Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Donna Saterlee appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly rejecting her hand impairment as medically nondeterminable at step two and consequently not including it in the RFC that formed the basis of the dispositive hypothetical to the Vocational Expert; and (2) failing to perform a proper credibility analysis in determining that complaints of limitations other than, or in excess of, those later included in the RFC were not credible. The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ was "undeniably wrong" about the lack of documented medical evidence of Plaintiff's condition that gave rise to the alleged numbness, "undercutting the categorical rejection of such an impairment on this threshold basis." The Court remanded the case for an administrative decision that properly accounted for all of the evidence of record.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelli Mike was an employee of Leisure Village Health Care Center. Leisure Village obtained a urine sample from Plaintiff and submitted it to Defendant-Appellee Professional Clinical Laboratory, Inc. (ProLab) for processing. Plaintiff's test results came back positive for marijuana. Leisure Village reported the results to the Oklahoma Board of Nursing (the Board). The Board placed Plaintiff's nursing license on probation and later revoked it. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging that ProLab violated the Oklahoma Standards for Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Act (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 sec. 551-565 (West 2011)), and committed gross negligence during the drug-testing process. The district court granted summary judgment to ProLab after concluding that the civil remedy provision in the Testing Act did not apply to testing facilities and that Plaintiff failed to establish that ProLab committed gross negligence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit found that a rational jury could conclude that ProLab was aware that Leisure Village previously disregarded the limits of its contract by requesting ProLab to perform an unauthorized employee drug screen, and also was aware that Leisure Village disregarded the collection procedures for forensic drug testing outlined in the Testing Act. The Court found that ProLab was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of causation because the foreseeability of any intervening causes was a question of fact for a jury to resolve. Because the district court resolved this claim on the causation element, which involved disputed issues of fact, summary judgment was improper. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of ProLab on the Testing Act claim, but reversed the district court's judgment on the gross negligence claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Mayra Carrera was a trimmer in a Tyson meat processing plant in Kansas. One day, four of her co-workers made sexual gestures toward her by "moving and shaking their hips." When Plaintiff complained, a manager immediately spoke to the co-workers. No further incidents occurred, but Plaintiff felt ostracized by employees keeping their distance. Plaintiff asked for a transfer to another plant. Despite the transfer, Plaintiff filed suit alleging a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Tyson. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by focusing only on the gesturing incident and ignoring the fact that afterward her co-workers ostracized her. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did consider this aspect of Plaintiff's claim "correctly observing that standoffish, unfriendly, and unapproachable behavior" was insufficient to establish an objectively hostile work environment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Luster, an employee of the United States Forest Service, appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff, a full-time Visitor Information Specialist (VIS) with the Forest Service, claimed that: (1) she was not selected for a Forestry Technician position because of her gender; (2) she suffered disparate work conditions because of her gender and in retaliation for her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint; and (3) a Forest Service attorney inappropriately disclosed her EEO complaint information in violation of the Privacy Act. The Tenth Circuit "commend[ed] the district court for its thorough and well-reasoned order granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment" and affirmed, finding no error in the court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Timothy J. Smith appealed a district court order that granted summary judgment for his employer, Defendant Morton International, Inc., (Morton), on his claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court held Smith’s claim failed at the prima facie case stage for two distinct reasons: he had not shown either that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA or that Morton had discriminated against him on the basis of his alleged disability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of his alleged disability, and affirmed on that basis without reaching the discrimination issue.

Petitioner Theresa Freeman appealed the denial of her applications for social security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Petitioner applied for benefits in June 2007, alleging she was unable to work as the result of obesity and an on-the-job back injury that had occurred in February 2007. Her applications were denied at the administrative level, on reconsideration, and after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Petitioner's degenerative disk disease and obesity were severe impairments, but that none of her impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled one of the listings. Furthermore, the ALJ found that Petitioner had "the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work." After the Appeals Council denied her request for review, Petitioner filed her complaint in district court, and a magistrate judge affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner wanted the Court to "reweigh the evidence or substitute [the Court's] judgment for that of the Commissioner" which the Court declined to do. Accordingly the Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision to deny Petitioner's benefits.

Plaintiff Steven Lucas filed suit against Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston (Liberty Life), asserting that the company violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) when it denied his claim for long term disability benefits. Finding that the denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, the district court entered judgment in favor of Liberty Life. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision. Plaintiff was an employee of the Coca-Cola Company. Liberty Life both administered and insured Coca-Cola's long-term disability benefits plan. Under the plan, it has discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury requiring spinal surgery and, after a short period back on the job, stopped working. He filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in August 2005. In September 2007, Liberty Life terminated Plaintiff's benefits after determining that he was not eligible for continued benefits under the "any occupation" provision: while he might not be capable of performing his own occupation, he was capable of performing some occupation comparable to his former position. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with Liberty Life, but the company upheld the denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Liberty Life's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and that Plaintiff failed to show that it was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Denice Twigg appealed a district courtâs order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hawker Beechcraft Corporation (HBC) on Plaintiff's claims for (1) retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and (3) interference under the FMLA. Upon its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that HBC terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about race discrimination or her taking FMLA leave. Therefore, her retaliation claims under Sec.1981 and the FMLA failed as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to HBC on Plaintiff's FMLA interference claim because HBC met its burden of demonstrating that it terminated Plaintiff for a reason unrelated to her FMLA leave, namely, her failure to comply with the companyâs notice-of-absence policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiffs Ginger James and Deborah Tennison brought suit under 42 U.S.C.1983 alleging Defendant Prue Public Schoolsâ (the District) termination of their employment violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They appealed a summary judgment that rejected their claims, in which the district court determined (1) their pre-termination hearing satisfied their due-process rights, and (2) they failed to show their speech was a motivating factor for the termination. The School Board became concerned about the Districtâs finances. It initiated a financial investigation by retaining a financial consultant and terminated the treasurerâs employment. Without recommending any particular positions to be cut, Jones further opined there would have to be some reduction in personnel and it appeared the District had too many administrators. Eliminating the positions of an elementary and a high-school principal, it decided, would have the least impact on the students and was in the Districtâs best interest. Accordingly, the Board voted to eliminate the positions due to lack of funds and to dismiss Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issues Plaintiffs raised in their appeal did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding a denial of due process. Furthermore, they did not establish the occurrence and/or the content of the speech sufficiently for the district court to hold in their favor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district courtâs decision.

In January 2011, Daniel Bagwell filed a pro se complaint against his former employer, Safeway Denver Milk Plant (âSafewayâ). In his complaint, Mr. Bagwell asserted claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Mr. Bagwell included only two factual assertions in his complaintâthat (1) his "hours changed," and (2) he experienced "career-ending performance evaluations." Safeway filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Bagwellâs complaint did not comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Bagwell did not respond to the motion. The district court dismissed his complaint, noting that Mr. Bagwellâs complaint was "entirely devoid of sufficient facts to state a claim for retaliation." Mr. Bagwell did not object to any of the magistrate judgeâs specific findings or recommendations. Instead, he requested that his "case be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States of America on the grounds that Title VII is unconstitutional and violate[d his] civil rights." Upon review of Mr. Bagwell's appeal of the district court's findings in his case, the Tenth Circuit found that Mr. Bagwell waived appellate review by failing to file specific objections to the magistrate judgeâs recommendation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and dismissed this matter.