Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a hospital network and senior executives, claiming to represent more than 12,000 employees deprived of compensation for work performed during their meal break, for work performed before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, based on the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148; the Massachusetts Minimum Fair Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A and 15--or breach of contract or implied contract; money had and received; quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; conversion; equitable and promissory estoppel. Defendants claimed that the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, precluded state law claims. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, stating that the district court. It is not clear that either named plaintiff is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

Former employees of defendants participated in the Capital Accumulation Plan, under which they received portions of their earned commissions in the form of Citigroup stock, received at a 25% discount and on a tax-deferred basis. The stock was subject to a two-year vesting period during which transfer was restricted and rights would be forfeited if the employee resigned. Plaintiffs alleged that the CAP forfeiture provision violated the Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 8-4-103 and Louisiana's labor statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:631(A)(1)(a), 23:634(A) and breach of employment contracts, breach of the CAP contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, based on a previous decision involving similarly-situated plaintiffs. The First Circuit affirmed. The Colorado law applies only to compensation that is "earned, vested, and determinable." The Louisiana law does not apply because the stock was not "then due" when the plaintiffs resigned. There was no breach of contract, hence no conversion; the claims of unjust enrichment failed because of the existence of a contract.

The former (2001-2006) Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department sued the Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the official fired him due to his political affiliation. The district court dismissed, holding that plaintiff could be terminated without cause because he held a trust position for which party affiliation was an appropriate qualification, and fined plaintiff's attorneys $1000 each, concluding that the pleadings and responses that they submitted violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The First Circuit affirmed; plaintiff's position was not federally protected against political discrimination. The pleadings at issue consisted, in large part, of speculation and conclusory allegations lacking evidentiary support.

Plaintiff claimed that her employer since 1990, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, when it failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations (flexible schedule) for her chronic fatigue syndrome disabilities and retaliated against her, including by terminating her employment, for engaging in protected activities. The district court granted the Ports Authority's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that a reasonable jury could have found facts supporting plaintiff's claims. The district court erred finding that plaintiff was not "qualified" under the ADA without considering that the accommodation she requested was a flexible schedule.

The company claimed that the union violated a collective bargaining agreement no-strike clause on four occasions in 2008 and 2009 as part of a pattern of behavior undercutting the arbitral process. Specifically, the company claims the union made representations that the union would fine members who brought required devices to work, engaged in a short concerted work stoppage, coordinated refusals to volunteer for overtime work, and protested at a company facility each morning for several weeks. The district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the company had not shown future harm and declining to issue either injunctive or declaratory relief. The First Circuit affirmed denial of injunctive relief, but vacated with respect to declaratory relief. The alleged actions do not establish a repeated pattern giving rise to ongoing harm that would justify an injunction, but the matter is ripe for declaratory relief.

A medical social worker at the Health Department of San Juan sued the municipality and officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they fired her in retaliation for statements she made on matters of public concern in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied the individual defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The First Circuit reversed. Defendants could have reasonably concluded that they did not have the necessary confidence and trust in plaintiff to continue her employment and that firing her would not violate her First Amendment rights: the city investigated plaintiff's much publicized allegations of serious improprieties by the executive director of her department, she refused to provide testimony or evidence to corroborate her claims, the investigation determined that the claims were false and baseless, and her actions were found to violate state and local regulations.

A jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 in damages in a Title VII suit alleging intentional discrimination by her former employer. Plaintiff had testified that during her employment as a construction worker, she was forced to perform oral sex on a supervisor multiple times, was subjected to extreme, continuing sexual abuse by coworkers and supervisors, that the job was her only means of supporting her family, and that the company ignored her complaints. The district court reduced the jury award to $50,000 under 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)(A), using the year of the award to measure the number of employees and determine the size of the applicable statutory cap. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an award of $200,000,stating that the relevant year for determining the cap was the year in which the discrimination occurred and that the employer had the burden of proof with respect to the cap.

The employee of a firm that provides temporary workers signed a confidentiality agreement. After disputes about delays in compensation and reimbursement, he approached the employer's client (for whom he had been working) about the delays. He was terminated for violation of the clause and filed an unfair labor practices charge. The NLRB found the clause overbroad so that the termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interfering with rights guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The First Circuit granted the NLRB's motion to enforce its order that the employer rescind the provision, reinstate the employee, and pay damages. The confidentiality language could be fairly read to cover disclosure of terms of employment to union representatives; a more narrowly-drafted provision could serve the employer's legitimate interests. The NLRB did not err in not considering that the employee would have been discharged regardless of violation of the clause.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for gender-based discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Puerto Rico law. A jury awarded damages for emotional distress; the judge reduced the $350,000 award to $200,000. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and to support the jury's rejection of a defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.