLA). All contractors working on the project were required to sign the PLA, which contained a “supremacy provision,” providing that the PLA, with the local Collective Bargaining Agreements, superseded any national agreement, local agreement or other collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Sambe, the general contractor, signed the PLA. Sambe subcontracted roofing work to Donnelly, which signed the PLA and agreed that any party it selected to perform work would also be required to sign the PLA. Donnelly selected the Carpenters Union to perform the work, even though it was not a signatory to the PLA, apparently because the two were parties to a CBA. Sheet Metal Workers protested. The NLRB assigned the work to Carpenters and later concluded that Sheet Metal violated the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 185, by maintaining a section 301 suit against Donnelly and Sambe following that decision. In the parallel litigation district court granted summary judgment on Sheet Metal’s breach of contract claim. The Third Circuit granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its order; vacated the breach of contract judgment against Donnelly and Sambe; and remanded the with directions to enter judgment in favor of Donnelly and to conduct further proceedings on the claim against Sambe. View "Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc." on Justia Law

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The NLRB Regional Director brought charges of unfair labor practices against Somerset Valley. While administrative proceedings were pending, the NLRB brought a petition under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), seeking to prevent Somerset Valley from engaging in behavior that violates the Act and to reinstate certain employees. The district court enjoined Somerset Valley from interfering with its employees associating with the labor union and required reinstatement of two discharged employees. The court refused to order Somerset Valley to reinstate two other employees or to order rescission of notices of discipline filed against certain employees. Before the merits of the parties’ cross-appeals were briefed, the NLRB issued a decision that rendered the temporary injunctive relief moot. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal and remanded with instructions to vacate the prior order. Neither party has relinquished its challenge to that order; vacating the order protects the parties from any adverse legal consequences of that unreviewed opinion. View "Lightner v. 1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued their employer on behalf of themselves and “similarly situated” individuals, alleging that the employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to ensure that they were paid for time worked during meal breaks. Notice was directed to potential collective-action members, and individuals opted into the lawsuit. FLSA collective actions are subject to “opt-ins,” unlike class actions under FRCP 23, under which those not wishing to be included must “opt out” after the class is certified. After preliminary discovery, the district court dismissed the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice; at the request of the remaining plaintiffs, the court dismissed remaining claims with prejudice to enable appellate review. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the named plaintiffs lack final orders appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Plaintiffs attempted to short-circuit the procedure for appealing an interlocutory order that is separate from, and unrelated to, the merits of the case. They could have obtained review of the decertification order by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of their individual or could have asked the trial court to certify their interlocutory orders for appeal. View "Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

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On behalf of themselves and former and current bus drivers and trolley operators (collectively, the Operators) employed by SEPTA, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the plaintiffs filed a purported class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, to recover unpaid wages and overtime compensation for work performed during morning “pre-trip” inspections required before the start of each daily run. The district court dismissed on the ground that the FLSA claim required the interpretation of provisions of collective bargaining agreements between SEPTA and the unions representing the Operators and was, therefore, subject to those agreements’ grievance and arbitration provisions. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the FLSA claim does not require the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements; the Operators based their claims solely on their statutory, rather than their contractual, rights to recovery, View "Bell v. SE PA Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

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After leaving coal mining, Eckman sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, in 1985. An ALJ awarded benefits in 1993; the Benefits Review Board affirmed the decision. Marmon paid benefits to Eckman until his 2002 death; his widow, Ethel, sought benefits as a dependent survivor. An ALJ denied the claim in 2005, finding that although Eckman had pneumoconiosis, Ethel failed to prove that his death was due to the disease. The Board affirmed. After Congress enacted the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, and amended the BLBA, Ethel filed a new claim. A Department of Labor district director awarded benefits. An ALJ upheld the award, finding that Ethel satisfied the familial relationship and dependency criteria for survivors under the BLBA and that, based on Eckman’s lifetime disability award and the filing date of Ethel’s claim, Ethel was entitled to benefits under section 932(l), as amended by the ACA. The Board affirmed. The Third Circuit denied the coal company’s petition for review, noting that in Ethel’s second claim, the cause of death was not at issue, her entitlement to benefits turned primarily on an administrative fact: whether her husband had been awarded benefits. View "Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir. Office of Workers Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

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Philadelphia officers stopped and frisked men they believed to be engaged in an illegal drug transaction. One of the men, Artis, accused the officers of stealing money. When the officers returned to headquarters, they learned that a complaint had been made to the Internal Affairs Bureau, and were taken to an office. They did not feel free to leave.They were joined by other superior officers and instructed to stay in the office and not use their cell phones. The officers obeyed instructions to remove their jackets and to pull out their pockets, pull up their pant legs and pull down their socks, and open their wallets, because they feared discipline and possible loss of employment. Internal Affairs officers questioned them for 15-20 minutes, then spoke to Artis, then stated that they believed Artis and told the officers that they were not needed for anything further. When they opened their lockers, it appeared that they had been searched. About 14 months later, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed. When police administrators undertake employment-related, non-criminal detentions, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure; the searches were reasonable. View "Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

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The NLRB certified a union and ordered an election. The union won a majority. The company refused to bargain. The union claimed unfair labor practices. A three-member NLRB delegee group granted the union summary judgment. The NLRB is composed of up to five members, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 29 U.S.C. 153(a) and may delegate its authority to any group of three or more members. Delegee groups must maintain a membership of three.The company unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the group’s order was not issued until it was mailed, by which time one member had resigned and the panel had only two members. The company then argued that the reconsideration order group was improperly constituted because one panelist was a recess appointee whose term concluded at the end of the Senate‘s 2011 session, which, it contended, was 13 days before the order issued. The NLRB denied the second motion. The company next argued that the group that issued the second order included two members that were invalidly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause while the Senate was not in recess, reasoning that if the Senate‘s session ended when it began using pro forma sessions, the term of one member had expired; if the session did not end then, the president‘s recess appointments were invalidly made while the Senate was not in recess. The NLRB denied the motion. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the Recess of the Senate in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks; the panel lacked the requisite number of members because one panel member was invalidly appointed during an intrasession break. View "New Vista Nursing & Rehab. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law