Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A narcotics agent employed by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General reported witnessing a coworker sexually and racially harass a female intern during a work assignment. Following his report, the Office investigated the incident, reprimanded the offending coworker for "unbecoming conduct," but otherwise continued to employ him in a supervisory role. The reporting agent subsequently applied for several promotions and career opportunities, including overtime assignments and specialized training courses, but was repeatedly denied. He alleged that these employment decisions were made in retaliation for his good faith report of harassment and that favoritism within a clique, referred to as a "boys’ club," influenced promotions within the Office.After filing a complaint under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, the agent presented evidence including deposition testimony from coworkers, performance evaluations, and records of denied promotions. The Commonwealth Court, applying the summary relief standard, found that he failed to establish a causal connection between his report and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that the evidence showed he was passed over due to preferential treatment given to members of the "boys’ club," not because of his report, and dismissed his complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the Commonwealth Court erred in granting summary relief. The Supreme Court held that the agent provided sufficient concrete evidence of a causal link between his report and the adverse employment actions, such as testimony that the report "played a role" in promotion decisions and evidence of post-report antagonism. The Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether all elements of a prima facie case under the Whistleblower Law are satisfied, including whether the report concerned a "wrongdoing." View "Adams v. AG" on Justia Law

Several patients sustained work-related injuries and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Their treating physicians, Drs. Purewal and Jalali, wrote prescriptions that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The State Workers’ Insurance Fund, acting as the insurer for the patients’ employers, refused to pay for these prescriptions, arguing that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) barred payment because the physicians had a financial interest in the pharmacy and thus engaged in unlawful self-referrals.A hearing officer from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office addressed the Pharmacy’s fee review applications. The hearing officer found that the Anti-Referral Provision made it unlawful for providers to refer patients for “goods or services” if they had a financial interest in the receiving entity. Relying on state regulations and the federal Stark Law, the hearing officer determined that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services fell within the meaning of “goods or services,” thus denying the Pharmacy’s claims for payment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding that the phrase “goods or services” acted as a catchall, including prescription drugs and professional pharmaceutical services within the self-referral ban.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed these consolidated appeals. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the court held that the Anti-Referral Provision’s prohibition on self-referrals is limited to the eight specifically enumerated categories of services and does not extend to prescription drugs or professional pharmaceutical services. The court reasoned that the statute’s plain language and structure do not support reading “goods or services” as a catchall encompassing unlisted services. The court reversed the Commonwealth Court and remanded for proceedings consistent with its decision. The main holding is that the Anti-Referral Provision does not bar payment for prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services provided under these circumstances. View "700 Pharm. v. Bur of WC" on Justia Law

An individual who was the sole owner and employee of a general contracting business applied for workers’ compensation insurance and later suffered a serious injury while working. After the accident, he claimed to have notified his insurance agent of the injury, but the agent testified that he did not recall being notified until much later, after the statutory notice period had expired. The insurer denied the claim, arguing that the owner did not provide timely notice of his injury, as required by the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.The matter was first heard by a workers’ compensation judge, who credited the agent’s testimony and found that the owner did not provide notice within 120 days, barring his claim under Section 311 of the Act. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed, relying on precedent stating that notice to an insurer is not required and that, since the owner was his own employer, notice was instantaneous. The case was remanded for further findings and the owner was ultimately awarded benefits. The insurer appealed, and the Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that Section 311 requires a sole proprietor to provide notice to the insurer within 120 days, distinguishing the case from prior cases involving corporate forms.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that Section 311 does not require a sole owner-employee to notify the insurer of a work-related injury within 120 days to be eligible for compensation. The Court held that the statutory definition of “employer” does not include the insurer for purposes of the notice requirement in Section 311 and found no ambiguity in the statute justifying a contrary reading. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Erie Insurance Co. v. Heater" on Justia Law

