Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff claimed that his former employer discriminated against him on account of his age when it terminated his employment, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The employer argued that the reason for plaintiff's discharge was due to a reduction in force (RIF), not his age, 71-years-old. After thorough review of the record with benefit of oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that no reasonable fact finder could find that the employer's decision was "but-for" his age and plaintiff had not established that the project manager acted as a mere cat's paw for the assistant project manager's discriminatory animus. View "Sims, Jr. v. MVM, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought by cabin stewards against their employer, Celebrity Cruises, and against the Union (FIT) that represented them. Because the stewards were foreign employees involved in an internal wage dispute with a foreign ship, neither the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159, applied to the stewards' challenges. Since their claims were dependent upon the protections of those acts, the district court properly dismissed their claims against Celebrity and FIT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-13623. Because the stewards could have raised their Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313, claim in Lobo II but did not, the court affirmed the district court's order in Gomez as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-10406 View "Lobo, et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., after she was terminated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the termination - that plaintiff violated (or appeared to violate) the company's conduct policies - was pretextual. In this case, the corporate executive who terminated plaintiff later said that she was an exceptional employee who had done nothing wrong, had done everything right, and should not have been fired. The court held that such evidence, when combined with a prima facie case, created a jury question as to discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that her termination was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it was based on her candidacy. The court held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, did not require defendant to retain her political opponent after becoming superior court clerk for the county. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Underwood v. Harkins, et al" on Justia Law

Lakeland appealed a decision of the NLRB finding Lakeland in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), (1), for its refusal to bargain with the Union. The NLRB cross-appealed for enforcement. At issue was whether substantial record evidence supported the NLRB's determination that certain licensed practical nurses (LPNs) employed by Lakeland were "supervisors" within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. The court found unreasonable the NLRB's conclusion that the LPNs' involvement in certified nursing assistants (CNAs) coaching did not make them supervisors under the Act. The court also concluded that the NLRB's determination that the LPNs did not exercise independent judgment in assigning CNAs was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted Lakeland's petition for review and denied the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Lakeland Health Care Associate v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

This case arose when Gimrock refused to bargain with the Union and its operating engineers went on strike. The Board found, among other things, that the strike was an economic strike and that Gimrock's refusal to reinstate the strikers violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3). The court concluded that the evidence before the ALJ fully supported the ALJ's recommendation - that the Board award the strikers the sum total stated in the Compliance Specification - and therefore the Board's adoption of the recommendation. The court found merit, though, in Gimrock's argument that only this court had the power to modify its order and, for example, require Gimrock to meet with the Union at set times. Accordingly, the court denied the Board's petition to the extent that it sought enforcement of its order requiring Gimrock to meet with the Union for sixteen hours a week and, in doing so, bargain in good faith. The court enforced the Board's petition regarding the reinstatement and back pay awards. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Gimrock Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed summary judgment in favor of her former employer and against her complaint of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. At issue was whether the employer was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court held that the employer was a state agency immune from plaintiff's complaint of disability discrimination and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment against plaintiff's complaint of racial discrimination where plaintiff unequivocally answered "no" when she was asked if her termination had anything to do with her race. View "Ross v. Jefferson Co Dept of Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in a class action suit alleging that Broward County's employee wellness program violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that the wellness program's biometric screening and online Health Risk Assessment questionnaire violated the ADA's prohibition on non-voluntary medical examinations and disability-related inquiries. The court held that the district court did not err in finding as a matter of law that the wellness program was a "term" of Broward County's group health insurance plan, such that the wellness program fell within the ADA's safe harbor provision. View "Seff v. Broward County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

This appeal concerned the Eleventh Circuit's authority to review an order remanding an action based on an antecedent and erroneous ruling that an agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable. Petitioner St. Hugh Williams filed in a Florida court a complaint that, while working onboard the M/V Norwegian Sky, he was injured as a result of the negligence and other tortious conduct of the owner of the ship, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. NCL removed the action to the district court on the ground that Petitioner was contractually bound to arbitrate his complaint under the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but Petitioner moved to remand the action to state court. The district court ruled that the arbitration clause was unenforceable and granted Petitioner's motion to remand. NCL appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit later held in "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.," (652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011)), that an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention is enforceable. Petitioner argued that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but the Court found that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to compel under "City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.," (293 U.S. 140 (1934)). The Court reversed the order denying the motion to compel of NCL, vacated the order remanding Petitioner's complaint to state court, and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration.