Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Leandre Layton, on behalf of himself and the similarly-situated members of his conditionally-certified class (collectively, "Drivers"), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHL Express, Inc. ("DHL") on his claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). DHL contracted with Sky Land Express, Inc. to manage local parcel deliveries. Petitioner worked on DHL routes for Sky Land. Petitioner filed his collective action for unpaid overtime, naming DHL, Sky Land and Gary Littlefield (owner and president of Sky Land) as his joint employers and defendants to the suit. DHL moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not the drivers' employer. The district court granted DHL's motion: "DHL did everything it could possibly do to relate to Sky Land only as an "independent contractor[."] The contract with Sky Land allowed DHL to exercise only the minimal supervision necessary to monitor compliance with the contract. The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that if plaintiffs were employed by anybody, they were employed by Sky Land, the entity that they ostentatiously dismissed as a defendant, for reasons this court can only guess at. DHL was not an employer, much less a joint employer." After a thorough examination of the realities of the economic relationship between Drivers and DHL, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the grounds that DHL was not a joint employer of the Drivers.

Petitioner sought review of the Secretary of Labor's decision in favor of petitioner's former employee who intervened in this case. In contradiction to the findings of an ALJ, the Secretary's Administrative Review Board (ARB) found that petitioner gave pretextual, shifting explanations for terminating the employee and found that the employee suffered disparate treatment in comparison to other similarly situated employees. Consequently, the ARB found that the employee proved that petitioner fired him for engaging in conduct protected by the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851. The court concluded that the ARB erred by reviewing the ALJ's decision de novo rather than observing the Secretary's regulation requiring substantial review. The court also concluded that the ARB failed to follow Eleventh Circuit precedent when analyzing its contrary factual findings. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an African -American, brought this action against UPSF, his former employer, alleging that he had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of UPSF and plaintiff timely appealed. The court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the events alleged by plaintiff created an objectively hostile work environment and therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

The Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Stacey Williams appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' claim of pregnancy discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and state law negligence. The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on Williams' Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., claim for pregnancy discrimination because Williams had presented enough circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that her supervisor's action in terminating her because of her pregnancy and his inaction in not attempting to find her a light-duty job were a violation of Title VII. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 race discrimination claims because she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gate Gourmet intentionally discriminated against her based on her race. Summary judgment was improperly granted against Williams' Title VII and section 1981 retaliation claims because there was a reasonable inference that the statutorily protected filing of and refusal to settle the EEOC charge caused Gate Gourmet to deny Williams a light-duty position, which was a materially adverse action. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a jury verdict and award of damages and injunctive relief in favor of plaintiffs, Doctors Gowski and Zachariah, in their discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment suit against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). At issue was whether this circuit recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment claim and, if so, whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury's verdict and damages award. The court concluded that a retaliatory hostile work environment was a viable claim and, after a thorough review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, the remittur, the vacatur of the lost-wages award, and the award of attorneys' fees. The court also affirmed in part the grant of injunctive relief, but remanded in part the injunctive award with instructions for the district court to strike the award as it pertained to the removal of the doctors' disciplinary files and the prevention of their use in any further disciplinary action; the order that the doctors be appointed to additional hospital committees; the order that Dr. Gowski be placed back on the rotation for duty assignments and be permitted to obtain the necessary credentials and privileges to do so; and the order that Dr. Zachariah be permitted to continue her research.

Plaintiffs claimed that the fiduciaries of their retirement plan violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., in ways that damaged their efforts to stockpile savings for their winter years. The court held that because plaintiffs have not pleaded facts establishing that defendants abused their discretion by following the Plan's directions, they have not stated a valid claim for breach of the duty of prudence. The court also held that plaintiffs have failed to state a viable breach of loyalty claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' third and last amended complaint.

Plaintiff filed suit against Sheriff Gee, in his official capacity, after she was transferred from her data processing telecommunications technician position to the Help Desk when she informed the sheriff's office, her employer, that she was pregnant. Plaintiff asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), Fla. Stat. 760.01 et seq. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded her $80,000 in back pay and $10,000 for emotional distress. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict; in view of the sheriff's concession that he did not plead or argue the affirmative defense under the doctrine of after-acquired evidence and that there was no evidence that plaintiff engaged in wrongdoing, the district court erred in applying the doctrine to vacate the award of back pay; and the district court did not err in its response to a question from the jury.

The United States brought an action against ADMH, claiming that ADMH violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it failed to rehire longtime employee Roy Hamilton after his service in Iraq with the Alabama National Guard. The district court denied ADMH's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and found that ADMH had violated USERRA by not immediately rehiring Hamilton after his return from Iraq. The court held that ADMH was not entitled to sovereign immunity, and that the district court did not err in finding that ADMH violated USERRA and was required to pay money damages. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendants, alleging that all defendants violated her free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that CSC violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims. The court held that plaintiff had not provided evidence that Dr. Chosewood, CDC's Director of Health and Safety, and Ms. Zerbe, the CDC project officer responsible for managing the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contract, requested her removal from the EAP in retaliation of her free exercise rights. Because plaintiff failed to show that her constitutional right was violated, Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that no reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe's decision was based on plaintiff's religious objections to counseling clients in same-sex relationships, rather than the manner in which plaintiff handled a certain client's referral and their understanding that plaintiff would not alter her behavior in connection with future referrals. Because Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe did not violate plaintiff's statutory right under RFRA, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court further held that plaintiff could not assert a Bivens action against CSC; because CSC did not burden plaintiff's religious rights by removing her from the EAP contract or by ultimately terminating her employment, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of CSC on her RFRA claim; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim against CSC. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner National Labor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) sought enforcement of its order against Respondent Contemporary Cars, Inc. (Contemporary). In 2008, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union) filed a petition with the Board seeking certification as the representative of Mercedes-Benz service technicians employed at Contemporary. The Board held a hearing, determined the proposed bargaining unit was appropriate under two different theories, and directed that an election occur. Contemporary requested that the Board review the Regional Director’s decision regarding the bargaining unit. Despite only having two members, the Board summarily denied the request. Members of the bargaining unit voted in for representation by the Union, and the Regional Director certified the Union. To preserve its right to challenge the validity of the bargaining-unit determination in a court of appeals, Contemporary refused to bargain. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Contemporary conceded the violation, and in 2009, the two-member Board issued an order finding Contemporary in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Contemporary filed a petition for review of the NLRB’s order with the federal district court. The NLRB cross-petitioned seeking enforcement. The circuit court granted Contemporary's motion to hold the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in "New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB" (130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010)). In 2010, the NLRB issued an order setting aside its previous two-member decision to "take further action as appropriate." The original two members plus an obligatory third member issued a new order, again affirming the Regional Director's bargaining-unit decision. The NLRB subsequently filed a petition for enforcement of its order with the Eleventh Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Contemporary's due process challenge raised on appeal of the 2010 NLRB order. Furthermore, Contemporary did not meet its burden of demonstrating the Board's determination lacked substantial evidentiary support. Therefore, the Court granted the NLRB's petition.