Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

State environmental police officers brought state court litigation against their employer, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, based on the DEM's handling of wage and benefit matters, relating to unorthodox work schedules. Based on a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, the case was removed to federal court. The district court held that the state had immunity under the FLSA and ruled in favor of the state on other claims. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a state waives its sovereign immunity by removing a claim to federal court. Waiver occurs only if removal confers an unfair advantage on the removing state. In this case, "removal did not change the level of the playing field."

Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University-defendant, was arrested by campus police and charged with stalking and disorderly conduct after unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket. Plaintiff was temporarily banned from campus, removed as department head, and required to attend an anger-management class. Although the charges were later dismissed, Collins sued for false arrest, defamation, and violation of his due process rights. The district court granted judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the arrest was illegal because the "violation" was civil in nature. The warrant was supported by probable cause. Suspension with pay for two months was a minimal deprivation that did not entitle plaintiff to pre-deprivation process. Plaintiff was allowed to visit campus several times during the ban and was given adequate process for the minimal deprivation of liberty. An email indicating that plaintiff's presence on campus should be reported was not defamatory.

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment challenge to an ordinance requiring that, when there is a change in the identity of a hospitality employer, that employer must retain its predecessor's employees, subject to some conditions, for a three-month period. The district court rejected the challenge. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that a pre-enforcement suit is not appropriate for determining preemption under the National Labor Relations Act. Nothing would prevent a successor employer from raising pre-emption in an appeal from the NLRB successorship determination based on the involuntary continuation of employment under the ordinance or in a state court enforcement action. The court rejected an argument that, by providing employees with benefits for which they otherwise would have had to bargain, the ordinance impermissibly enhances employee and union bargaining power and an argument that the law impermissibly interferes with hiring decisions.

Plaintiff was employed as a custodial worker at a Coast Guard Air Station in Puerto Rico for four and one half years before being fired for allegedly pilfering various items. He filed suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 , and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, alleging constitutional violations and negligence. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. State law is the source of substantive liability under the FTCA; the Act does not waive immunity for constitutional tort claims. The district court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff worked for defendant, primarily as a stevedore, for 57 years. In 2006-2007, he missed several months of work due to physical ailments and received disability benefits. Plaintiff claims that when he returned to work, his colleagues insulted his age and medical conditions, often in the presence of supervisors. Plaintiff, then age 71, was first suspended, then terminated, after the company's human resources department was informed that he had assaulted his supervisor (also more than 60 years old). In a case under the Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621-634, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence of age bias.

Plaintiff, a municipal employee since 1989, was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 2005. She claimed of disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000. The district court entered summary judgment for her employer. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's refusal to consider evidence for which no corresponding English translation was provided to or properly filed, admission of summary charts prepared by a paralegal employed by the defendant's law firm, and dismissal of an alleged equal protection claim sua sponte. Plaintiff, who was absent more than 50 percent of the time starting in 2006, failed to establish that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA; physical presence was an essential function. Her request for assigned parking was reasonable, but did not cause any of the claimed adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff, a 49-year-old Cape Verdean female who self-identifies as black, began working for defendant as a Budget Administrator in 2001. Between 2004 and 2008, she applied for, and was denied, promotion to four different positions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer in her case, alleging discrimination based on gender, race, and national origin in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B and Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not make a prima facie case; she failed to show that she was qualified for the positions at issue or that she was "similarly situated" to other candidates.

Plaintiff, a dental hygienist at defendant's dental health center for more than 10 years, claimed that supervisors subjected her to unpaid work hours because she is black and then to selective discipline and other malfeasance in retaliation for questioning her unpaid hours. The district court entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff established only "a litany of petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry recriminations" that are not actionable.

Plaintiff, an employee of the USDA since 1977, claimed discrimination based on age and gender and retaliation for having complained about discrimination in the past. The district court entered summary judgment against her on claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a). The First Circuit affirmed. Having failed to raise a claim of sex-based discrimination in her 1997 EEOC complaint, plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Her retaliation claim failed for lack of proof of causation. The passage of several years, coupled with the fact that the person in question merely had knowledge of plaintiff's prior complaints, made any inference of causation unreasonable. An age discrimination claim failed because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that age was a motivating factor in the decision to promote another, rather than plaintiff.

Plaintiff, a small, family-owned firm, with Puerto Rican owners, does construction and related work on electrical utility lines, and had contracts with defendant. Plaintiff's employee was severely electrocuted and burned in accident that occurred while working on an project for defendant and defendant's manager ordered a work stoppage pending investigation, during which the contract expired. OSHA fined plaintiff. When defendant next put contracts out to bid, another company got the primary contract and plaintiff got the secondary contract, which it declined. When re-bidding became necessary, plaintiff did not participate, but filed suit, alleging discrimination in the early termination of the earlier contract and in the award and hostile work environment as well as unfair practices under state law (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9, 11). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of evidence of racial animus.