Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005 American Airlines began charging passengers a fee of $2 for each bag checked with porters providing curbside service (skycaps) at Logan Airport. Gratuities fell significantly, despite the posting of signs intended to clarify that the fee was not a tip. Skycaps sued and a jury awarded damages for tortious interference with economic advantage and for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, which provides that no employer may demand or accept from any service employee any payment or deduction from a tip or service charge given to a service employee by a patron. The First Circuit reversed, noting that violation of the tips statute was the basis of damages itself and served as the improper conduct on which the jury based its tortious interference verdict. That statute is preempted by federal law; it is "related to" both price and service and it favors Massachusetts working for the national operation.

The employee claimed sex and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed. The company established the existence of a valid agreement. The court rejected an argument that the Spanish translation differed from the English version and held that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is supported by consideration. Claims under Title VII and the ADA are subject to arbitration; a contract reference to remedies available under the employer's rules is ambiguous and could be interpreted as allowing all of the remedies provided by the statutes. The employee, having signed a receipt, had adequate notice of the obligation to arbitrate.

In 2003 the hotel and the union entered into an agreement in anticipation of renovation of a dilapidated structure into the Renaissance Providence Hotel. The agreement allowed the union to organize hotel employees and seek recognition as their collective bargaining representative; the union would refrain from picketing or economic activity against the hotel. In 2010 the union requested recognition pursuant to the card recognition procedure described in the agreement; the hotel declined, claiming that the agreement had expired, and declined to participate in arbitration. The district court ordered arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed and awarded costs to the union. The meaning of the phrase "full public opening" in the duration clause of the agreement falls within the provision that "any dispute over ... interpretation or application" will be submitted to arbitration.

The plaintiff, employed by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, was observed taking a security pass from a car. He shredded the pass, without reporting to his superiors. The Puerto Rico Police Department arrested, charged, and investigated, but because the employee was already under investigation for misconduct, an agent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was dispatched and observed some of the ensuing questioning and hearing, without participating. The case against the employee was dismissed. The employee's claim of malicious prosecution through the DHS agent was rejected on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, looking to state law, as required by the Federal Torts Claims Act. The DHS agent was not actively instrumental in the investigation and there was no evidence of malice.

The employee's complaint under the Americans with Disabilities Act was dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the employee was required to submit to alternative dispute resolution. After examining Puerto Rico contract law and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, the court concluded that continued employment of the at-will employee was sufficient consideration to support the agreement, despite the fact that the agreement did not bind both parties to identical procedures. The "threat" of termination did not amount to intimidation that would invalidate consent; state law does not prohibit termination without just cause. The employee's claim that she did not understand the document because of limited English did not constitute an excuse and the agreement was not unconscionable.

The worker is a Massachusetts resident, whose services were obtained through a temporary labor firm's offices in Massachusetts, and was injured while working for a construction company at the Newport Naval Station. The temporary firm, which maintains workers compensation insurance, filed a Rhode Island workers compensation claim on behalf of the worker, but without his knowledge. The worker received benefits for 17 weeks, then sought Massachusetts benefits. A Massachusetts administrative law judge ordered the Massachusetts insurance company to assume responsibility for future payments. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the worker's suit against the construction company and a co-worker. The First Circuit reversed and remanded. Applying Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, the court concluded that the states' laws conflict and that Massachusetts law applies because that state has a more significant connection to the parties and the occurrence. Massachusetts prohibits suits against direct employers only; Rhode Island prohibits suit against "special employers" who contract with a general employer for the worker's services. The immunity of co-employees derives from employer immunity and does not apply in this case.

A black police officer, assigned to the drug prevention division of the Puerto Rico police department, was reassigned to a less-desirable position after a lieutenant made racial slurs and statements that she did not want him. One position that subsequently opened in the drug prevention division was not filled; another position was filled by a white person with less education than the black officer. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000) against individual supervisors. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. Failure to name the police department as a defendant did not justify dismissal under Title VII; the supervisors acted as agents of the department. The complaint plausibly alleged equal protection violations.