Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

After he retired, Robert Marmaduke filed a disability-benefit application with the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund (OP&F). Finding that Marmaduke was permanently and partially disabled, the Disability Evaluation Panel recommended awarding Marmaduke a permanent-partial disability benefit. Marmaduke appealed, but the OP&F’s board of trustees reaffirmed its award of a permanent-partial disability benefit. The court of appeals affirmed the board’s determination that Marmaduke was entitled to a permanent-partial, rather than permanent-total, disability benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OP&F did not abuse its discretion in awarding Marmaduke a permanent-partial disability benefit. View "State ex rel. Marmaduke v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Manuel Perez was injured while working in the construction industry and was awarded temporary-total-disability compensation. Prior to his injury, Perez owned and was operating an auto-repair business. Years later, the Industrial Commission of Ohio determined that Perez was overpaid temporary-total-disability compensation for more than four years and that he committed fraud in applying for it. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission’s finding of an overpayment and dismissed the fraud finding for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion (1) in finding that Perez had been overpaid compensation while operating his auto-repair business; and (2) when it concluded that the evidence supported a finding of fraud. View "State ex rel. Perez v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Michael Onderko was terminated from Sierra Lobo, Inc. for his “deceptive” attempt to obtain workers’ compensation benefits for a “non-work-related injury,” Onderko filed a complaint against Sierra Lobo, alleging retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sierra Lobo on the grounds that Onderko failed to prove that his injury occurred at the workplace. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a workplace injury is not a required element of a retaliatory discharge claim under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under section 4123.90 does not require a showing that the plaintiff suffered a workplace injury; and (2) failure to appeal the denial of a workers’ compensation claim does not foreclose a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 4123.90. View "Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc." on Justia Law

As the result of an audit, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reclassified some of Aaron’s Inc.’s employees for purposes of workers’ compensation premiums, applied the reclassifications retroactively, and billed Aaron’s for more than $2 million in back premiums. Aaron’s filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing adequately to explain why it decided to apply the reclassifications retroactively and not solely prospectively as Aaron’s had advocated. The administrator’s designee concluded that the Bureau properly exercised its discretion to apply the reclassification retroactively. Aaron’s subsequently filed the instant complaint seeking a writ of mandamus regarding the order of the administrator’s designee. A magistrate concluded that the administrator’s designee appropriately exercised his discretion in ordering the reclassifications to be applied retroactively. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it applied the audit adjustment to the twenty-four months prior to the current payroll period. View "State ex rel. Aaron's, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

Steve Maddox and eight other named relators (collectively, Maddox) brought this original action in mandamus against the village of Lincoln Heights and several of the village’s officials (collectively, the village). Maddox alleged that several classes of people who work for or have worked for the village had not been provided employee benefits owed to them and requested a writ directing the village to provide the withheld benefits. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement consisting of money payments to class members. The Supreme Court referred the case to mediation, with instructions for the parties to attempt an out-of-court settlement without court approval, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to preside over this monetary settlement because no class had yet been certified and nothing prevented the parties from settling the case without the approval of the Court. View "State ex rel. Maddox v. Village of Lincoln Heights" on Justia Law

After the mayor of Streetsboro resigned, Arthur Scott was appointed to serve as acting mayor. Five months later, Scott was elected to serve for the remainder of the former mayor’s term. Following his reelection, Scott filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that he was underpaid for his service as mayor and acting mayor and that he was entitled to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Streetsboro. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant Scott’s motion to strike several documents that Streetsboro attached to its response to Scott’s motion for summary judgment; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro regarding Scott’s entitlement to additional pay for his service as acting mayor and as the elected mayor of the city; but (3) erred in granting summary judgment to Streetsboro as to Scott’s entitlement to compensation for unused vacation, sick, and personal leave. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Streetsboro" on Justia Law

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

Marcus Pryor applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment compensation. The director of ODJFS concluded that Pryor was ineligible for benefits. A hearing officer with the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The Commission denied Pryor’s request to review the hearing officer’s findings. Pryor filed an appeal in the common pleas court naming the director of ODJFS as the appellee but failing to name the Army, Pryor’s former employer, as a party to his appeal. The common pleas court dismissed the appeal, finding that because Pryor failed to name the Army was an interested party, his notice of appeal did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 4141.282(D), thus depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court’s dismissal of Pryor’s appeal and reinstated Pryor’s administrative appeal in the common pleas court, ruling that Pryor’s failure to name the Army was not a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the naming of interested parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under section 4141.282; but (2) the Commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements in section 4141.282(D), and therefore, Pryor’s time to appeal the Commission’s decision never started to run. Remanded. View "Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Daniel Stolz worked for a subcontractor on a construction project when he was injured in an accident on the job site. Prior to the accident, Messer had obtained authority from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to act as the self-insuring employer on the project, which gave Messer responsibility for providing workers’ compensation coverage for its own employees as well as the employees of enrolled subcontractors on the project. Stolz brought negligence claims against Messer Construction, the general contractor, and several subcontractors. A federal district court granted summary judgment to Messer as the self-insuring employer but denied summary judgment to the subcontractors, concluding that an enrolled subcontractor on a self-insured construction project is immune from claims made by its own employees but not from those made by employees of other enrolled subcontractors. The federal court then certified a question of state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that subcontractors enrolled in a self-insured construction project plan are immune from tort claims for workplace injuries from employees of other enrolled subcontractors on the same project. View "Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Boyd retired from Scotts Miracle-Gro Company in 1983. Boyd received workers’ compensation benefits in 2005 for asbestosis in both lungs. In 2013, Boyd applied for permanent-total-disability benefits. A staff hearing officer at the Industrial Commission denied Boyd’s application. Boyd then filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus that would require the Commission to vacate its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Boyd’s complaint in mandamus failed where Boyd failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by any evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. Boyd v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co." on Justia Law