Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Employee was terminated from his job at a Walgreens store in Puerto Rico after a two-week absence from his job due to a medical condition. Following his termination, Employee and his wife (Wife) sued Walgreens, alleging that Employee was fired in retaliation for conduct protected by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), that his termination was wrongful under Puerto Rico law, and that the loss of Employee's job caused Wife to suffer compensable emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens on Wife's claim and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the other Puerto Rico law claim. The FMLA claim went to trial, and a jury found in Employee's favor, awarding compensatory damages. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects, save its rejection of Wife's Puerto Rico law claim. Because the claim presented an important and unresolved issue of Puerto Rico law that the Court declined to address in the first instance, the Court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and reserved judgment on this particular issue pending its response. View "Pagan-Colon v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment. View "Espinal v. Nat'l Grid NE Holdings 2, LLC " on Justia Law

Lynch is a highway construction contractor and a signatory of the Construction Industries of Rhode Island's collective bargaining agreement with Local 251, as representative of truck drivers employed by Lynch. Lynch employed 26 Local 251 members in 1995, 16 in 1997, and only 10 in 2001. Local 251's vice president, Boyajian, testified that each time a truck driver retired, Lynch would sell a truck and replace that person with a subcontractor, gradually reducing the number of bargaining unit employees. The collective bargaining agreement states that employers are not permitted to use subcontractors unless employees of the subcontractors are paid the prevailing rate. Boyajian complained to Lynch about its use of subcontractors that did not pay prevailing rate and, in 1999, filed grievances with the NLRB. Lynch and the union entered into a letter of agreement, which was later challenged as violating the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(e), by impermissibly preventing Lynch from doing business with two subcontractors. The NLRB upheld the challenge and subsequently sought enforcement. The First Circuit noted contradictory evidence that the Board failed to consider and reversed with respect to one company, while entering an order of enforcement with respect to the other.View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 251" on Justia Law

In 1996, Cordero began working as an agent in the Internal Revenue Division of the Puerto Rico Treasury Department. Her supervisor, Rodríguez, was brother of the mayor of Mayagüez, who was head of the Popular Democratic Party's city office. Politically, Cordero affiliates with the New Progressive Party. Cordero says that on many occasions Rodríguez made disparaging comments about the NPP within her earshot. She also claims that Rodríguez took many subtle steps to inconvenience her, such as repeatedly changing her schedule and falsely claiming that she left early so he could deduct ten minutes of pay from her check. She also claims that Rodríguez "physically and verbally assaulted" her and that there were several other incidents, including incidents after she received a transfer. The district court rejected her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the allegations “troubling” but untimely. Although the continuing violation doctrine can render otherwise time-barred conduct actionable, the doctrine still requires some anchoring violation within the limitations period, and none of Rodríguez's post-transfer conduct meets that test. Cordero's transfer occurred more than a year before she filed suit, and none of Rodríguez's conduct within that one-year limitations period was actionable. View "Cordero-Suarez v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Palmquist, a veteran, injured in a helicopter crash that caused residual brain injury, was entitled to preference in federal employment, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C), 3309(1), 3313(2)(A). The VA hired him as a medical support assistant. Aichner was his supervisor. Palmquist applied for promotion but did not receive an interview. He believed that the VA had not honored his preference, and told Aichner that he was going to complain to the equal employment opportunity specialist and his congressman. He did so. Aichner and Palmquist maintained a generally positive relationship for the next two years, but Palmquist was sometimes preoccupied, left the unit during working hours to do personal business, distracted other employees, and used his computer for personal purposes. Palmquist sought a new position. An interview went well. Interviewers warned Palmquist against unsolicited post-interview contact, but he e-mailed both to reiterate his qualifications. Aichner gave a generally favorable recommendation, but the recommendation was one factor in Palmquist not getting the job. The court rejected his claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701-796. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act does not entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the “but-for” cause of, adverse employment action. View "Palmquist v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Alvarado began working for the U.S. Postal Service in 1991. His recurrent schizoaffective disorder was first diagnosed in 1992. According to Alvarado, the medication made him drowsy and slowed his work pace, at times making him late with his mail delivery, but made him able to perform competently. Alvarado claims to have been subjected to harassment and discrimination after he told his superiors of his medical condition. He complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity office. In time, Alvarado ran into problems relating to his work performance, particularly his slow work pace. At one point he was suspended for 14 days for improper conduct and delay of mail. Later, when he returned to the USPS branch at approximately 6:00 PM after completing his delivery route and found it closed, he felt anxious and humiliated, did not return to work, and officially resigned his post. Since his resignation, Alvarado has been found permanently disabled and eligible for disability benefits. Alvarado exhausted EEO administrative proceedings. The district court dismissed his suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The First Circuit affirmed.

Gove worked for TDC, which had a contract with Loring. TDC employees were informed that CSD had been awarded the Loring contract and would be providing services previously furnished by TDC. Gove applied online for a CSD position, similar to the one that she held with TDC. The application included a provision that any dispute with respect to any issue prior to employment, arising out of the employment process, would resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement adopted by CSD for its employees. When Gove was interviewed by CSD, she was visibly pregnant and was asked whether she had other children. Gove was not hired, although CSD continued to have a need for the position and continued to advertise the position. Gove filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which found reasonable grounds, but was unable to persuade the parties to reach agreement. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Maine Human Rights Act. CSD moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it covered an applicant who was never hired and should be construed against CSD. The First Circuit affirmed.

Cham, a Muslim and a native of The Gambia, immigrated to the U.S. in 2000 and began work in May, 2003, at a gas station/ convenience store. In December, 2004, Cham was injured in a car accident and informed his supervisor that he was taking Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave on his doctor's recommendation. When Cham returned to work, he was consistently scheduled to work only 32 hours per week, although his actual work hours fluctuated. Cham claimed this was retaliation for taking FMLA leave and in violation of Title VII. Cham quit in May 2005, days after suffering a panic attack at work that sent him to an emergency room. The district court granted defendant judgment as a matter of law on the Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, disparate treatment claim. A jury awarded $20,000 on the FMLA retaliation claim. The court granted a new trial, stating that prejudicial evidence had been introduced, relevant to the hostile work environment claim, which had been voluntarily dismissed, that was irrelevant to the FMLA retaliation claim. After a second trial, the court entered judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiffs, former directory-advertising sales representatives for Idearc were discharged in 2007. Each was older than 40 and each had at least 18 years of service. Idearc claimed they were let go for poor performance; the employees alleged that the terminations were motivated by age discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621) and a desire to negate pension benefits (Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1140,). They also advanced a retaliation claim. The district court rejected all of their claims. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the company’s performance-based standards. Idearc’s 2002 collective bargaining agreement authorized Idearc to terminate underperforming employees as specified by the plan. Employees were ranked within six-month periods by "percent net gain," calculated by comparing a salesperson's revenues against the revenue produced by his accounts in the previous year. Idearc was permitted to terminate employees failing 4 out of 7 consecutive semesters, but no more than 7.5 percent of a peer group could be terminated in any given semester.

Plaintiff’s employment was terminated after she exhausted 12 weeks of medical leave and did not return to work. The employer had received a certification of health care provider indicating that she was "not incapacitated" and was "able to perform [her] job" on a normal work schedule with "no heavy lifting." The district court entered summary judgment in favor of her former employer on her claims of retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, and disability discrimination in violation of Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. The First Circuit affirmed.