Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that one need not be prejudiced to be an "adversely affected" party, as that phrase is used in Ohio Rev. Code 119.12(I), holding that the phrase "adversely affected" as used in the statute imposes a prejudice requirement.After the State Personnel Board of Review ordered that Kristy Goudy be reinstated to her position at the Tuscarawas County Public Defender's Office, the public defender's office appealed. The personnel board, however, failed timely to certify a complete record. It subsequently corrected the error and certified the remainder of the record outside the allotted time. The court of common pleas ruled that the public defender's office was not an adversely affected party because the delay in certifying the record did not cause any prejudice to the office. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that section 119.12(I) does not contain a prejudice requirement; and (2) prejudice was not shown in this case. View "Goudy v. Tuscarawas County Public Defender" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Appellant temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation after sustaining a work injury, holding that the Commission's order was neither unsupported by evidence in the record nor was it contrary to law.Appellant gave Appellee two weeks' notice of her intention to resign and subsequently sustained a work injury. The Commission awarded Appellant TTD compensation. The court of appeals granted a writ ordering the Commission to reverse its decision because Appellant had resigned from her employment prior to her injury. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the decision in Klein did not redefine voluntary abandonment of the workforce as voluntary abandonment of the injured worker's position; and (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that, but for her work injury, Appellant would have remained gainfully employed. View "State ex rel. Ohio State University v. Pratt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4117.11(B)(7) does not violate the First Amendment, holding that the statute's prohibition on inducing or encouraging targeted picketing in connection with a labor-relations dispute violates the First Amendment.Section 4117.11(B)(7) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee organization or public employees to "induce or encourage any individual in connection with a labor relations dispute to picket the residence or any place of private employment of any public official or representative of the public employer.” The common pleas court in this case rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute, ruling that section 4117.11(B)(7) was a valid, content-neutral time, place and manner limitation on speech. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law was a form of expressive-activity suppression that was irreconcilable with First Amendment protections. View "Portage County Educators Ass'n for Developmental Disabilities v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ordering the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation to return the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional Council of Governments (OKI) to its previous classifications after reclassifying OKI as a "special public authority," holding that the Bureau abused its discretion.The Bureau assigns each Ohio employer to a classification, for purposes of setting workers' compensation premium rates, based on the degree of hazard presented in the employer's business. While the Bureau had long assigned OKI to classifications applicable to private employers, in 2018 the Bureau reclassified OKI as a type of public-employer taxing district resulting in a higher premium. OKI sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Bureau to return it to its previous classifications, but the court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed and granted a limited writ of mandamus, holding that it was insufficient for the Bureau to simply consider OKI to be a public employer and a taxing district without making further explanation. View "State ex rel. Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Region of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its decision granting a specific safety requirement (VSSR) award to Josue Morales, holding that Target Auto Repair failed to establish plain error in the proceedings below.Morales sustained injuries while working as a technician for Target Auto Repair. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for multiple conditions. The Commission further granted Morales's application for a VSSR award in the amount of fifty percent of the maximum weekly rate. Target Auto Repair subsequently brought this mandamus action. The court of appeals denied the mandamus request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Target Auto Repair may not appeal the court of appeals' adoption of findings of fact or conclusions of law to which it failed timely to object. View "State ex rel. Target Auto Repair v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that some evidence supported the determination of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation that Appellant, an underground cable installation provider, had misclassified its workers as independent contractors rather than as employees for workers' compensation purposes, holding that there was no error.The Bureau determined that cable installers who Appellant had characterized as independent contractors were Appellant's employees for purposes of Ohio's workers' compensation program. Appellant requested a writ of mandamus ordering vacated of the Bureau's decision. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that some evidence supported the Board's determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish its entitlement to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Ugicom Enterprises, Inc. v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals compelling the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) to reverse its denial of Appellant's application for disability benefits, holding that there was no error.After sustaining a fall while working for the state as a highway technician Appellant applied to OPERS for disability benefits. OPERS denied Powell's application. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the Tenth District to issue a writ compelling OPERS to reverse its denial of his application. The Tenth District found that OPERS's decision was supported by some evidence in the record and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported OPERS's decision, and Appellant did not establish that any evidence should have been excluded from OPERS's consideration. View "State ex rel. Powell v. Ohio Public Employees Retirement System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus compelling the Ohio Industrial Commission to vacate its orders rejecting a proposed settlement between Employee and Employer, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Employee suffered a work-related injury, and his workers' compensation claim was allowed. Employee applied for an award of additional compensation due to Employer's alleged violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs). Employer and Employee subsequently submitted a proposed settlement for approval by the Commission. A staff hearing officer rejected the settlement as neither fair nor equitable and then granted Employee's request for a VSSR award. Employer sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Commission to vacate its orders and approve the settlement, but the court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer's three propositions of law are rejected. View "State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting temporary total disability (TTD) compensation to Bridget Moss and then granted a limited writ, holding that the Commissioner must reconsider this case under the proper standard, as articulated in this opinion.Moss's employer, Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. (Ryan) sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order and deny TTD compensation because Moss had refused an offer of alternative employment within her medical restrictions. The Tenth District granted the writ. At issue on appeal was whether the Commission may award TTD compensation if an employee refuses an offer of alternative employment in good faith based on family circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth district's judgment and granted a limited writ, holding that the Commission's orders exhibited confusion about the correct standard under which the employer's good faith standard was to be determined. View "State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Cincinnati to promote Jay Johnstone to the rank of captain, with backpay, holding that the trial court erred.Johnstone requested to be allowed to participate in a process to be promoted to the position of captain in the City's police department. After an examination, Johnstone was not promoted. Johnstone filed a petition seeking a writ of mandamus, which the trial court issued. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a municipal civil service commission may require that a police officer other than a patrol officer serve more than twelve months in the officer's current rank as a condition for being promoted to a higher rank. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124.44 does not allow a municipal civil service commission to require that a police officer other than a patrol officer serve more than twelve months in the officer's current rank as a condition for promotion. View "State ex rel. Johnstone v. Cincinnati" on Justia Law