Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a Muslim and a native of Algeria, filed an amended complaint alleging that he was denied a promotion at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Department”) based on his religion, race, and national origin. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, the Secretary of the Department, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the Department’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for rejecting Appellant’s promotion. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded, holding that Appellant’s proffered evidence raised material disputes of fact that would allow a jury to infer that Appellant was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "Ahmed v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were former officers and a former cadet of the Boston Police Department (Department) who were fired after testing positive for cocaine, a current officer who tested positive and underwent rehabilitation as an alternative to termination, and a former applicant whose contingent job offer was revoked after a positive test. Each Plaintiff was black. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Department, alleging, inter alia, that the Department’s drug testing program, which used hair samples to test for illegal drug use, caused a disparate impact on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim and reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether they had proved a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, holding that Plaintiffs proved beyond reasonable dispute a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against his former employer, a school district alleging that the school district violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) when it reassigned Plaintiff to a new position after he took an extended leave of absence for medical reasons. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding (1) the school district’s FMLA eligibility and designation notices were inadequate and untimely, but Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that he suffered harm from the lack of notice; and (2) the school district’s request for a medical opinion as to Plaintiff’s ability to return to work did not interfere with his FMLA rights or constitute retaliation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not overlook genuine issues of material fact, misapply the parties’ burdens of production, or rely upon inadmissible evidence in granting summary judgment for the school district. View "Bellone v. Southwick-Tolland Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fifty-five years old when he was hired to work as an assistant manager at Walgreens. In 2011, Walgreens terminated Plaintiff’s employment after Plaintiff failed to provide what Walgreens considered to be adequate customer service. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that his employment was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1B). The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff (1) did not raise any genuine issue as to whether Walgreens believed the truth of its stated reason for terminating him; (2) did not demonstrate pretext through a showing that Walgreens violated its policy to uniformly enforce the rules; and (3) did not demonstrate that Walgreens’ proffered reason for terminating him was pretext designed to disguise age discrimination. View "Adamson v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs found engineering jobs through Advanced Technology Innovation Corporation (“the company”), a recruiting firm. Plaintiffs were paid by the company. In 2012, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the company violated 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1)-(2) by failing to pay the required overtime rate of at least one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that the company wrongly labeled part of their regular hourly wage a “per diem” and excluded the per diem when it calculated the rate for overtime. After examining the company’s formula for calculating the per diem, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the company’s formula was impermissibly based upon and thus varied with the number of hours worked per week, depriving Plaintiffs of overtime pay. Remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor as to liability. View "Newman v. Advanced Tech. Innovation Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by Employer in 1983. Plaintiff was covered by a short-term disability plan, and the Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) had the authority to decide questions of eligibility for coverage or benefits under the plan. After Plaintiff underwent back surgery in 2009, LINA at first granted but then denied Plaintiff disability benefits. In 2010, Plaintiff sued LINA, Employer, and others in Puerto Rico court, seeking review of the benefits denial. LINA later removed the action to the District of Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the district court (1) found LINA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient medical evidence of disability, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Employer for failure to plead it with specificity. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal on procedural grounds because Plaintiff committed numerous procedural errors, which precluded intelligent review. View "Gonzalez-Rios v. Hewlett Packard PR Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, the then-Governor of Puerto Rico appointed Plaintiff to the position of Advocate for Persons with Disabilities. In 2013, new legislation established an Office of the Ombudsman for Personal with Disabilities. Plaintiff was subsequently informed that an Ombudsman had been appointed and that his position had been abolished by legislative act. Plaintiff sued the Governor and other officials for attempting to oust him from his job as Advocate, claiming that it was unconstitutional for Puerto Rico to abolish the Advocate position without an individualized hearing. The district court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order, concluding that the court erred in finding that Plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where there was no viable claim that the abolition of the Advocate Office independently violated some constitutional proscription. View "Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employment with Employer was terminated due to what Plaintiff alleged was disability discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint against Employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) but did not file a civil action against Employer within ninety days after he received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff filed a new administrative charge against Employer two months after the first right-to-sue letter issued adding a second charge for retaliation. Less than a month after the transmittal of the second right-to-sue letter, Plaintiff sued Employer and other defendants in federal district court for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed both federal claims on the grounds that they were time barred, as (1) the discrimination claim was not brought within ninety days of Plaintiff’s receipt of the first right-to-sue letter, and (2) the retaliation claim had been filed too late with the EEOC. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing both charges due to Plaintiff’s failure to meet applicable time limits. View "Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Health Plans of P.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-time employee of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Plaintiff was separated from her employment as a result of her inability to return to the workplace resulting from severe depression. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the IRS alleging that she had been constructively discharged on account of her disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that Plaintiff had not lodged her administrative complaint within forty-five days of the incident, as statutorily required, thereby rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that equitable tolling applied to her claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not establish that equitable tolling should be applied to save her untimely administrative action. View "Bartlett v. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a charge of gender discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that the Municipality of Carolina discriminated against her because of her gender by refusing to hire her as a firefighter. The EEOC concluded that Carolina had discriminated against Plaintiff in its hiring process. Carolina subsequently hired Plaintiff as a firefighter. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued the Municipality and Mayor of Carolina, asserting claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as pendent state law claims, based on Defendants’ pre- and post-hire conduct. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her right to the review of her claims against the Mayor and her post-hire discrimination claims; and (2) the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s pre-hire discrimination claims and post-hire retaliation claims against Carolina, as the claims asserted met the plausibility standard. View "Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina" on Justia Law