Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Townsend alleged that she was sexually harassed by defendant, who was the husband of the President of her company, the sole corporate Vice President, as well as a shareholder of the company. Before Plaintiff Grey-Allen, the Human Resources Director of the company, completed an internal investigation of these allegations, she was fired by defendants. On appeal, the parties challenged the decisions of the district court that granted summary judgment dismissing Grey-Allen's Title VII retaliation claim; denied defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative for a new trial; and awarded Townsend attorney's fees and costs. The court considered all of the arguments of the parties and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race and gender, retaliation, and sexual harassment by her employer, the State Parole Division, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that her supervisor's touchings were sufficiently abusive to support her hostile work environment claim and that summary judgment was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried. The court agreed that summary judgment dismissing the hostile work environment claim was inappropriate and vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed that claim, remanding for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint challenging a number of agreements entered into by the City of New York with respect to labor conditions on certain City construction projects. Plaintiffs argued that the agreements regulated the labor market and were therefore preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169. The court found the project labor agreements in this case materially indistinguishable from agreements the Supreme Court found permissible under the market participation exception to preemption in Building and Construction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island Inc. Because the City acted as a market participant and not a regulator in entering the agreements, its actions fell outside the scope of NLRA preemption. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

HOP Energy appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Local 553 Pension Fund. The district court held that HOP Energy was not exempt from withdrawal liability under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, because the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division lacked an obligation to contribute "substantially the same number of contribution base units" to the pension fund post-sale by HOP Energy had contributed pre-sale. The court agreed and held that the "contribution base units" were hours of employee pay. Although the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division had an obligation to contribute to the pension fund at the same contribution base unit rate, it had no obligation to contribute substantially the same number of hours of employee pay. Therefore, HOP was not exempt from withdrawal liability.

Plaintiff, an African-American and former Syracuse police officer, was suspended with pay pending investigation of an incident involving a fifteen-year-old girl whom he took to a hotel knowing she was a runaway. He was eventually suspended without pay and terminated. Plaintiff claimed that defendants, the City and certain police officers, discriminated against him by treating him more severely than white officers who committed acts of an equal or more serious nature. Because plaintiff's subsequent guilty plea to the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child resulted in his automatic termination under New York Public Officers Law 30(1)(e), he could not prove an "adverse employee action" for any of the measures taken by his employer after his guilty plea. Further, as a matter of law, plaintiff's suspension without pay pending the investigation did not, in these circumstances, amount to an adverse employment action, and plaintiff had no constitutionally recognized cause of action for deprivation of "professional courtesy" that police sometimes extended to their fellow officers.

This cross-appeal arose out of the trial and retrial of plaintiff's claim against his former employer and his supervisor for tortious interference with a job offer from another firm. Upon retrial, the second jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded substantive monetary damages. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial where the verdict, predicated almost entirely on the jury's assessment of credibility, could not be said to have been either egregious or a serious miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court, vacated the judgment entered on the basis of the second verdict, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the first verdict and to enter judgment in defendant's favor in accordance with that verdict.

In this case, the district court found that plaintiff's claims against defendant were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., because they arose under defendant's Pension Plan (Plan) and not separately and independently out of plaintiff's written employment agreement (Agreement). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the additional benefits he sought were based on a promise separate and independent from the Plan. The court held that the district court properly denied plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court because plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by ERISA where the Agreement merely described the benefits plaintiff would receive as a Plan member and it made no promises of benefits separate and independent from the benefits under the Plan. The suit was properly removed to federal court, the district court had federal jurisdiction over the case, and remand to state court was not warranted. The district court properly dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to state a plausible claim. Finally, the court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The City appealed from a district court order requiring it to pay plaintiff damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for retaliation against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and state law, for making complaints of gender discrimination. Plaintiff cross-appealed, principally challenging the dismissal of her retaliation claims against individual defendants and denying her additional damages and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the City's appeal provided no basis for overturning the judgment against the City. The court also concluded that plaintiff's cross-appeal merited only in its challenges to (A) the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of her New York State Human Rights Law (HRL), N.Y.Exec. Law 296 et seq., claim against defendant Rick Guy, and (B) the grant of summary judgment dismissing her main discrimination claims under the HRL against the City and defendant Roy Bernardi, and that plaintiff was entitled to trial of those discrimination claims. The court held, however, that a trial of the erroneously dismissed HRL discrimination claims alone could lead to an award of damages that would be duplicative, in whole or in part, or the compensation plaintiff was awarded in the present judgment. Accordingly, the court concluded that if there was to be a trial of the HRL discrimination claims, that trial must be combined with a retrial of plaintiff's Title VII and HRL retaliation claims against the City and her HRL retaliation claim against Guy.

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing as time-barred their putative class action complaint against their former employer and the employer's pension plan for benefits alleged to be due under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred when it looked past the six-year New York limitations period for contract actions; applied part of the New York regime known as the "borrowing statute," which directed it to Pennsylvania law; and ruled that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period barred plaintiffs' claims. The court held that in an action for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132, the court applied the forums state's statute of limitations, including its borrowing statute. Therefore, the district court was correct in applying New York's borrowing statute and plaintiffs' claims were untimely under Pennsylvania law.

The Board petitioned to enforce its August 2010 decision and order, concluding that County Waste violated section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2), by allowing Local 124 to distribute a bonus to employees when an election was pending. County Waste cross-petitioned for review of the August 2010 decision, contending that the decision could not be enforced since two of the Board members who entered it also sat on the panel that issued an earlier decision in this case, which was vacated by the court pursuant to New Process Steel. The court held that because the court found nothing in New Process Steel that precluded Board members who entered a subsequently vacated decision from participating on the panel that reviewed the case on remand, the court granted the Board and Local 108's petition to enforce the August 2010 decision and denied County Waste's cross-petition for review.