Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff terminated Defendant from employment. Thereafter, Defendant began arbitration proceedings seeking severance compensation he felt was contractually due. After arbitration hearings had commenced, the hearings were postponed for two months due to a medical situation afflicting Plaintiff's counsel. During the recess, Plaintiff formally requested pre-hearing and hearing third-party subpoenas directed at Defendant's current employer. The tribunal denied the issuance of the subpoenas. After the arbitration hearings resumed, the tribunal found Defendant was entitled to compensation pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement dealing with his termination without cause. The tribunal also found Defendant was entitled to pre-award interest. Plaintiff subsequently sought vacatur of the award, which the trial court denied. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration tribunal did not engage in misconduct by denying the issuance of the pre-hearing and hearing subpoenas; and (2) the tribunal did not exceed its authority in awarding pre-award interest to Defendant. View "Doral Fin. Corp. v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

This case concerned the withdrawal liability for a pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a multiemployer pension fund of Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI), a bankrupt company. SBI had withdrawal pension obligations to the multiemployer pension fund (TPF), which sought to impose the obligations on two private equity funds (Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs asserted they were passive investors that indirectly controlled SBI and sought a declaratory judgment against the TPF. The TPF counterclaimed and sought payment of the withdrawal liability at issue. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, holding (1) at least one of the private equity funds that operated SBI sufficiently operated and was advantaged by its relationship with SBI, and further factual development was necessary as to the other equity fund; (2) the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Plaintiffs under the "trades or businesses" aspect of a two-part "control group" test under 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1); and (3) the district court correctly entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs on TPF's claim of liability on the ground that the funds had engaged in a transaction to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. Remanded. View "Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the human resources director of two Puerto Rico governmental agencies. Plaintiff resigned one position and was terminated from the other. Plaintiff sued her former supervisors under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Puerto Rico law, alleging that she was retaliated against due to her allegiance with a certain political faction disfavored by Defendants and because she refused to follow personnel-related orders that she considered illegal and politically motivated. The district court dismissed some of Plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment on the remainder. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects, holding that the district court did not err (1) in dismissing Plaintiff's First Amendment free speech claim, as Plaintiff's "speech" exclusively revolved around her professional duties as human resource director; (2) in dismissing a claim Plaintiff made under the Puerto Rico Whistleblowers Protection Act, as Plaintiff failed to raise her meritorious arguments regarding this claim in district court; and (3) in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's freedom of association claim, as the First Amendment was inapplicable to Plaintiff's position as human resources director. View "O'Connell v. Marrero-Recio" on Justia Law

Verizon New England, Inc. was a party to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with six electrical workers unions. After Verizon and the unions were unable to reach a new agreement before the CBA expired, the union members commenced a large-scale work stoppage. After the employees returned to work, several members of various unions employed by Verizon in Rhode Island applied for unemployment benefits. The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (RIDLT) denied unemployment benefits, but the RIDLT's board of review reversed. Verizon subsequently filed a federal court action against RIDLT and claimant union members, arguing that the board's decision to award unemployment benefits should not be enforced, as it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the NLRA does not preempt a state's ability to provide strikers unemployment benefits; and (2) the action must be dismissed under the Younger absention doctrine. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed but on the singular ground that the dismissal was warranted under the Younger absention doctrine. View "Verizon New England, Inc. v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was suspended, he was discharged from his employment with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). An arbitrator ruled that the MBTA had lacked just cause to terminate him, and the MBTA subsequently reinstated Plaintiff to his former position. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the MBTA, alleging, among other things, that his discharge constituted racial discrimination and that the MBTA unlawfully retaliated against him for writing a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy after MBTA officials recommended firing Plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to the MBTA on all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) MBTA's merely questionable behavior did not show minimally sufficient evidence of pretext sufficient to support a discrimination claim; and (2) the district court correctly held that there was no causal link between Plaintiff's letter and his termination. View "Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the decade-long litigation of Relator's qui tam action against Defendant for alleged violations of the federal False Claims Act (FCA). The claims arose from Defendant's efforts to promote the pharmaceutical drug Procrit. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the district court's determination that Relator's kickback claims in Count I of the amended complaint were not pled with sufficient particularity. On remand, the district court imposed limitations on the scope of Relator's discovery for the kickback claims. At the discovery's conclusion, Relator agreed it had not identified any admissible evidence to support the remaining Count I claims, and the district court granted summary judgment for OBP on that basis. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the discovery limitations imposed by the district court were proper, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting OBP's motion for summary judgment on the basis of Relator's stipulation that she did not possess evidence to support her remaining Count I claims. View "United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Employer, ostensibly for his failure to properly investigate, document, and ameliorate the misconduct of an employee under his supervision. The termination occurred just months before Plaintiff was to receive a $60,000 bonus. Plaintiff filed an action against Employer to recover the bonus on the grounds that he was terminated without good cause. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment to Employer on Plaintiff's Massachusetts Wage Act claim and allowed Defendant's breach of contract claim to go to the jury. The jury found for Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the jury verdict, holding that whether Plaintiff was terminated without good cause and thus remained eligible for the bonus was a decision within the ambit of the sole and final decision-making authority of Employer's Employment Benefits Committee under the company's "Commitment to Success Bonus Plan"; and (2) affirmed the summary judgment order in Employer's favor, as Employer was under no obligation to pay the bonus. View "Weiss v. DHL Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, on behalf of the United States, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Guidance Corporation and Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), alleging they engaged in a kickback scheme to promote the sale and use of their cardiac rhythm management devices. However, a former employee of BSC had previously filed a qui tam action against BSC, which was later dismissed, alleging similar claims. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the earlier-filed complaint barred consideration of Appellant's complaint under the first-to-file rule of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(5). Appellant appealed, arguing that the earlier-filed complaint could not serve as a preclusive first-filed complaint to trigger the first-to-file bar because it did not meet the heightened pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 3730(b)(5) does not require the first-filed complaint to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) to bar a later-filed complaint. View "United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp." on Justia Law

When a tire company closed its plant in Puerto Rico, it offered its employees severance pay contingent upon the execution of general releases. Plaintiff, a former employee of the company, accepted the severance package and signed the proffered release. Almost one year later, Plaintiff sued the company, asserting claims for unjust dismissal under Puerto Rico law. The district court dismissed the case. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim under a protective Puerto Rico statute, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29, 185a-185m, known as Law 80. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order of dismissal as to the Law 80 claim and remanded, holding that, in the interests of comity and federalism, the antecedent issue about whether Law 80 applied at all to Plaintiff's discharge should be decided before the question of statutory interpretation raised by the parties. View "Ruiz-Sanchez v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a police dispatcher with the Town of Camden Police Department for thirty-one years until his department was eliminated and he was laid off. In the year following Plaintiff's termination, at least two positions opened with the police department for which Plaintiff was qualified. The Town did not recall Plaintiff to either position. Plaintiff subsequently brought a procedural due process against the Town under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Town deprived him of a constitutionally protected property interest in his right to be recalled to employment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Plaintiff's complaint alleged a protected property interest in his recall right; but (2) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's potential recourse to state law foreclosed his section 1983 claim, as Plaintiff's injury could not be fully redressed by recourse to a state law breach of contract claim or the grievance procedures in a collective bargaining agreement. Remanded. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden" on Justia Law