Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A victim of alleged child sexual abuse purportedly perpetrated by one of the priests of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the 1970s filed suit against the Bishop of the Diocese, seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject mater jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The court of appeals held (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims; and (2) the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims; and (2) the victim's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Remanded.

Employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with Employer. Employee's left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned eight percent permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee's evaluating physician assigned thirteen percent impairment to the left leg and twenty percent impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's opinions and awarded fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to the right knee; (2) by adopting the impairment rating of the evaluating physician for Employee's right and left knee injury; and (3) in awarding fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs, where Employee had significant activity restrictions as a result of the injury.

Employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. Employer denied Employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of Employee's willful violation of Employer's safety rules. The trial court found that Employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for Employer. Employee appealed, contending that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Employee willfully and intentionally violated Employer's safety rules, where Employee did not give a credible explanation regarding his failure to comply with the rules, and Employer offered strong proof of its strong emphasis on compliance with the safety rules.

Employee, hired as a university professor and department head, filed suit against Employer after Employee was removed as department head, alleging a violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA), commonly termed the Whistleblower Statute. Employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Employee failed to state a claim for relief under the TPPA. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the TPPA claim, ruling that, assuming the facts of the complaint to be true, Employee was neither discharged from his employment nor did he refuse to participate in or remain silent about any alleged illegal activities. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Employee's complaint, holding that because Employee was neither terminated nor discharged from his employment, only removed as department head, the complaint did not allege facts from which the Court could reasonably infer a claim under the TPPA.

Employee suffered a work-related injury and sought benefits. The benefit review conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (DOL) ended in an impasse after a dispute about the degree of Employee's medical impairment. Employee filed suit. Subsequently, Employer filed an application for medical impairment rating (MIR) with the DOL, seeking the appointment of an independent medical examiner pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(5). The trial court granted Employee's motion to quash the MIR, holding that the statute was established for the purpose of resolving workers' compensation claims while the claim was before an administrative body, and therefore, DOL had relinquished jurisdiction when the benefit review process reached an impasse. The trial court then adopted the higher of the disputed impairment ratings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the constitutional separation of powers question was not properly presented, argued, or litigated before the trial court; and (2) whether the Employer may attempt to resolve the dispute of degree of medical impairment by seeking the opinion of an independent medical examiner pursuant to the statute was an issue for the Employee, Employer, and Attorney General to address on remand.

While Alicia Howell worked on an assembly production line at Nissan North America, she was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. After surgery, Howell and Nissan settled Howell's workers' compensation claim for her carpal tunnel injuries. When Howell attempted to return to work, she was told she would be returning to the fast-paced assembly line. Howell resigned and was hired at minimum wage for a temporary staffing agency. Howell then filed a petition for reconsideration of her earlier settlement. The trial court held that Howell was eligible for reconsideration of her workers' compensation benefits because she did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded her a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability rating to each upper extremity. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appeals panel and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the appeals panel erred in holding that Howell had a meaningful return to work and her decision to resign rather than returning to work was unreasonable, and (2) the trial court's award was not excessive.

Employee injured his shoulder while working for Employer. After Employee returned to work, he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Employee and Employer settled Employee's claim. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or Employee's independent medical examiner. After Employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits. The chancery court awarded additional permanent disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. Employer appealed. At issue was whether the chancery court erred in declining to apply any of three impairment ratings assigned by physicians after the original settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court's reconsideration of a workers' compensation award is limited to a determination of additional permanent partial disability based on the employee's impairment rating at the time of the initial award or settlement, and therefore, the chancery court properly computed the medical impairment rating; and (2) the award was not excessive.

After Pam Webb, who was employed by the Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, was fired, Webb filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge. Habitat filed a motion to dismiss Webb's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Webb filed an amended complaint, and Habitat responded by filing an amended Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Habitat's motion and dismissed the amended complaint on all claims. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court granted review. At issue was the proper standard for Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and whether the Court should adopt the pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which retired the notice pleading regime recognized in Conley v. Gibson in favor of a new plausibility pleading standard. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Employee injured her right shoulder in the course of her employment with Employer. Employee received medical treatment, during which time she continued to work for Employer. Employee filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers' compensation benefits from her Employer. At trial, the parties contested the extent of Employee's anatomical impairment and permanent disability. The medical evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of two physicians, and through their testimony, the parties introduced Employee's medical records generated by other treating physicians. The physicians assigned varying degrees of impairment to the body as whole. The trial court eventually chose the evaluating physician's impairment, who assigned a seventeen percent impairment, and awarded Employee 25.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer appealed, arguing that the evaluating physician's rating did not comply with the American Medical Association Guides and that the award was therefore excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the evaluating physician's impairment rating as the basis of the disability award.

After Employee sustained an injury, he filed a worker's compensation action against Employer. The result was a court-approved workers' compensation settlement. Employee's authorized treating physician later recommended medical treatment. After Employer's utilization review provider denied approval of the proposed treatment, Employer filed a motion for an independent medical examination, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(1), which is required if reasonable. The trial court found Employer's request to be unreasonable and denied the motion. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Employer had good faith reasonable basis for questioning both the causation and the necessity of the proposed treatment and for filing a motion for a physical examination of Employee; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Employer's request for a medical examination of Employee was unreasonable. Remanded.