Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Building Official for the Town of Marlborough from 1994-2010, sued the Town, as well as its Board of Selectmen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his procedural due process and free speech rights when his position was reduced from full to part time after he made certain statements regarding the use of wood-burning stoves. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Selectmen Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that the Selectmen defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, as plaintiff did not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Looney v. Marlborough et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the DEP, claimed that he failed to prevail in a prior employment-related suit because of false statements and deliberate omissions in an investigative report issued by defendant. The court held that "backward-looking" access-to-court claims were not cognizable when plaintiff had knowledge of the crucial facts and an opportunity to rebut opposing evidence, because such a plaintiff necessarily had adequate access to a judicial remedy. The court also held that the district court's opinion in the prior suit demonstrated that it did not rely on statements or omissions in defendant's report, and therefore no reasonable factfinder could find that defendant's actions denied him a right of access to the courts in violation of his federal constitutional rights. View "Sousa v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants unlawfully retaliated against him after he spoke out about issues involving his employer, the Long Beach Fire Department. The district court dismissed some of the claims against some of the defendants and the remaining individual defendants sought to appeal the denial of their dismissal motion, raising a defense of qualified immunity. The court held, however, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their appeal because they did not file a timely notice of appeal that specified that they intended to appeal. View "Gusler v. The City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Superintendent of the Connecticut Technical High School System, renewed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which defendant was alleged to have deprived plaintiff of her right to procedural due process. The district court denied the motion after concluding that there existed a dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff received sufficient notice before the elimination of her position as a guidance counselor at a Connecticut high school. The court held that defendant's conduct in this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not violate plaintiff's clearly established rights. Therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed and remanded. View "Coollick v. Hughes" on Justia Law

These appeals, heard in tandem, challenged awards of summary judgment entered in the district court in favor of Starbucks on plaintiffs' complaints that Starbucks violated New York Labor Law 196-d in the distribution of tip pools maintained at stores in New York State. These appeals presented unresolved questions of New York law. Because these unresolved questions implicated significant New York state interests, and are determinative of these appeals, the court deferred decision and certified them to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Barenboim, et al. v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

The EEOC appealed from a post-judgment order by the district court denying its request for injunctive relief against defendant following a jury verdict finding defendant liable for sexual harassment and fostering a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and New York State law. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying any injunctive relief to the EEOC. At minimum, the district court was obliged to craft injunctive relief sufficient to prevent further violations of Title VII by the individual who directly perpetrated the egregious sexual harassment at issue in this case. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Equal Employment Opportunity v. KarenKim, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, the school district superintendent, appealed from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim that she was fired in retaliation for her reports of financial malfeasance. The court concluded that plaintiff, a payroll clerk typist for the school district, was speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee and her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. View "Ross v. Lichtenfeld" on Justia Law

The State appealed from a decision of the district court holding that the State improperly made income tax, FICA tax, and other deductions from a Title VII judgment for back and front pay in favor of plaintiff. The court held that such Title VII awards constituted "wages" under the Internal Revenue Code and, as such, were subject to statutory withholding. View "Noel v. New York State Office of Mental Health Central New York Psychiatric Center" on Justia Law

The Fund is a multiemployer defined-benefit pension plan. Honerkamp, a New York employer, contributed to the Fund pursuant to collective bargaining agreements with its employees. In 2008, the trustees announced that the Fund was in critical status as defined by the Pension Protection Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. 1085(b)(2) and began drafting a rehabilitation plan. Because the rehabilitation plan would figure prominently in negotiations between Honerkamp and the union, the parties extended existing agreements. The final rehabilitation plan set forth new schedules of reduced benefits and increased contributions. According to the plan, the Fund was unlikely to emerge from critical status within the statutory 10-year rehabilitation period because employer contribution rates required for that result would exceed amounts that employers would have had to pay to withdraw from the Fund. The trustees therefore designed schedules “to impose approximately the same burden actuarially on employers that a withdrawal from the [Fund] would produce.” Following negotiations, Honerkamp withdrew from the Fund. The trustees sued, arguing that the PPA prevented Honerkamp from withdrawing and required the company to make certain ongoing pension contributions pursuant to the rehabilitation plan. The district court granted summary judgment to Honerkamp. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Trs. of Local 138 Pension Trust Fund v. F.W. Honerkamp Co. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued citations to Loretto-Oswego Residential Health Care Facility for violating employee safety standards. At the time, Loretto Management oversaw a number of non-profit corporations that operated nursing homes in upstate New York, including Loretto-Oswego; nearly all used the “Loretto” name. Loretto-Oswego reached an agreement with OSHA officials settling all matters related to the citations except whether several violations were “repeated” under 29 U.S.C. 666(a), which depends on whether Loretto- Oswego and a pair of other entities operated as a single employer for purposes of the OSH Act. If the violations were repeated, Loretto-Oswego must pay a penalty of $56,250, and if they were not, then Loretto-Oswego must pay only $11,250. An administrative law judge found that the three entities did operate as a single employer. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reversed. The Second Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting the Secretary of Labor’s variation of the “single employer test, which considers”: interrelated operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership. The Commission also considered the factor “common worksite.” View "Solis v. Loretto-Oswego Residential Health Care Facility" on Justia Law