Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission not to award Appellant benefits after he was injured while renovating a historic school building, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving his statutory-employer claim for workers’ compensation benefits.Appellant sought benefits against a church and its historical society, alleging that these entities were his statutory employers. The Commission denied benefits, holding that none of the defendants were Appellant’s direct employer and that the church and the historical society were not Appellant’s statutory employers. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission applied the correct legal standard and acted within its fact-finding discretion in concluding that Appellant had failed to prove that the church or the historical society were his statutory employers. View "Jeffreys v. Uninsured Employer's Fund" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err when it ruled that Plaintiff, a retired firefighter, was not a disabled person entitled to receive health insurance benefits under the Virginia Line of Duty Death and Disability Act, Va. Code 9.1-400 et seq.Plaintiff was diagnosed with throat cancer after he retired from the fire department but did not experience any health problems while he worked as a firefighter. The circuit court concluded (1) under the plain reading of the Act, Plaintiff’s duties as a firefighter ceased as of his retirement; and (2) because Plaintiff became disabled after he retired, his claim for insurance coverage under the Act was not viable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not a “disabled person” under the Act because his incapacity did not prevent the “further performance” of his duties as a firefighter. Therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to continued health insurance coverage under the Act. View "Jones v. Von Moll" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err when it ruled that Plaintiff, a retired firefighter, was not a disabled person entitled to receive health insurance benefits under the Virginia Line of Duty Death and Disability Act, Va. Code 9.1-400 et seq.Plaintiff was diagnosed with throat cancer after he retired from the fire department but did not experience any health problems while he worked as a firefighter. The circuit court concluded (1) under the plain reading of the Act, Plaintiff’s duties as a firefighter ceased as of his retirement; and (2) because Plaintiff became disabled after he retired, his claim for insurance coverage under the Act was not viable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not a “disabled person” under the Act because his incapacity did not prevent the “further performance” of his duties as a firefighter. Therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to continued health insurance coverage under the Act. View "Jones v. Von Moll" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law.ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the City of Danville and its Employees’ Retirement System were required by the provisions of Va. Code 51.1-813 to award a disability retirement benefit to Jacqueline Garrett, a former police officer, at a rate of no less than 66 2/3 percent of her average salary. The Supreme Court held that section 51.1-813, which was in Article 2 of Chapter 8 of Title 51.1 of the Code of Virginia, did not apply to the City because the City had neither taken steps to adopt Article 2, nor was the City included in the legislative direction mandating compliance with Article 2. Therefore, the circuit court erred in ordering the City and its retirement system to make payment to Garrett in compliance with section 51.1-813. View "City of Danville v. Garrett" on Justia Law

After his employment as the Town of Warrenton’s Building Official ended, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the Town requesting a writ of mandamus to reappoint him as “the executive official in charge of the Warrenton building division” as a remedy for the Town’s alleged violation of a local regulation. The Town filed a demurrer, contending that Plaintiff did not allege facts demonstrating that he was ever permanently appointed as the Town’s Building Official. The circuit court sustained the demurrer, concluding that the alleged facts did not demonstrate that the Town had made a “permanent appointment” of Plaintiff as Building Official. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to survive a demurrer and to permit the reasonable inference that he was permanently appointed as the Building Official for the Town. Remanded. View "Hale v. Town of Warrenton" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Appellee, her former employer, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville. The trial court sustained Appellee’s demurrer, which alleged that there were no sufficient allegations of a true public policy violation. Appellant then filed an amended complaint asserting a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman based on allegations that Appellee wrongfully discharged her in violation of the public policy embodied in Va. Code 19.2-152.7:1 through 19.2-152.10. The trial court sustained Appellee’s amended demurrer with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the amended complaint filed by Appellant failed to state a claim for wrongful termination under Bowman, the circuit court did not err in dismissing it with prejudice. View "Francis v. National Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Virginia Department of State Police (VSP), an agency of the Commonwealth, under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) alleging that he was denied a promotion because of his service in the United States Army Reserves. The trial court granted the VSP’s plea of sovereign immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s USERRA claim, concluding that the VSP could not be sued on a federal right of action in state court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly held that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s USERRA claim against the VSP. View "Clark v. Virginia Department of State Police" on Justia Law

After Frances Robinson was fired from her employment with the Salvation Army, she filed a wrongful termination suit alleging that she was terminated for refusing requests from her store manager to engage in fornication. Robbins claimed common law wrongful termination for refusing to commit fornication and contended that the fornication statute, Va. Code Ann. 18.2-344, remained viable as a basis for her common law wrongful termination claim despite the ruling in Martin v. Ziherl that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Salvation Army. Robinson appealed, asking the Supreme Court to find that section 18.2-344 provides the basis for a valid public policy ground to support her Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville claim for wrongful termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 18.2-344 does not support a public policy Bowman claim for wrongful termination in this case; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Salvation Army. View "Robinson v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff, a member of the United States Army Reserve, was hired by the Roanoke County Sheriff’s Office (the Sheriff) as a deputy sheriff. In 2009, Plaintiff was deployed to Afghanistan, where she suffered physical and psychological injuries. In 2011, Plaintiff returned from Afghanistan and was rehired by the Sheriff. The Sheriff later terminated Plaintiff’s employment in 2013 due to her inability to return to work in a full-time capacity. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging (1) the Sheriff failed properly to reemploy Plaintiff and failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her disability in violation of 38 U.S.C. 4313, and (2) the Sheriff was required to allow Plaintiff a two-year convalescence period before terminating her employment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 4312. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff, concluding that sections 4312 and 4313 were inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims because they apply only until the moment of reemployment and because the Sheriff rehired Plaintiff in the same position that she had left during her deployment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sections 4312 and 4313 afford returning service members protection only during the act of rehiring, and because the Sheriff promptly rehired Plaintiff upon her return from deployment, summary judgment was proper. View "Huff v. Winston" on Justia Law