Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were several dismissed or demoted employees of the State Insurance Fund Corporation, a public corporation that administered Puerto Rico's workers' compensation program. Before the adverse employment actions took effect, Plaintiffs requested informal administrative hearings before the Corporation. Plaintiffs then filed administrative appeals before the Corporation's board of appeals. The board had not acted on the appeals when Plaintiffs sued the Corporation and several of its officers in the U.S. district court, alleging political discrimination and due process violations stemming from adverse employment actions. The district court abstained under Younger v. Harris and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, finding that Plaintiffs voluntarily engaged the wheels of an administrative procedure before filing an action in federal court. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in abstaining based on Younger, and dismissal was not the remedy in any event; and (2) a stay of the federal proceedings was appropriate in this case pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales Segarra v. State Ins. Fund Corp. View "Casiano-Montanez v. State Ins. Fund Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nurse working for Employer, was injured during a horseback riding accident. Plaintiff's employment was later terminated. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Employer, alleging Employer retaliated against her for requesting an accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence that Employer's stated basis for terminating Plaintiff was pretextual and that Plaintiff's evidence of retaliatory animus was too conclusory and speculative to take to trial. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the entry of summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claims under the ADA and MHRA, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to bring to a jury. Remanded. View "Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a partner in a medical practice where she served as a staff anesthesiologist. When Plaintiff's dependence on opioids came to light, her employer had in force a group employee benefit plan, underwritten and administered by Union Security Insurance Company & Management Company for Merrimack Anesthesia Associates Long Term Disability Plan (USIC), which included long-term disability (LTD) benefits. When Plaintiff applied for those benefits, USIC refused to pay benefits past the point when Plaintiff was discharged from a treatment center, finding that Plaintiff's risk for relapse was not the same as a current disability. Plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court. The district court ultimately awarded Plaintiff LTD benefits for the maximum time available under the plan, concluding that categorically excluding the risk of drug abuse relapse was an unreasonable interpretation of the plan. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in an addiction context, a risk of relapse can be so significant as to constitute a current disability. View "Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation between Coverall North America, Inc. and its franchisees. Proceeding under federal diversity jurisdiction, the franchisees asserted a variety of state-law claims against Coverall. Which of the various plaintiffs were subject to the arbitration provisions of the Franchise Agreement was at issue in this appeal. Appellees were a subgroup of Plaintiffs who became Coverall franchisees by signing consent to transfer agreements, which by reference incorporated under franchise agreements that contained arbitration clauses. The district court determined that Appellees did not have to arbitrate their claims against Coverall because they did not have adequate notice of the arbitration clauses contained in the franchise agreements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred because (1) Massachusetts law, which governed this dispute, did not impose any such special notice requirement upon these commercial contractual provisions; and (2) in any event, any special notice requirement would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Awuah v. Coverall N.A., Inc. " on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges of sexual harassment brought by a former employee (Employee) against the one-time president (President) of Jasmine Company, Inc. After President filed an action against Jasmine's liability insurance provider (Insurer), seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges, Insurer filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself, requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not duty to defend or indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine, holding that Insurer had to defend and indemnify Jasmine. At issue on appeal was whether a finder of fact must conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges did or did not begin before Jasmine's insurance policy took effect. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of when the harassing conduct that gave rise to Employee's claims began was a quintessential question for a factfinder. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment to her former employer in this suit for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, arguing that the district judge slipped by premising dismissal on disputed facts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff's appeal with prejudice after discussing the circumstances under which appeals will be dismissed for failure to adhere to appellate rules, holding that Plaintiff's substantial noncompliance with important appellate rules were major violations in that they crippled any attempt to review the issues intelligently and constituted sufficient cause to dismiss the appeal. View "Rodriguez-Machado v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Petitioner's husband was employed by GD Arabia, Ltd. as a military trainer in Saudi Arabia. After he was found dead by asphyxiation by hanging, Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under the Defense Base Act (DBA). Pursuant to agency policy and as authorized by statute, the matter was transferred to the district director's office in Boston and adjudicated there. An ALJ denied Petitioner's claim, and the Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed. Petitioner sought direct review in the First Circuit Court of Appeals, raising an issue of jurisdiction on which the circuit courts were divided. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the Review Board acted reasonably in upholding the ALJ's denial of compensation, as the record supported the inference of suicide and none of Petitioner's suggested hypotheses might entail coverage under the DBA. View "Truczinskas v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

Defendant, Starbucks Corporation, accumulated tips from containers along individual stores' cash registers and distributed them weekly to baristas and shift supervisors within a store in proportion to the number of hours worked that week by each individual. Plaintiffs, former Starbucks baristas, filed a putative class action state court against Starbucks, asserting that Starbucks' policy violated Massachusetts' Tips Act because it allowed shift supervisors to share in the pooled gratuities. Starbucks removed the case to federal court, alleging class-action diversity jurisdiction. The district court, applying Massachusetts law, concluded that the Defendant's policy regarding pooled gratuities violated the Tips Act, certified a class, and awarded damages in an amount exceeding $14,000,000. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of the Tips Act prohibited Defendant's tip-pooling policy. View "Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law