Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Bucalo, then 42 years old, applied for a position as a school librarian and was not hired; the position went to a 35-year-old man. Bucalo filed a charge of age and sex discrimination with the EEOC, which granted a right-to-sue letter, but she did not file. In 2003, the position re-opened and Bucalo, then 46, reapplied. Lanier, a new superintendent, selected interviewees; Bucalo was not among them. A committee hired a 32-year-old woman. Bucalo sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and retaliation for her 1999 EEOC complaint, violating the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Lanier, then suffering from a debilitating disease, executed an affidavit asserting that he had not selected Bucalo because she had worked in numerous short-term positions, evidencing “instability,” and denying that he had considered Bucalo’s age or 1999 EEOC charge. Lanier died before trial. The district court ruled in favor of the District. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that because of the death of the sole District employee with direct knowledge of the reasons she was not hired, Bucalo was entitled to judgment under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. View "Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The District hired Donnelly as a teacher under a three-year probationary contract. During his first year he received the highest rating and had perfect attendance. The District transferred him. His performance included episodes that required admonition. He told a student she was “acting retarded” and wrote the word “retard” on the board and told another to “go back to Mexico.” In the final year of his probation, Donnelly required gallbladder surgery, which occurred on November 27. He took leave through December 5. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Donnelly worked at least 1,247 hours (7.25 per day for 172 days) during the 12-month period prior to his leave: three hours short of Family Medical Leave Act eligibility, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A)(ii). When he returned, he received unsatisfactory evaluations and was denied tenure. The district court held that he was not eligible for FMLA leave and that he had not shown that he was qualified for tenure. The Second Circuit reversed. Donnelly presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether he qualifies for FMLA leave; the standard applied by the court does not apply outside of the college tenure context; and Donnelly presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find unlawful retaliation. View "Donnelly v. Greenburgh Central Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Wrobel was a longtime employee of Erie County's highway division. In 1999, a newly elected Republican county executive appointed defendants as Wrobel’s supervisors. Over the next 18 months Wrobel’s run-ins with them resulted in harassment of him and his transfer to a faraway workplace. His direct supervisor, Naylon, repeatedly referred to employees that predated his tenure as being part of the “old regime,” and to the office under his supervision as the “new regime.” Following his transfer, Wrobel made anonymous complaints to public officials and a confidential report to the FBI, for which he claims he was further persecuted. Wrobel’s complaint alleged retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. He alleged that he suffered discrimination because he was apolitical, and not politically aligned with the “new regime.” The district court dismissed hi 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Wrobel’s mistreatment was caused by any political activity or inactivity. View "Wrobel v. County of Erie" on Justia Law

Velez moved from Ecuador at age 16 to live with her half-sister, Sanchez, Sanchez’s sister Munoz, and their mother, Yolanda Munoz, and perform housework and babysitting. The relationship deteriorated and Velez believed that she was being isolated and that promises were not kept. She sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and New York state law. The district court dismissed certain claims, including breach of contract claim, allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials, then found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, but granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract and ATS claims and vacated and remanded with respect to FLSA and state law claims. View "Velez v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

African-American firefighters brought a Title VII discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) claim, based on 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant. The district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Buffalo had demonstrated that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity, despite the disparate impact of the 1998 examination on African Americans, and that plaintiffs were barred from challenging the job relatedness and business necessity of similarly derived examinations. The Second Circuit affirmed: an employer can show that examinations having a disparate impact on a protected class are job related and supported by business necessity when the analysis that produced the test relied on data not specific to that employer. While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry its burden in Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law. In this case, an independent state agency determined, based on empirical, expert, and anecdotal evidence drawn from fire departments across New York and the nation, that the job of fire lieutenant, wherever performed, involves common tasks requiring essentially the same skills, knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics; and developed a general test based on those findings.

Plaintiff, a seaman, contracted lymphoma and sued his former employer, a tugboat operator, seeking maintenance and cure. The doctrine of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Undisputed evidence established that the seaman had lymphoma during his maritime service, but the disease did not present any symptoms at all until after his service. The district court granted summary judgment for the tugboat operator. The Second Circuit reversed. Because the seaman’s illness indisputably occurred during his service, he is entitled to maintenance and cure regardless of when he began to show symptoms.

Plaintiffs, “captains” in defendants’ wholesale food warehouse, sought unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, under the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), 216(b) and an analogous section of New York Labor Law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims on the ground that plaintiffs are “executives” exempt from the overtime pay provisions The Second Circuit affirmed. The only disputed criterion was whether the teams of employees that plaintiffs supervise constitute “customarily recognized department[s] or subdivision[s],” of the company, defined by Department of Labor regulations as units with “a permanent status and a continuing function.” The court acknowledged that a warehouse worker who earns $700 per week ensuring that vegetables and other foodstuffs are loaded onto the correct delivery trucks and who lacks an office, a cubicle, or even a chair, to call his own does not fit the popular image of a “bona fide executive,” but concluded that plaintiffs fit the DOL definition.

Plaintiffs, 11 Asian-Americans currently or formerly Port Authority police officers, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that they were passed over for promotions because of race. The plaintiffs asserted: individual disparate treatment, pattern-or-practice disparate treatment, and disparate impact. A jury found liability for discrimination against seven plaintiffs and awarded back pay and compensatory damages. The district court also granted prevailing plaintiffs retroactive promotions, seniority benefits, and salary and pension adjustments corresponding with hypothetical promotion dates. The Second Circuit affirmed in part. With regard to individual disparate treatment allegations, the district court properly admitted background evidence predating onset of the limitations period; there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Port Authority discriminated within the limitations period. The district court erred in: submitting the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment theory to the jury in a private, nonclass action and concluding that the “continuing violation” doctrine applied to the disparate impact theory so that the jury could award back pay and compensatory damages for harms predating the statute of limitations. The court remanded for reconsideration of damages and equitable relief to the extent that relief was premised on failures to promote outside the limitations period.

Brault applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2007, claiming that he became disabled in 2006 because of nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical spine injury he sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested an administrative hearing. Brault’s counsel asserted a Daubert-like objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, contending it was unreliable. The ALJ never directly responded to the objections, but issued a ruling which relied on the VE’s testimony, agreed that positions existed in the eight DOT positions the VE had identified at the numbers the VE had given, and denied Brault’s application for benefits. The district court affirmed the denial. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge was not required to state expressly his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s challenged testimony.

This petition for enforcement of an order of the Board and an employer's cross-petition for review primarily concerned the validity of an employer's dress code provision limiting employees to displaying only prounion buttons on their work uniforms. Also at issue were the discharges of two employees. These issues arose out of efforts to unionize employees at several Starbucks coffee shops in Manhattan. The court concluded that Starbuck's enforcement of its one button dress code was not an unfair labor practice, nor was one of the two challenged discharges; as to the other discharge, a remand was required. Therefore, the court enforced in part, granted the cross-petition for review in part, and remanded.