A public employee working for the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services alleged that the union representing her bargaining unit failed to fairly represent her during a workplace grievance process. After being temporarily reassigned during a purported investigation, she lost opportunities for overtime work. She requested the union file a grievance, but claimed the union delayed providing information and failed to adequately pursue her complaint. When she followed up, union officials allegedly made derogatory remarks about her non-membership status and admitted to providing minimal representation. By the time she received notice of the grievance resolution, the period to appeal had expired, and she was dissatisfied with the outcome, believing she was denied proper relief under the collective bargaining agreement.The employee filed suit in the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas against the union, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for breach of the duty of fair representation, but did not request an order for arbitration or join her employer as a party. The trial court granted the union’s preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding the claim for damages legally insufficient. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, holding it was not free from doubt that the employee could seek damages against the union for such a breach.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that, under the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), when a public employee’s claim against a union arises from the union’s handling of a grievance, the employee’s remedy is limited to a court order compelling the union and the employer to arbitrate the grievance nunc pro tunc. Damages against the union are not available in this context, and the public employer is an indispensable party to such proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. View "Gustafson v. American Fed. of State" on Justia Law

Kristina Steets was severely injured in 2017 while working for Celebration Fireworks, Inc. The employer accepted liability for her total disability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) in 2018. In 2019, Steets filed petitions to amend the description of her injuries and sought specific loss benefits. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted her petitions, and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. However, Steets died from her injuries while the Commonwealth Court's decision was pending.Steets' estate filed petitions seeking payment of the specific loss benefits awarded to her, which were still under appellate review at the time of her death. The WCJ denied the Estate's claims beyond funeral expenses, and the WCAB affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, in a split decision, also affirmed, ruling that specific loss benefits did not survive Steets' work-related death based on the precedent set by Estate of Harris v. WCAB (Sunoco, Inc.).The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and overruled Estate of Harris and Burns International Security Services, Inc. v. WCAB (Crist), which had held that Section 306(g) of the WCA was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of a worker. The Court held that Section 410 of the WCA applies, which states that if a claimant dies before the final adjudication of their claim, the compensation due to the claimant up to the date of death shall be paid to the dependents or, if there are no dependents, to the estate. Since Steets died before the final adjudication of her specific loss benefits claim, the employer was required to pay those benefits to her estate. The case was remanded to the WCJ to determine the amount of specific loss benefits due to the Estate. View "Steets v. Celebration Fireworks" on Justia Law

Mark R. Schmidt, a workers' compensation attorney, sustained a work-related injury while loading files into a trial bag. His treatment included pain management with medications like OxyContin and Oxycodone. To avoid increasing his medication dosage, his physician, Dr. Murphy, prescribed CBD oil. Schmidt purchased CBD oil and lotion over the counter and used them as directed. He sought reimbursement from his employer, Schmidt, Kirifides and Rassias, PC, for the CBD oil costs, which the employer refused, arguing that CBD oil is not a pharmaceutical drug.A Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted Schmidt's penalty petition, ordering the employer to reimburse him for the CBD oil costs. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversed this decision, stating that Schmidt did not follow the necessary rules for reimbursement and that CBD oil is not a "supply" under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) due to the lack of FDA approval. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board's decision, concluding that CBD oil is a "medicine" or "supply" under the WCA and that Schmidt, not being a provider, was not required to submit standard billing forms for reimbursement.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that any item prescribed by a health care provider as part of a treatment plan for a work-related injury falls within the meaning of "medicines and supplies" under Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the WCA. The court also held that the cost containment provisions of the WCA and related regulations do not apply to claimants who are not providers. Therefore, Schmidt was entitled to reimbursement for the CBD oil costs, and the Commonwealth Court's order was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias" on Justia Law

