Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, when their company (LS&H) was bought out, defendants signed confidentiality and non-competition agreements for a term of "12 months after termination of my employment with LS&H;" each was paid $2,500 for signing the agreements, which were assignable and contemplated the sale. Each defendant accepted employment with the buyer, but refused to sign a new noncompetition agreement. They continued to work, even after the buyer merged with OfficeMax, until they were terminated in 2009 and 2010. Each found work doing essentially what they had done in the past. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from selling office supplies. The First Circuit vacated. The contract is unambiguous; the triggering date for the noncompetition provision is termination of employment from LS&H. OfficeMax has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Plaintiff, a sales representative for the company and member of the National Guard was deployed to Iraq. When he returned, the company told him there were no positions available. The company eventually offered, and plaintiff accepted, a much lower position, but later terminated plaintiff for absenteeism. The district court awarded damages against the company for violating the Uniform Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311; Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1)(D); and the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 and awarded attorney's fees. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the company. had waived a preemption claim. There wass ample evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the company acted willfully in refusing to reinstate plaintiff in his pre-service position and that its claim of absenteeism was pretextual.

A regional television personality was discharged from his employment with Comcast Network after he publicly protested the selection of political commentator Bill O'Reilly for a prestigious broadcasting award. He filed a claim of speech-motivated retaliation under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H, 11I. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Comcast. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's employment agreement permitted Comcast to terminate him for any reason, or no reason at all; termination, or threatened termination, of an employee under such a contract is not coercive in the relevant sense under the MCRA.

A neurosurgeon sued her employer, a hospital, and her former supervisor, Day, alleging gender discrimination by disparate treatment and hostile environment; retaliation; violation of the Massachusetts Health Care Whistleblower Act; intentional interference with advantageous relations; equal pay violations; and slander. As the department's professionalism officer and representative to the Quality Assurance and Risk Management Committee, plaintiff investigated three of Day's cases, which ultimately were reported to the state Board of Registration of Medicine. After a couple of years of hostile interactions between plaintiff and Day, the hospital credentials committee conditioned plaintiff's reappointment on obtaining an evaluation within four months by an outside agency and agreeing to comply with its recommendations. The district court entered an injunction against the hospital. The jury awarded plaintiff $600,000 against the hospital on the retaliation claim; $1,000,000 against the hospital for hostile work environment; $20,000 against Day for economic harm on the interference claim; and nominal damages for the whistleblower claim against the hospital, the slander claim against Day, and non-economic harm from the interference claim against Day. The First Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff worked for a temporary staffing agency and, on assignment to a pharmaceutical company, was cited and reprimanded for noncompliance with company rules several times. When she applied for a permanent position with the company she was seven months pregnant. She did not get the job and was not reassigned to the company. The district court rejected her claim of Title VII pregnancy discrimination on summary judgment and the First Circuit affirmed. The record demonstrated that plaintiff was not qualified for the position and that the company had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.

The company sought a preliminary injunction against a former employee to prohibit violation of his employment agreement by competition with the company, solicitation of its customers and remaining employees, and use of information gained while employed. The court granted a preliminary injunction as to the confidential information, but not as to competition or solicitation. The First Circuit affirmed, applying the law of Massachusetts. The contract limited the employee for only one year, which has passed. When the period of restraint has expired, even when the delay was substantially caused by the time consumed in legal appeals, specific relief is inappropriate and the injured party is left to his damages remedy.

Plaintiff, hired in 1998, filed suit alleging sexual harassment (42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Act, P.R. Laws tit. 29, 146) by his supervisor in 2001. The case languished for several years before the district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit vacated. Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under a hostile work environment theory. He also established the elements of retaliation for his actions in reporting the supervisor's conduct and the company did not allege legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the conduct of its managers.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on claims of sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151(B) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; retaliation, in violation of Title VII, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and state common law claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent failure to provide a safe working environment, and breach of contract. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show that the defendant company controlled the manner and means of her work so that she was its employee.

Plaintiff worked for the authority for 22 years while receiving treatment for schizophrenia, a condition diagnosed more than 30 years earlier. He received excellent evaluations. He claims that, beginning in 2005, his supervisors made plaintiff's life difficult in retaliation for his union activities. In 2006, plaintiff was barred from working until evaluated by a psychiatrist and was not allowed to work, even after a satisfactory report was received. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The complaint did not articulate due process violations to support claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court vacated dismissal of an Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 claim. Although the complaint did not allege that schizophrenia substantially limited any aspect of plaintiff's life, the allegations did support a claim that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Cases against the supervisors were properly dismissed; the Act reaches only the conduct of employers and does not impose liability on co-workers.

The company began requiring its field technicians to carry company-issued cell phones during work. The phones contain a GPS, which allows the company to monitor the locations of the technicians, who are represented by a union. An unfair labor practice, filed with the NLRB, is apparently in arbitration. The technicians filed a separate suit, claiming the policy violated their privacy rights under Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, 1B, and their state-law rights as alleged third-party beneficiaries of a contract the company and its provider, which they say required the company to receive consent from its employees when it instituted the phone policy. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a); the technicians did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement.