Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a former trust employee of the Metropolitan Bus Authority of Puerto Rico, sued public officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a decision not to install him in a career attorney position in the MBA was politically motivated and was effected without due process of law, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the due process claim as to all defendants, finding that plaintiff was afforded adequate process, and affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claim as to all defendants, save for defendant Delgado. Plaintiff's allegations of participation in the decision were speculative and inadequate with respect to all of the defendants except Delgado.

Mead was fired from her job as administrator of 15 assisted living facilities operated by IA and licensed by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,alleging that her termination without a hearing infringed her procedural due process rights. She also asserted state law claims.The district court dismissed the due process claims, explaining that IA was a nonstate actor and thus could not be held accountable under section 1983, and that the complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation by the DHHS employees. The First Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff worked for the Puerto Rico Ports Authority. In 2006, Bonilla, PRPA's executive director, named the plaintiff to a trust position within the PRPA. At the time, the Popular Democratic Party held power in Puerto Rico. In 2008, plaintiff voluntarily resigned this post in order to accept a career position at the Marín International Airport in Carolina. Within months, he transferred to another career position as a security supervisor at Aguadilla airport. The PDP lost the general election in 2008, and its rival, the New Progressive Party, assumed office. In early 2009, plaintiff began experiencing workplace harassment, including banishment from the Aguadilla airport, transfer to the Mercedita airport in Ponce (far from his home), removal of his sidearm, a series of negative performance evaluations, and threats of suspension and termination. No legitimate reason supported any of these actions. The district court dismissed his claim of political discrimination. The First Circuit reversed.

In 2001 the Hotel hired plaintiff as a casino worker. Approximately six years into his employment, he filed a charge of sex and age discrimination with the EEOC. In his complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico law, he alleges that, shortly after he made these filings, his supervisors embarked on a pattern of retaliation ultimately resulting in his dismissal. He filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue letter. Citing two agreements signed by plaintiff, each containing an arbitration clause, the Hotel moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the agreements he had signed impermissibly shorten the limitations period, impede public enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, and unduly burden workers' rights. The district court determined that the arbitration clauses were valid and dismissed without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16, and holding that the arbitrator can determine whether Puerto Rico law permits shortening of the limitations period.

In consolidated negligence actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, against two railroad defendants, a former employee, alleged cumulative, or wear-out, injuries to the neck, knees, left elbow and thumb, and accidental injury to the left forearm while driving a spike. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The aggravation claims were untimely, and no fact-finder could reasonably have inferred that plaintiff became aware of a work connection with his knee pain and neck injury only after mid-September of 2004. The court rejected claims based in negligence, alleging inadequate tools and failure to obtain ergonomic studies of the activities required to perform plaintiff’s jobs and upheld admission of evidence of malingering.

Jones started working for Walgreen in 1986. In 2004, she slipped on ice in front of a Walgreens' office. In March 2005, while on medical leave, Jones informed her supervisor that she hoped to return to work with reasonable accommodations. She also filed claims with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the U.S. EEOC, accusing Walgreen of discrimination against women. She ultimately filed a Title VII class action with over 21,000 plaintiffs. She later accepted relocation and resumed employment, stating that she could not climb ladders, lift more than 20 pounds, or work shifts longer than eight hours. Jones later notified her supervisor that she was having difficulty walking and shelving and thought she was working longer hours than medically advisable. Her doctor tendered his opinion that Jones had permanent restrictions. Jones was terminated on the ground that she could no longer perform as store manager. In her suit under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12101, state law, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3 (retaliation), the district court granted Walgreen summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find that Jones was able to perform the essential functions of her job even with reasonable accommodations or that Walgreen acted in retaliation.

Named plaintiffs sought to represent potential classes of hospital employees, some covered by collective bargaining agreements and others not, claiming that they were deprived of compensation for work performed during meal breaks, before and after shifts, and during training sessions. One case asserted only state law tort and regulatory claims; the other raised claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The state law claims were properly removed to federal court and were preempted because many were dependent on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The federal law claims, dismissed for failure to identify specific employers, were remanded to permit amendment.

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class, alleged failure to compensate them for work performed during their meal break and before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206-207; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1059(a)(1), 1104(a)(1); and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The district court held that the FLSA claim was deficiently pled, and that this was fatal to the complaint because the ERISA and RICO claims were derivative of the FLSA claim. The court found the allegation of under-compensation insufficient, given the lack of any information on plaintiffs' approximate weekly wages and hours worked, or even an allegation that they had worked in excess of 40 hours in any workweek. The First Circuit vacated. The allegations were insufficient under the FLSA, but plaintiffs should be permitted to amend.

UPRLS hired plaintiff as an assistant professor, with possibility of tenure after five years. During her probation, plaintiff, with a male professor, worked in the school's Legal Aid Clinic. Plaintiff's co-teacher had a sexual relationship with a student, who became pregnant as a result. Near the end of her probation, plaintiff requested a one-year extension. The dean questioned plaintiff about her knowledge of the relationship between her co-teacher and the pregnant student and chastised her for failing to report. There was no internal regulation prohibiting student-teacher relationships or mandating reporting. The Dean recommended the extension, but added comments questioning her judgment and maturity. When plaintiff learned of these comments, she wrote to the Chancellor and others, denouncing the comments. The dean reversed his position. A committee was formed and voted to deny the extension. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff sued UPRLS and individuals, alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The allegations did support a reasonable inference that plaintiff was engaging in protected conduct when she opposed the dean’s remarks or that defendants’ actions were based on gender.

Plaintiff, a police department employee, made claims of sexual harassment and emotional abuse. The district court issued a scheduling order, closing discovery as of November 18, 2010. When defense counsel encountered an emergency, the court reset the date to January 28, 2011. In November, defendants served plaintiffs with interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The court extended discovery closure date to February 28, 2011. On February 24, plaintiffs moved to extend this deadline by 30 days, claiming that their lawyer had no time to devote to their case. The court extended the discovery closure date to March 25, but stated that plaintiffs must provide answers to outstanding interrogatories and requests for production of documents no later than February 28 and that failure to answer by that date would result in dismissal, with prejudice. On March 1, defendants informed the court that plaintiffs had not complied. The court extended the deadline by 10 days. On March 16, defendants informed the court that the interrogatories remained unanswered and that the documents had not been produced. The next day the court dismissed the action with prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed.