Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Sonja Morris appealed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on her First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and grant of summary judgment on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in favor of Defendant Memorial Health System. Plaintiff worked as a registered nurse for Memorial and in 2007 joined the "Heart Team" which was performed all heart surgeries at the hospital. During her time with the Team, Plaintiff contended that the lead surgeon harassed her on multiple occasions. Despite participation in a teambuilding program, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Claim on Memorial in 2008. The hospital removed Plaintiff from the Heart Team and into a more "comfortable" work environment. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Memorial claiming her First Amendment rights were violated when she was removed from the Heart Team because she submitted her Notice of Claim. The district court granted Memorial's motion on the First Amendment claim on the ground that the notice did not contain "speech" as determined by case law. Furthermore, the court held that Plaintiff could not establish that the alleged harassment was based on her gender or pervasive enough to affect her work environment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in affirming the district court.

In the first time this case came before the Tenth Circuit, the Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellant Microsoft Corporation on Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Wallace's breach-of-contract claim, but reversed and remanded her state-law tort claims of wrongful discharge and outrage. In this, the second time the case came before the Court, the issue on appeal was the district court's grant of summary judgment to Microsoft, which denied Plaintiff's motion to supplement her amended complaint and to add a wrongful death claim. Plaintiff's husband was a consultant for Microsoft when he fell and was injured on a sidewalk while walking to a company meeting. He was placed on leave for about one month. Microsoft could no longer accommodate his medical restrictions once he returned to work. Microsoft never offered Mr. Wallace alternative employment, and he was never able to provide Microsoft with a medical release allowing him to return to his previous job. After Mr. Wallace had been on medical leave for sixty weeks, Microsoft terminated his employment. Mr. Wallace filed the petition in state court that ultimately gave rise to this case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of fact upon which she had the burden of proving Microsoft caused the torts she alleged.

Plaintiffs Michael Maestas, Thomas May, Juanito Marquez and Jahmaal Gregory were all officers in a private security force that protects Los Alamos National Laboratory. They contended that their employer, Day & Zimmerman, LLC and SOC, LLC, (collectively, SOC) improperly classified them as exempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). The district court found that Plaintiffs were exempt executive employees and granted summary judgment to SOC. The parties disagreed over which of Plaintiffs' job duties was "primary." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that such a dispute presented a question of fact rather than an issue of law. Furthermore, the Court held that an employee who supervises subordinates while also conducting front-line law enforcement work performs a non-managerial task. Because there remained a genuine dispute as to whether three of the Plaintiffs had this task as their primary duty, summary judgment was proper only against Plaintiff Thomas May and improper as to the others. Accordingly, the Court partly reversed, partly affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Conger appealed the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental social security income benefits. Plaintiff applied for benefits in 2005 alleging he was unable to work because of degenerative disk disease, spondylosis, arthritis, depression, and problems sleeping. His application was denied at the administrative level after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform simple and routine medium exertional work that required no more than occasional stooping and no contact with the public. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, Plaintiff filed his complaint in the district court. The district court adopted the report and affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's RFC finding and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court affirmed the district court and Commissioner's rulings.

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Dumas appealed the dismissal of his workplace discrimination suit against Proctor and Gamble (P&G). Plaintiff was employed as a contractor assigned to work at P&G's Kansas City manufacturing plant in 2005. Between 2005 and 2007, Plaintiff alleged he was subjected to discrimination in the workplace including the use of racial epithets, misuse of company disciplinary proceedings, and an incident in which a chair was pulled away as Dumas was attempting to sit on it. Dumas resigned in November of 2007. In 2011, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination. The EEOC closed the claim as untimely. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in district court against P&G, and P&G moved to dismiss, alleging Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff responded that he was given bad advice by an unnamed EEOC agent. The district court concluded that Dumas failed to meet the narrow requirements for equitable tolling and dismissed the claim. Finding that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of establishing that an EEOC agent actually misled him, and insufficiently present his state law claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgement in dismissing Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Field filed a wrongful termination action against his former employer the Board of Water Commissioners for the City and County of Denver (Denver Water), alleging three "1983" retaliation claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Denver water and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff was a project manager. He came to suspect misconduct between senior engineers and several contractors at three projects he was working on. Plaintiff expressed his concerns to his superiors, who responded that the matters were "taken care of." Denver Water assured Mr. Field they were retaining a national auditing firm to conduct an external review, but he alleged the firm was unqualified and biased. Plaintiff's supervisor issued a recommendation for corrective action against Plaintiff, noting that an internal auditor had "seen nothing that could not be corrected" at the end of the projects. Further, the supervisor reported that Plaintiff was insubordinate and "willing to go to extreme lengths to prove his unreasonable belief that the contractors and Denver Water management are corrupt." The supervisor recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. Finding that the district court "accurately and thoroughly examined Mr. Field's claims and concluded they were all meritless," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's case.

Appellant Taissiya Oleyniikova , an employee of the State of Colorado's Department of Human Services (DHS) Office of Information Tenchology Services brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for damages against the DHS' executive director and some of the agency's employees (Defendants). Appellant challenged the grant of summary judgement in favor of DHS. Plaintiff alleged she was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff emailed a supervisor stating that she felt "insulted" by another co-worker, because that co-worker accused her of lying. Over the next few months, Plaintiff sought a promotion within her department, but claimed that this attempt was thwarted. Plaintiff filed suit in 2009 alleging that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of her right to freedom of speech. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on both claims. Plaintiff then appealed the district court's ruling on the retaliation claim only. Finding that Plaintiff's statements were not on a matter of public concern, the Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

Petitioner Compass Environmental, Inc. challenged a final order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) which found a serious safety regulation violation and assessed a $5500 penalty against it. Specifically, the Commission held that Compass failed to train a now-deceased employee to recognize and avoid an electrocution hazard presented by a high-voltage overhead powerline at his worksite. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Compass argued that the Commission failed to apply the correct legal test and erred in concluding that a reasonably prudent employer would have anticipated this employee's potential exposure to the power line. "Although Compass might not have been able to predict the manner in which [the employee] would have been exposed to this hazard," the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in holding that Compass should have trained the employee on the fatal danger posed by the high-voltage lines located in the vicinity of his work area. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellee Denise Zaricor-Ritchie appealed the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits and Supplement Security Income. Plaintiff claimed she was disabled by bipolar disorder and depression. After administrative denials of her claims for benefits, she had two hearings before an ALJ, who concluded she was not disabled at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process. Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred in his treatment of the medical source evidence; (2) the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment; and (3) the ALJ failed to perform a proper analysis in concluding that she could return to her past relevant work as a dishwasher. Taking each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn, the Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ's analysis was sufficient to support its decision. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's denial of benefits.

After developing pain in his neck and shoulders, Petitioner Gordon George was diagnosed with cancer in 2003 and underwent surgery and radiotherapy. During his recovery, he continued to experience pain spanning from his neck to his shoulder and arm. Petitioner applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits. After many and various hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that for the period June 1, 2003 through July 31, 2005, Petitioner was disabled during that period. But the ALJ further found that Petitioner's condition improved dramatically over time and that by August 1, 2005, he no longer met any disability listing. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner raised several challenges to the ALJ's determination that he suffered no legally cognizable disability after August 2005. Upon review, the Court rejected all those challenges, and affirmed for substantially the reasons given by the district court, with one exception. The Court found that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether, after August 1, 2005, Petitioner suffered from a mental disability. In our case, by contrast, the ALJ has not made any factual findings "one way or the other" about the existence, severity, or functional limitations, if any, imposed by Petitioner's mental condition: "[i]t's entirely possible the ALJ on remand will find Mr. George's mental health issues have no impact on his ability to work." The Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.