Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in this declaratory judgment suit, holding that a corporate resolution did not authorize the law firm to redeem a departing shareholder's shares on terms unilaterally set by the firm's founders.Under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 21.801 , a professional corporation may redeem corporate shares, which are personal property, if one of three conditions is met. After the firm in this case terminated a shareholder's employment the founders purported to redeem his shares at no cost. The trial court concluded that a resolution generally authorizing the founders to take affirmative action on behalf of the firm unambiguously encompassed redemption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the resolution did not authorize redemption of the departing shareholder's shares on terms dictated by the founders. View "Skeels v. Suder" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting no-evidence summary-judgment motions in this action alleging that Defendants negligently collected, transported, tested, and reported the results of Plaintiff's hair sample used for a drug and alcohol screening, holding that third-party testing entities hired by an employer do not owe a common-law negligence duty to their clients' employees.Plaintiff, a pipefitter, was directed to report to the Houston Area Safety Council to provide hair and urine samples for drug and alcohol screenings. The Safety Council collected the samples and delivered them to Defendant for laboratory testing. Defendant reported that Plaintiff's hair sample tested positive for cocaine and a cocaine metabolite. Subsequent samples tested positive, but Defendant was required to find work with a different employer. Plaintiff later brought this action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the competing factors and well-established tort principles, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a legal duty under the circumstances of this case. View "Houston Area Safety Council, Inc. v. Mendez" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this employment discrimination suit ruling that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and affirming the order of the trial court denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.After Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment Respondent sued for race discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law. Petitioner moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement signed by Respondent when he was hired. Respondent opposed the motion, arguing that the agreement was unconscionable. The trial court denied the motion to compel, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the agreement was unconscionable. View "Houston AN USA, LLC v. Shattenkirk" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying the Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs' conduct was not protected by the Texas Whistleblower Act.Plaintiffs sued HHSC under the Act, alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for their good faith reports about violations of law by HHSC to various law enforcement agencies. HHSC responded by filing a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea and motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' reports of misconduct could not support a Whistleblower Act claim against HHSC. View "Tex. Health & Human Services Comm'n v. Pope" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that neither party had established proper venue in this workers' compensation case, holding that the record adequately demonstrated that venue was mandatory in Dallas County.Tex. Labor Code 410.252(b), a mandatory venue provision governing suits for judicial review of administrative decisions regarding workers' compensation benefits, requires that suit be brought in "the county where the employee resided at the time of the injury." At issue in this case was whether judicial review of the denial of the workers' compensation claim brought by a Texas Tech University offensive lineman who signed a contract to play for the Dallas Cowboys and was injured while attending the team's training camp in California was proper in Travis County, the county to which the insurer sought transfer, or Dallas County. A Dallas County jury found in favor of the plaintiff on his appeal of the denial of his workers' compensation claim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that neither party had established proper venue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff "resided" in Dallas County at the time of his injury, as required by section 410.252(b), and therefore, venue was mandatory in Dallas County. View "Fortenberry v. Great Divide Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court remanded this case stemming from a labor dispute between a union and city, holding that remand was required to establish whether the city complied with Local Government Code Chapter 174's compensation standards.When the City of Houston and the Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Association, Local 341 could not agree to an employment contract the Fire Fighters sued the City for compensation under the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, codified in Chapter 174, claiming that the City failed to meet Chapter 174's compensation standards. Thereafter, the City's voters approved the "pay-parity amendment" amending the City's charter. The Houston Police Officers' Union sued the Fire Fighters seeking a declaration that Chapter 174 preempted the pay-parity amendment, rendering it unenforceable. In the first action, the trial court rejected the constitutional and immunity challenges brought by the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. In the second action, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that state law did not preempt the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the initial suit and reversed as to the second suit, holding (1) Chapter 174 does not violate constitutional separation of powers principles; (2) the Fire Fighters met the prerequisites for seeking Chapter 174 enforcement; and (3) Chapter 174 preempts the pay-parity amendment. View "City of Houston v. Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Ass'n, Local 341" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the company alleged to be a deceased worker's employer and dismissing this vicarious liability case, holding that the court of appeals erred.An oilfield worker was involved in a fatal accident as he was driving to the oilfield drilling site after completing personal errands. At issue was whether the court of appeals erroneously relied upon the "special mission" exception in declining to apply the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for negligence arising from employee travel to and from work. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a personal trip for groceries does not fall within the special mission exception to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's negligent acts while the employee travels to and from work. View "Cameron International Corp. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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In this workplace injury case, the Supreme Court conditionally granted YRC, Inc.'s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying YRC's motion for leave to designate a responsible third party and to grant the motion, holding that YMC's motion was timely, contrary to the trial court's conclusion.Defendants in this case sought to designate Plaintiff's employer as a responsible party sixty-two days before the suit's third trial setting and more than five years the injury. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding (1) the motion was timely filed and pleaded sufficient facts; and (2) there was no applicable limitations period for Plaintiff to join the third-party employer as a defendant on tort cause of action because workers' compensation was his exclusive remedy. View "In re YRC Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Fort Worth in this case brought under the Texas Whistleblower Act, holding that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that they reported a violation of law under the Act.Plaintiffs, two veteran law enforcement officers with the Fort Worth Police Department, brought this action alleging that they were unlawfully disciplined for making a "good faith report of a violation of law" regarding another officer's conduct. The City filed motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege jurisdictional facts necessary to show a waiver of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reported a violation of law under the Whistleblower Act; and (2) therefore, the Act did not waive the City's immunity from suit. View "City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen" on Justia Law