Jennifer Jackiw, while working for Soft Pretzel Franchise, sustained an injury that led to the amputation of her right forearm. The employer acknowledged liability, and at the time of the injury, Jackiw's average weekly wage was $322.05. The parties agreed that the injury was a "specific loss" under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, entitling her to a healing period of up to 20 weeks followed by 370 weeks of compensation. However, they disagreed on how to calculate the weekly benefit amount for the 370 weeks.A workers' compensation judge (WCJ) concluded that Jackiw's benefit should be calculated according to the formula for total disability under Section 306(a) of the Act. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed this decision, despite acknowledging arguments that the specific-loss benefits should be calculated differently. The WCAB felt bound by the Commonwealth Court's decision in Walton v. Cooper Hosiery Co., which had interpreted the Act to harmonize benefits for specific loss and total disability.The Commonwealth Court, in a divided en banc panel, affirmed the WCAB's decision, applying the rule of stare decisis and agreeing with the interpretation in Walton. The dissenting judges argued that the statutory text provided more generous benefits for specific-loss injuries than for total disability without the loss of a body part.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the correct statutory formula for calculating workers' compensation benefits for the loss of a body part. The court concluded that the plain text of the statute indicated that specific-loss benefits should be calculated under Section 306(c), not Section 306(a). The court vacated the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackiw v. Soft Pretzel Franchise" on Justia Law

William Herold worked for the University of Pittsburgh as a stationary engineer from 1976 to 2004, during which he was exposed to asbestos. He later became a foreman, a position without asbestos exposure, and retired in 2015. In 2019, Herold was diagnosed with mesothelioma, attributed to his asbestos exposure, and he died in 2022. His estate filed a common law negligence action against the University and other defendants in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.The trial court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) provided the exclusive remedy for Herold’s claim. The court found that Herold’s mesothelioma, manifesting more than four years after his last exposure, was not compensable under the ODA. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the ODA’s exclusivity provision did not apply to Herold’s non-compensable claim, allowing the common law action to proceed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ODA’s exclusivity provision barred Herold’s common law action. The Court held that the ODA’s exclusivity provision extends only to claims asserting compensable disability or death, defined as occurring within four years of the last employment. Since Herold’s mesothelioma manifested beyond this period, the exclusivity provision did not apply, and the common law action was permissible. The Court also determined that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require the claim to be adjudicated by the workers’ compensation authorities, as the issues were not complex or technical.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, allowing the common law negligence action to proceed in the trial court. View "In Re: Estate of W. Herold" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Ursinus College utilized financing from the Montgomery County Health and Higher Education Authority (Authority) to undertake a construction project. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 98 (IBEW) asserted that this project was a public work under the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act (PWA), which would require workers on the project to receive prevailing minimum wages. The court was tasked with determining whether this project constituted a public work under the PWA. The court found that the project was not a public work as defined in the PWA, as the funds for the project did not come from a public body. Rather, the Authority served as a conduit for financing, with private funds generated from the Authority's ability to issue bonds being used to pay for the project. The Authority did not hold or disburse these funds, nor did it bear any risk or liability with respect to the repayment of the bonds. Therefore, the court held that the project was not subject to the PWA's prevailing wage requirements. View "Ursinus College v. Prevailing Wage Appeals Board" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called upon to determine whether the ascension of an unclassified service employee to a classified service position with higher pay with the same public employer is a promotion under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA). The case arose when Ralph E. Lynn, a classified service employee, and Aaron Novotnak, an unclassified service employee, both veterans, applied for a classified service position with the Department of Corrections (DOC). The Office of Administration (OA) deemed the position a promotion for Lynn and did not apply veterans’ preference, while it deemed the position an appointment for Novotnak and applied veterans’ preference. The DOC selected Novotnak for the position, and Lynn appealed to the State Civil Service Commission.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the ascension of an unclassified service employee to a classified service position with higher pay with the same public employer is not a promotion under the CSRA and the VPA, but rather an appointment. Therefore, it is not discriminatory under section 2704 of the CSRA to award a veterans’ preference to an unclassified service employee seeking an appointment but not to a classified service employee seeking a promotion. The court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court in part and reversed in part. The court ruled that Lynn was not entitled to veterans’ preference as he was seeking a promotion, not an appointment. However, Lynn will remain in his position due to a separate issue of technical discrimination that was not reviewed by the court. View "Department of Corrections v. Lynn" on Justia Law